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1.1 What will a market economy do to income
distribution in China?
It is curious, indeed, that while most economies over the world stagnate, the socialist
Chinese economy has been growing noticeably in recent years. Economists and others
attribute the achievement to the market-oriented reform started in 1978 in China. At
present, the reform is on track, but the fact remains that China still has a long way to
go from a market economy. The government, for example, still owns the majority of
production inputs and factories and controls the main part of the economy. Just how
far away, then, is the current economy from a market economy? In what other ways
will the market reform impact the Chinese economy? To answer these questions, this
study attempts to model a hypothetical market economy in China, based on modern
economic theory. The model is computable, and its solutions reflect market economy
features-particularly profit maximization.
To narrow down the examination, this study chooses one aspect of the economy,
focussing on the issue of personal income distribution. This particular issue was cho-
sen because the influence of the reform on income distribution has been remained one
of the most ambiguous problems in the Chinese economy. Discussions on the topic
have centered around three questions: What is the current situation with regard to
personal income distribution? How will the situation change with the economic refor-
m? Finally, is the distribution equitable? While the first and second questíons seek
to describe the problem, the third question delves into the welfare aspect of personal
income distribution. This piece of research works entirely on the first two questions,
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and has nothing to do with the third one. In that sense, this is positive rather than
normative research. It does not explore the optimal distributive patterns and policies.
Rather, it is meant to describe the generation and distribution of income. The study
investigates the income distribution in order to answer to the following questions:
What are income differences between geographical regions, between economic areas,
and between social classes in the current markets and in the hypothetical competitive
markets in China? Compared to the current economy, will the income inequality in
the market economy increase or decrease? Who will be the beneficiaries?
Research into income distribution has formed two branches: the functional in-
come branch, which deals with income distribution to production factors, and the
personal income distribution branch, which deals with income distribution among
persons. Traditionally, the two branches are isolated. Personal income, of course,
was approached by personal characteristics such as age, sexy, chance, genetic ability,
education, saving propensities, bequests, inheritance, etc., which were not related to
economic structures. The isolation of personal income distribution from functional
income distribution has held back research on personal income distribution. Recently,
the branch of personal income distribution tends to go in a new direction: personal
income is approached from an economic point of view that holds that economic funda-
mentals determine income. This approach connects functional with personal income
distribution. It is difficult to reconcile the two different regimes of income distribution,
but recent developments in economic modelling have shed new light on this possibili-
ty. In particular, since 1970s a number of applications on developing economies have
explored the field.' This research is one such attempt. Its idea is as follows: Personal
income is accounted for by the ownership and prices of personal endowments. Given
fixed ownership, personal income depends on the prices of endowments. According
to neo-classical theory on functional income distribution, in competitive markets, the
marginal productivity of a resource determines its price. In turn, once resource prices
are known, personal income becomes traceable. Therefore, the core of this study is to
discover a benchmark distribution of income in a competitive economy. First it will
construct and solve a general equilibrium framework in which competitive wage and
rental rates are generated according to the marginal productivity of labor and capital
in competitive markets. Subsequently, the study will transform the functional to the
personal income distribution.
1For a broad review, see Dervis et al. (1982), and Shoven and Whalley (1992).
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The general equilibrium model in this research is constructed as follows. China is
considered to be an integrated economy, with trade connections with the rest of the
world. However, international trade is fixed - it is considered as a kind of external
source. The objective of this economy is to maximize its overall domestic final uses.
China has 30 provinces, each of which is an independent economy. This research clas-
sifies each provincial economy into 30 commodity and service sectors. Trade between
provinces is completely free, and 29 commodities are considered to be tradable, while
public administration is considered to be nontradable, based on the observation of
trade account that all provinces have no exports and imports in this commodity.2
Production and services have inputs of intermediate products, labor and capital.
According to the traditional approach, fixed capital is an immobile factor. In the
model, it is assumed to be sector specific, which means that each sector uses a specific
type of capital. The model classifies labor by skill level into four types, namely
unskilled, skilled, manager and technician. Theoretically, in the competitive markets
in which agents are utility-driven, labor is a mobile factor. This model incorporates
three types of labor motions: substitution from high to low skill, moving among
sectors, and migration among regions. According to human capital theory, different
skilled labor matches different marginal productivity, higher skilled labor is able to
replace lower skilled labor. This kind of substitution can be easily observed from
real markets - a mathematician is doing a programmer's job, an engineer becomes
a department manager, and so on. The model considers a hierarchy of substitution
in the sense that a technician is able to substitute for the other three, a manager is
able to substitute for skilled and unskilled, and skilled worker is able to substitute
only for unskilled worker. Moreover, labor motion among sectors is a more common
phenomena in the markets. The model allows labor to be freely mobile among sectors
by introducing the incentive to seek for more income. However, migration is a complex
matter, because while migration brings income gains, it also involves some losses to
the migrant. For example, hometown loss is one of the most important concerns. In
most people's opinion, the hometown's utility is the one that cannot be matched by
a certain amount of increase in income. Because of the fact and also the concern that
specific investigation on all kinds of migration utility gains and losses may drive the
research too far away from the mainstream, this model simply assumes that labor
prefers any non-zero low income to migration. This means that as long as a worker
ZProvincial input-output tables in China, 1992.
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can earn some income, he~she will not migrate to seek for more. In the model, because
of the substitutive effect, skilled workers, if losing their jobs, will prefer occupying low
positions to migrating. Unskilled workers have no room for substitution, and therefore
have to migrate if their work becomes redundant in local markets. Therefore, in the
model, technicians, managers and skilled workers are considered to be mobile between
sectors within a province, while unskilled workers are mobile all over China.
The empirics of this research solve the model on the basis of real data on the
Chinese economy in 1992. The results simulate a competitive set-up of the Chinese
economy, where competition drives resources to be allocated optimally, forces some
sectors to be cut back or eliminated, and stimulates some sectors to expand. As
a result, the competitive economy is an efficient one; the difference from the cur-
rent markets therefore measures the inefficiency in the current economy. The most
important result for this research is that the empirics expose the functional income
distribution in the competitive markets; when resources are fully employed, they are
valued by the marginal products, which equal to the efFicient rental and wage rates.
5ubsequently, given ownership of resources, the personal income distribution emerges
under perfectly competitive conditions.
In practice, personal income distribution is often investigated with respect to in-
come inequality. There are many methods proposed to measure income inequality
numerically, but different measures may yield different conclusions. In theory, none of
these measures can be superior over all others, because each of them has its own spe-
cific purpose, meaning and use. This research adopts Theil's index to measure income
inequality. Theil's index has nice properties, particularly its additive decomposition
ability and monotonity over group inequalities. However, note that Theil's index does
not directly suit this research, because it approaches the within-group inequality by
exogenous statistical distribution. The empirics in this research avoid depending on
any exogenous estimations on income distribution within the group, and therefore
develop Theil's index into an extended form that includes multiple groupings until all
within-group inequalities disappear and overall inequality is the sum of all between-
group inequalities. As a result, the extended Theil's index provides more systematic
information on income inequality than the original one.
The empirics apply the extended Theil's index to measure income inequality in
both the current and the hypothetical competitive Chinese economy. The applications
investigate income inequality to the extent that the overall inequality, the inequality
between social classes, in and between areas, and in and between regions, are all
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revealed. The former application has two purposes: identification and clarification.
Income inequality has been studied intensively during the reform period in China,
but so far there exist few systematic and consistent studies and conclusions on the
topic. The application investigating the current situation of income inequality is a
new attempt, which is expected to present systematic and consistent information.
Although many conclusions on income inequality have been drawn by other research,
they are often contradictory and controversial. This application is used to examine
the conclusions from other research. Some of the conclusions are compatible with
them, others are not. Of importance, however, is that the application serves as a
comparison with the income inequality in competitive markets. The latter application
aims to reveal the impact of competition on income inequality, and to further point
out the winners and losers.
The main ideas of this research are as follows. First, as opposed to traditional
theories on the size distribution of income, this research follows the new direction
of approaching the size distribution of income in connection with the functional in-
come distribution. The analysis is based on neo-classical theory, which says that in
competitive markets, the marginal productivity of resources determines their prices.
Once the prices are known, personal income becomes traceable. Second, this research
simulates a full market economy by constructing a general equilibrium model, which
differs from other models in that it specifically considers China as an integrated e-
conomy in which competition occures between China's provincial economies and their
sectors. In addition, the model allows for the substitution from high to low skilled
labor and the migration of unskilled labor, and considers fixed capital to be sector-
specific. The hypothetical Chinese market economy will eliminate the inefficiency of
labor misallocation in the current economy and reveal the efficient functional income
distribution, which is then transformed into personal income distribution. Third, this
research develops an extended form of Theil's index, using this to investigate the in-
come inequalities in the current and the hypothetical Chinese economy, respectively.
Finally, conclusions are drawn, based on the comparison of income inequalities in the
competitive markets and in the current markets.
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1.2 The outline of the thesis
The thesis comprises the three parts of economics: theory, modelling and empirical
analysis. The theoretical part is presented in chapters 2 and 3; chapter 2 develops a
theory of income distribution, while chapter 3 considers the measure of personal in-
come distribution. Chapters 5 and 6 introduce and present the model, which simulates
functional income distribution in competitive markets. Empirics are covered in two
separate chapters: the current Chinese economy in Chapter 4, and the hypothetical
competitive Chinese economy in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes the research.
Chapter 2, which sets up a theoretical basis for this research, attempts to answer
the following questions: How is income defined? To whom is income imputed? Where
does income come from? How is the final income formed? Finally, what causes
differences in the distribution of personal income?
Income can be studied from two angles: its sources or its uses. With regard to
its sources, income is the sum of wages, salaries, interest, rents, dividends, pension-
s, various subsidies and allowances, donations, support payments, and inheritances.
With regard to its uses, income consists of consumption, saving, investment, taxes,
and bequests. Taubman (1978) maintains that a comprehensive income should also
include nonmarket activities such as income imputed to owner-occupied houses, the
value of self-provided goods and services, and capital gain on assets. Theoretically,
as Simon (1938) defined, income is the sum of the market value of rights exercised in
consumption, and the change in value of the store of property rights between the be-
ginning and end of a certain períod. Practically, however, this research defines income
from its sources: it is the sum of earnings, rents, subsidies, and inheritance (where
the earnings represent wages and salaries, the rents include interest and dividends,
the subsidies consist of pensions and other allowances, and the inheritance contains
donations and support payments).
With respect to functional income distribution, income recipients are factors. With
respect to personal income distribution, income recipients are persons. In both theory
and practice, the `persons' may refer to either households, families or individuals. This
research chooses the individuals as income recipients to classify the persons precisely.
According to income sources, there are wages, rent, subsidy, and inheritance receivers.
Under certain circumstances, the four types of receiver may overlap. For example,
a low-income earner may also receive subsidies for living; a rent receiver may work
for wages as second income source. Yet, subsidy, as a form of transfer income, has
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not been broadly applied to other groups of people except for the retiree. Because
this research focusses particularly on the Chinese economy, in which few people have
multiple income sources, it ignores the overlapping by assuming that each person has
only one income source. In particular, the person who receives wages is called `labor',
the person obtaining rents is `capitalist', the person who depends on subsidies is
`transfer income dependant', and the person relying on inheritance is `family income
dependant'. Labor as a group is divided further into unskilled, skilled, manager
and technician according to skill level. The transfer income dependant is specific
to retiree. The family income dependant comprise junior, senior, unemployment,
disability, housework, and student.
Although personal income is observed with three sources (namely primary, trans-
fer, and family income flow), the original source is the primary income. Both transfer
and family income are, in fact, the redistribution of primary income. Neo-classical e-
conomists have concluded that primary income is generated in production. According
to neo-classical theory on functional income distribution, factors extract income from
the production in which they participate; since labor and capital are the principal
factors, labor receives earnings and capital gains rents. The earnings and rents there-
fore constitute primary income. In an economic system, income distribution does not
end at the primary stage, but is distributed further. Transfer income is formed with
taxation and other forms of charges collected by public sectors, mainly over primary
income. Family income comes from the primary income earner in family. The entire
procedure of income distribution therefore consists of three times distribution: pri-
mary, transfer and family income distribution. After the three distributions, everyone
has their final disposable income.
Final income is different between persons. In reality, it is difficult to explain the
difference in personal income. 5o many factors influence income, and some factors are
not understood, or have even been observed, yet. In theory, however, it is possible
to approach income difference. According to neo-classical economics, under perfect
competition, resources are valued by marginal productivity. The difference in the
marginal productivity of resources therefore causes the difference in wage and rental
rates. Given the ownership of capital, functional income can be transformed into per-
sonal primary income, thus exposing the difference in primary income. Furthermore,
if data on public transfer programs are available, the difference in transfer income
can be calculated. Using the assumption that income is shared within the family, and
combining this with basic knowledge on family structure, family income difference can
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be derived. Finally, the difference in final income is revealed.
This research is an application based on the above theoretical structure. It models
a hypothetical competitive economy to generate functional income distribution under
perfect competition. By observing capital ownership in a real economy, the application
transforms functional income into personal primary income. For simplicity, when the
application investigates transfer income distribution, it uses the observed program of
public transfer that specifies that the retiree is the sole receiver of transfer income,
and that the retirees' income is the mean of working people's earning. When deriving
family income, the application employs the observed dependency ratio, which is the
dependency population over the working population. After having obtained the final
income of persons in a competitive economy, the application uses inequality measures
to evaluate the distribution of personal income.
A quantitative measurement of income inequality is important for the study of
personal income distribution, as it provides explicit and precise information to reveal
the ranking of income distributions. Chapter 3 is therefore devoted to finding out a
proper measure that best suits the need of this research. Sen (1972) and Kakwani
(1980) have summarized various popular measures such as the Relative mean devi-
ation, Variance, CoefFicient of variation, Variance of logarithms, Standard deviation
of logarithms, Gini coefl~icient, Theil's index, Dalton's measure, Atkinson's measure,
Sen's measure, etc.. Among these, it is hard to select one as better than the oth-
ers, because each of them has special explanation on income inequality. However,
through plenty of work on theory and practice, economists have realized that some
measures may not be qualified, and have proposed that a qualified measure of income
inequality should possess certain properties. In general, four properties are consid-
ered to be essential: the Pigou-Dalton income transfer principle, Symmetry, Income
homogeneity, and Population homogeneity. Certain research recommends Additive
decomposability as an important property. Foster (1983) proved that Theil's index
was the only one satisfying all five properties. Shorrocks (1988 ) found out that the
additive decomposability of Theil's index had the particularly interesting property of
subgroup monotonity.
Normally, Theil's index consists of a between-group and a within-group inequality.
While the between-group inequality is accounted, the within-group inequality is ob-
tained by assuming a distribution form. This dependence on the assumed or observed
distribution within groups restricts the direct application of Theil's index. Because
additive decomposability can be used to study between-group inequality, this research
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develops an extended form of Theil's index, in which the total inequality of Theil's
index is the sum of a number of between-group inequalities - while the within-group
inequality is zero. With the extended Theil's index, the population of individuals
are classified into different income intervals for several times; the number of the clas-
sification times should be no less than the number of types of income-determining
factors, so that the individuals in same group have identical income. This method, in
fact, breaks down total inequality into various between-group inequalities and leaves
within-group inequality to be zero. The extended Theil's index is used to measure in-
come inequality in the current Chinese economy in Chapter 4, and in the hypothetical
competitive Chinese economy in Chapter 7.
This research attempts to shed light on how the hypothetical competitive market
in China differs from the current situation in terms of personal income distribution.
Important, in the first place, is a good understanding of the current distribution of
personal income in China. Chapter 4 investigates the current situation of income
inequality in China by using the extended form of Theil's index developed in Chapter
3. This work is meaningful in three aspects. First, it presents systematic and detailed
information on income inequality, which has not been provided by other research
before. Second, compared with the conclusions provided by other research, the results
of this work will add some new comments on the current income inequality in China.
Third, the results will be used in a comparison with the hypothetical situation of
income inequality in the competitive Chinese economy.
Chapter 4 measures income inequality regarding the real economic situation in
China. China is still an agricultural country; the majority of the population resides
in rural areas, and there is an obvious distinction between the rural and the urban
economies. For this reason, income inequality in general is investigated with respect to
three aspects: inequality in rural areas, in urban areas, and between rural and urban
areas. It is conjectured that rural China has more income inequality than urban
China. Much research has supported this reasoning. The State Statistical Bureau
calculated that the Gini coefficient was 0.236 for urban areas in 1987. Zhu and Wen
(1990) calculated the national Gini coeíficient for rural areas in 1988 as 0.3014. Griffin
et al. (1994) calculated that the Gini coefl~icients were 0.334 in rural areas and 0.233
in urban areas in 1988. Wang et al. (1995) found that the Gini coefficients were 0.331
in rural areas and 0.242 in urban areas in 1993. Income inequality between rural
and urban areas has been observed commonly to be significant. By comparing the
difference in mean income between rural and urban areas from 1978 to 1994, Wang et
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al. (1995) concluded that income inequality between urban and rural areas in China
was showing an increasing trend.
A vast country, China consists of a number of regions. It ís necessary, therefore,
to investigate personal income distribution for each province. Because each province
is a relatively independent and integrated economy, income levels and structures may
differ from province to province. So far, research on this topic has yielded few sys-
tematic results. Zhu and Wen (1990) and Grifbn et al. (1994) calculated the rural
Gini coefficients in 1988 for each province. Their results did not show a systematic
relationship between rural economic development and income inequality. Griffin, et
al. (19941 calculated the urban Gini coefficients for ten provinces. They found a
similar conclusion as for rural inequality. In addition, they concluded that income
inequality in urban areas is in general lower than income inequality in rural areas
within provinces. Very little work has been done on measuring the income inequality
between provinces. The work of Griffiin et al. (1994) yielded no explicit result. Eco-
nomic development is unbalanced in China; the east coast is developed, the middle of
the country less developed, and the western part under developed. Yang (1992) used
the Mean deviation to calculate the income inequality within and between the three
parts. He concluded that the eastern part had the highest inequality, the western part
the second highest, and the middle part the lowest. Also, the income in the eastern
part was significantly different from the income in the middle and western part, while
the income difference between the middle and west was small. Wei's (1992) research,
based on a weighted mean deviation, yielded similar conclusions.
The methods often adopted in studying income inequality in China are the fol-
lowing: comparing the income means, calculating the mean deviation and computing
the Gini coefFicients. Although the Gini coefficient is popular, the other two methods
have been disqualified for measuring income inequality. The results obtained by these
disqualified methods are not trustworthy. Moreover, Gini coefficient also has the lim-
it in decomposing the inequalíty. Thus far, Theil's index, also one of the qualified
methods, has not yet been applied widely to measure income inequality in China.
Chapter 4 measures income inequality by Theil's index, and presents the results in
a systematic way, looking at income inequality in its three aspects together: namely,
the inequality between social classes, the inequality between rural and urban areas,
and the inequality between provinces. First of all, the research calculates the overall
inequality in China, and decomposes it into three components: the overall inequality
between social classes, between rural and urban areas, and between provinces. Conse-
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quently, the research takes account of the part played by each component inequalities
in relation to the overall inequality. This chapter, secondly, calculates Theil's in-
equality in rural areas and in urban areas, separately. The inequality in either area is
decomposed into the inequality between provinces and the inequality between social
classes. The results reveal which area has higher inequality than another, and how
much each inequality between provinces and the inequality between social classes con-
tributes to the total inequality in each of the areas. Third, this chapter explores the
inequality in each province, which is decomposed into the inequality between rural
and urban areas and the inequality between social classes within the province. This
result will reveal the ranking of inequality among provinces. Finally, the results in
this chapter specify with the same detail all the inequalities between social classes.
To calculate Theil's index, certain data are required. In principle, two sets of
information are needed: the data on the population classified with respect to three
dimensions (provinces, rural and urban areas, and social classes), and the data on the
income corresponding to the population categories. In total, there are 30 provinces,
two areas, and eight social classes. The social classes are divided according to income
sources and labor skills: the income earner includes unskilled, skilled, technician,
manager, capitalist and self-employed, retiree, and income dependant. The data are
detailed so as to assign each individual to a certain lot that is finally formed through
the triple classifications of areas, provinces and classes.
This research constructs a large scale model to simulate the competitive market
in China. The main part of the model is a linear program, in which market forces
will automatically drive the economy to use its resources efficiently. However, the
problem of resource allocation in this case is a bit complex because of the great
amount of activities, commodities and resources. Chapter 5, therefore, serves as an
illustration to the model. In Chapter 5, linear programming is briefly introduced as
regards the model.
Departing from the classical Ricardian theory, neo-classical economists have made
considerable progress by the introduction of the marginal productivity theory. In
competitive markets, given a constant or decreasing returns to scale technology, com-
petition may yield an equilibrium in which all the production factors are paid by the
marginal products, and the price ratios between factors correspond to the slopes of
the isoquant at the point determined by the factor endowments. Neo-classical theory
has become one of the most attractive theories in modern economics, not only be-
cause it provides a great insight into competitive economies and the determination of
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income, but also because it permits numerical solving. There have been some efforts
towards modelling a competitive economy in some countries and, especially, towards
accounting for factor prices. Explorations made in this direction, however, have not
been widely recognized so far. A possible explanation is that most of the existing
models have not yet reached a sufFicient level of competency in the description of a
competitive economy. In general, the more detailed the model, the more complex
it becomes, and the more it calls for better techniques and more information. This
problem has been motivating economists to search for more eíficient and advanced
modelling methods. Recently, ten Raa (1995) proposed a series of theoretical models
and some empirics. In his work, factor prices are determined endogenously.
The present research is a new application of ten Raa's fashion of modelling. In
Chapter 6, a general equilibrium model is constructed to simulate the competitive
Chinese market. This model captures the internal forces determining income. The
essence of an economic determination of personal income is to consider income gener-
ation and distribution in an economic system in which production, distribution and
consumption flow interactively. Production generates income, and income distribu-
tion determines consumption, which in turn creates demand for production. Being
static, the model is suitable only for the first part of the cycle: income generation
from a production process. The model simulates the competitive market and solves
the benchmark primary income distribution in the following way. Given initial en-
dowments of production factors, constant or decreasing returns to scale technologies
and fixed preferences (by maximizing the domestic final use), the economy reaches an
efficient stage in which ineffiicient sectors are eliminated and resources are allocated
optimally. In the model, production takes place according to Leontief's technologies,
preferences are determined by the observed composition of domestic final uses, and
the endowments consist of labor and capital only. Primary income consists of labor
income and capital income which, according to neo-classical theory, are paid by the
marginal productivity.
The model considers China as an economy integrated by her provincial economies.
Competition takes place between sectors and provinces. Moreover, trade is free within
the country. The model consists of a linear program and additional non-linear equa-
tions. The linear program comprises a pair of programs, which are called a`primal'
and a`dual' programs. The primal program of the linear program shows production
relationships, while its dual program reveals the aspect of cost relationships. The non-
linear equation system is intended to control equilibrium in the place where overall
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value of net exports of each province must match the observed value. By using linear
programming and the Newton method for non-linear equations, the model solves the
endogenous variables simultaneously. Solving the model provides the following result-
s: domestic final use, provincia] final uses, levels of sector activities, capital and labor
employment, labor substitution and migration, interprovincial trade patterns, prices
of tradable and non-tradable commodities, wage rates, and rental rates.
The final product, or net output, is the surplus of gross product minus intermediate
uses. In an open economy, the final product includes the domestic final uses and the
net export. Maximizing overall domestic final products can be considered as a goal
of an economy like China. In the model, net exports to the rest of the world is
considered to be an external resource; the objective therefore becomes maximizing
overall domestic final use.
The economy has two endowments: labor and capital. Labor is classified into four
types: unskilled, skilled, manager and technician, according to occupation. The types
are substitutable from technician to manager, skilled, and to unskilled. Technician,
manager and skilled labor are mobile between sectors within each province, while un-
skilled labor is mobile across all sectors and provinces. Capital is completely immobile
and specific in each sector in each province. Household preferences are considered to
include the observed composition of domestic final uses. Production involves the in-
puts of labor, capital and intermediate commodities and services. There are 30 types
of commodities and services, among which 29 are tradable, and one is non-tradable.
Technology determines the composition of inputs in sectors, which is detailed in the
input-output table by province.
Chapter 7 has three tasks: to outline the competitive markets, to transform func-
tional to personal income distribution, and to measure income inequality. After the
model is solved empirically, the competitive Chinese markets are exposed. In the
markets, competition eliminates the most inefficient activities, restricts the less in-
efficient activities, and encourages the efficient activities. As a result, resources are
allocated optimally, thus removing inefficiency in the observed economy. Because la-
bor is employed fully in the observed markets and trade to the rest of the world is
fixed in the model, the inef)'iciency is in fact the allocative inefficiency. In the com-
petitive markets, skilled labor and highly skilled labor are no longer fully employed,
as unskilled labor is a mobile factor within the nation and skilled and highly skilled
labor are mobile factors only within a given province. As some inef6cient sectors are
cut back or closed down, unskilled labor flows into the expanded sectors, but skilled
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and highly skilled labor cannot follow. In the competitive markets, because of the
efficient employment, resources are valued by the marginal productivity. Therefore,
functional income is revealed. The most important information from the results is
about the rental and wage rates that equal the marginal productivity. As the rental
rate and employment of capital are known, capital income is obtained by multiplying
the rental rates with the employed capital. The unskilled wage is solved directly in the
model, but the wages of the skilled and the highly skilled are obtained by summing
the unskilled wage and the wage premiums of skilled and highly skilled labor that are
solved together with the unskilled wage in the model. The way to calculate the wages
of skilled and highly skilled labor is as follows:
The wage of skilled labor is the sum of the premium and the wage of the unskilled,
The manager's wage is the sum of the premium and the wage of the skilled,
The technician's wage is the sum of the premium and manager's wage.
Once functional income distribution is solved, personal income distribution can
also be solved, if capital ownership data are given. In practice, it is almost impossible
to specify capital ownership at the individual level, because of the wide variety of
capital types and the lack of the information on capital holders. To overcome the
problem, this research separates capital into government and private capital, and
assumes that the capitalist is the sole earner of private capital income. The capitalist's
income is calculated according to the proportions of private capital in total capital
within the sectors. Per capíta income of capitalists is calculated by dividing capitalists'
income over their number.
In competitive markets, the self-employed are no longer considered to be a special
class; they earn as same as skilled labor. The class of retirees is assumed to earn
an average of the wages of the technician, the manager, skilled labor and unskilled
labor. The income of dependants, which is accounted for based on the assumption
that dependants share their income with money-earners within family, is obtained by
dividing the mean income of primary income earners over the dependency ratio.
After the personal income distribution (which is reflected by the data on the
classified population and corresponding income) in the competitive markets is made
known, the extended form of Theil's index is applied to measure income inequality.
The information structure regarding the income inequality in this chapter is the same
as in Chapter 4, so that the income inequality in the current and the competitive
markets can be compared to each other.
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1.3 Conclusion
This research explores what a market economy will do to personal income distribu-
tion in China. More specifically, it has completed the following tasks: developing a
theoretical basis of the personal income distribution determined by internal economic
forces, constructing a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the hypo-
thetical market economy in China, solving the model and revealing the functional
income distribution, connecting the functional to the personal income distribution,
measuring the income inequalities in both the observed and the competitive markets,
and drawing conclusions.
The most important result from the research is the revelation of both observed and
hypothetical, competitive distributions of personal income. From the current to the
market economy, personal income distribution will change considerably. In particular,
the income inequality between social classes will grow. This is because there are an
abundance of unskilled and a scarcity of highly skilled labor in China; skilled labor
will be rewarded much more than unskilled labor when work is rewarded according to
marginal productivity. As a result of competition, technician, manager and capitalist
will gain, while the unskilled and the self-employed will loose. The income inequalities
between areas and provinces will also increase, even though their shares in the overall
income inequality will decrease. This result is caused mainly by the migration of
unskilled labor. Competition would dissolve the negative relationship between the
level of economic development and of income inequality across provinces. Among the
areas, the urban areas will be the winners in all provinces, but rural areas will be the
relatively small winners in nine provinces, the big winners in six provinces, and the
losers in twelve provinces. Among the eastern, the middle, and the western parts, the
eastern part will be the big winner, because in the eastern part, income will increase in
all the ten provinces; in the middle part, Anhui and 5anxi will be the big winners, and
Jiangxi and Henan will be the losers; in the western part, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia
and Yunnan will be the big winners, and Guangxi and Guizhou will be the losers.
In spite of its achievements, this research still faces some limitations that will
need to be addressed in future studies. With respect to the modelling, the objective
in the model is only a part of the final product, because the model assumes the net
export outside of China to be fixed. A potential improvement is to incorporate the
net export outside of China into the objective, and then to consider the role of the
world economy in the model. The model has a strong assumption that fixed capital
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is sector specific. In fact, some fixed capital is sector specific, but some is not. If
the fixed capital is divided into the specific and common fixed capital, and the model
allows the common fixed capital to be mobile among sectors and even locations, the
results will be improved. Also, the model has another inappropriate assumption that
the technician is mobile among sectors. In fact, the technician may be of two types:
the special and the general technician. A special technician is unable to move to other
sectors, while a general technician does. The model has a deadly drawback that, owing
to the linear program in the model, the number of non-zero shadow prices inevitably
is influenced by the number of independent constraints in the linear program. In other
words, the fewer independent constraints, the more zero shadow prices. To avoid the
problem, the model may have to consider the modelling of a non-linear program rather
than a linear program. Finally, for the research on personal income distribution, the
model does not directly include personal income distribution. It merely generates
functional income distribution and leaves the personal income distribution to be dealt
with outside of the model. In most of the studies on income distribution policy (such
as that of Adelman-Robinson (1978) and Sahota-Rocca (1985)), the loop of personal
income distribution is presented in the model in order to capture the feedback effects
of personal income distribution on policy. If the model in this research wants to say
more about transfer income distribution, then it must directly incorporate the loop
of personal income distribution.
With respect to the empirics, the problem of data availability inevitably hurts the
results. The data on capital utilization, in fact, do not exist. The empirical analysis
has no choice but to substitute the capital for production for the capital utilization
in industrial sectors, despite the fact that two differ considerably, at least in their
definitions. More roughly, the empirics have to use the industrial data to estimate the
capital utilization rates in the sectors of agriculture, commerce, construction, finance
and banking, education, and public administration. Because unemployment in the
current Chinese markets is not well observed, the empirics have to assume that labor
is employed fully in the current markets, even though this, in fact, is not true. It
is also unrealistic to assume that the capitalist is the sole earner of capital income.
Apparently, other classes of people may also hold a certain amount of private capital,
and earn the income. However, collecting the data on this aspect is beyond of the
ability of the present research. An additional restriction of this research is that it was
unable to reveal the levels of the overall income inequality, since it ignored within-class
inequalities. If the research could include micro-data to investigate the within-class
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Income distribution is a problem that everyone thinks about. Why do people earn
differently? Is it fair? To whom should I compare my income? Economists ask even
deeper questions: What income status does a particular earner occupy? To what
extent and why do the income differences exist? Is the difference rigid or flexible?
The accumulated knowledge on income distribution is plentiful. It has encouraged
and assisted further studies. Yet, the theory is incomplete and controversial. This
chapter attempts to clarify some basic concepts, to summarize existing theories, and to
review recent applications. Without a careful specification of the theoretical structure,
further study on income distribution is unlikely to be helpful but may rather cause
confusion.
Section 2 deals with some income concepts such as the definition of income, income
sources and uses, distribution processes, income recipient units, etc..' Essential issues
in the section are the definitions of `person' and `personal final income'. `Person'
refers to an individual in this research. Theoretically, income is defined as the sum
of the market value of rights exercised in consumption and the change in the value
of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of a certain period.2
Practically, final income is formed by three income flows: primary, transfer, and family
1This kind of reseatch has been studied delicately by A.B. Atkinson (1983).
ZSimons(1938).
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income flow. In the primary stage, labor, private and public capital participate in
production, the production sector releases income, and labor, private capital owners
and public sectors are all recipients of primary income. After the primary income flow,
the public sectors distribute primary income further; it acts as both income receiver
and releaser. The income that flows in and out of the public sector constitutes the
second flow. During or after the second flow, income is distributed further within the
family. This is the family income flow. Final income is formed after income has gone
through all three flows.
Section 3 reviews the recent theory of income distribution in order to give the
research a strong foundation on the most recent insights. Research on income dis-
tribution has traditionally been developed into two branches: the functional and the
personal income distribution. The former is concerned with income distribution a-
mong production factors. It seeks to explain prices of production factors - land,
labor, and capital. The latter, also called the size distribution of income, studies in-
come distribution among persons. It shows particular interest in explaining personal
income differences. Historically, functional income distribution theory has been well
developed through the efforts of classical and neo-classical economists. In compari-
son, less progress has been made on the theory of personal income distribution. For
a long time, this theory has consisted mainly of a statistical approach to individual
characteristics, which is basically isolated from the economic structure and therefore
provides few insights on economic intuition. Gathering speed recently is the trend to
combine these two branches in order to analyze personal income distribution in depth
and comprehensively. In the modern theory of functional income distribution, neo-
classical theory is particularly attractive for applications, as it allows for numerical
calculations. According to the theory, functional income distribution is closely linked
with the distribution of personal primary income. Namely under perfect competition,
the marginal productivity of resources determines resource prices. Once the prices of
resources are known, personal primary income becomes traceable.
Many recent applications have studied the incorporation of personal income distri-
bution into economic models. Section 4 reviews the other applications, focussing par-
ticular interest on comparing the model in this research with the Adelman-Robinson
model.
Personal income distribution has been traditionally analyzed with econometric
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models.3 Such models are based on individual characteristics, and therefore are devoid
of economic intuition. Their abilities to simulate economic forces, to explain outcomes,
and to shed light on economic phenomena are limited. The absence of an economic
model of personal income distribution is probably due to the fact that functional and
personal income distribution have been considered as two separate regimes. It was
not until the early 1980's that some work approaching the issue of personal income
distribution as a component of an entire economic system, attempting to integrate it
with functional distribution, appeared. Then, research on generation and distribution
of personal income entered a new stage. At that stage, the research relied mainly
on neo-classical theory. The experiments usually construct a gerreral equilibrium
framework in which functional and personal income distributions are connected, and
then apply the model to developing economies. Among such studies are Adelman
and Robinson's (1978) application to Korea, the BACHUE model of the Philippines
(1977), Taylor and Lysy's (1980) application to Brazil, Ahluwalia's (1974) application
to Malaysia, and Sahota's (1985) application to Brazil. Although their work has
much in common in theory and methodology, they differ with respect to the problems
they address, the information available, and the economies studied. In particular,
the Adelman-Robinson model has been commonly recognized as one of the most
comprehensive existing models on personal income distribution.
The Adelman-Robinson model has much in common with the model in this re-
search applied to the Chinese economy. First, both models are based on neo-classical
theory. Second, both models set up a static core model of computable general equilib-
rium to generate factor income from the production process. Third, both models are
multisectoral. Fourth, both models divide labor and households into several classes,
according to certain criteria, to transform income from functions to persons.
The model in this research differs from the Adelman-Robinson model, however, in
the following aspects. First, the model in this research attempts to reveal a benchmark
income distribution of persons in competitive markets rather than to simulate or
optimize policy concerns. Second, the model in this research is built on the basis
of economic fundamentals only and therefore requires a minimum set of information
compared with the Adelman-Robison model and others. Third, the model in this
research combines linear programming with non-linear equations, while the Adelman-
Robinson model and most of the other applications are non-linear. Fourth, the model
3See, for instance, Tinbergen (1975).
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in this research is multiregional and solved completely and successfully, while the
Adelman-Robinson and other applications usually work on one economy. Fifth, the
model in this research does not include personal income distribution directly, but the
other applications all incorporate it directly in their models.
2.2 Income concepts
2.2.1 Definition of income
Although classical economists have suggested various definitions on income, 5imons'
comprehensive definition of income is accepted by most economists nowadays. Si-
mons (1938) defined income as the sum of the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of a certain period. It should be noted, therefore, that income was
in general not identical to consumption during a period, unless the property value
during that period is constant. Personal income is used normally for consumption,
saving, investment, taxes and bequests. Consumption is the income expenditure on
goods and services. One may also use part of income to increase wealth by saving or
investing. Taxes are the payments to the government or public sectors. Bequests are
the opposite of inheritances, namely the income that one gives to others.
The above definition approaches income from its uses. However, income is ob-
served, in practice, more often from its sources. Basically, personal income has four
sources. The main source for labor is earnings, which include all kinds of salaries and
wages. Rent, interest and dividends constitute the income source of capital holder-
s. In general, `rent' represents capital income. The third source is transfer income,
which has many forms, such as pensions, unemployment subsidies, medical care, life
insurance, housing allowances, education subsidies, and child support subsidies. All
these kinds of transfer income can be represented briefly by the term `subsidies', since
government and public sectors pay them. The fourth source is family income, includ-
ing the transfers of cash, savings, property, house, land, and goods and services within
family. Usually, the term of `inheritance' simply represents this source, because it is
a transfer within the family.
Based on the sources, personal income distribution, in fact, includes three distribu-
tion procedures: primary, transfer and family income distribution. Since earnings and
rent are determined by production, they constitute the primary income distribution,
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which is in fact an `economic distribution'. The source of subsidy is the tax collected
from the primary income of labor and capital holders. In a sense, it is a redistri-
bution of primary income. This distribution is called a transfer income distribution.
Subsidy is distributed by government and public sectors, and therefore depends on
government and public sector policies. For this reason, it is in fact a`policy distri-
bution'. The remaining income is disposable, and will be distributed further within
the family. This is the `family distribution', which may take place before the transfer
distribution. One example is the inheritance tax levied upon inheritance. One may
argue that there is also inheritance between families. However, because inter-family
inheritance is relatively negligible, it is usually ignored.
The income that remains after the three distributions is the final income, which is
used for consuming and for increasing property. Final income is a proper definition to





















Diagram 2.1. The procedure of income formation
A arrows - functional income distribution
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B arrows - primary income distribution
C arrows - transfer income distribution
D arrows - family income distribution
The diagram presents income sources and uses around production, government
or public sectors, and persons. Arrows with A indicate the functional income dis-
tribution, where labor and personal capital gains are extracted from production to
form the primary income of labor and capital owners. At the same time, because the
government may own some capital, production then also distributes the capital gains
to government. The government rents are used either as transfer income to persons
or as investment in production.
The B arrows represent the primary income distribution. Primary income be-
comes disposable income after tax, and then goes to the labor and capital owners.
C arrows show the transfer income distribution, where government is the principal.
Taxes on primary income and bequests constitute another source of government in-
come. Except for the investment part, the remaining government income is a transfer
(subsidy). The subsidy to persons constitutes the transfer distribution. Finally, D
arrows illustrate the distribution among persons within the family. Income given by
one person to another is a bequest, while income that one person receives from an-
other is an inheritance. As a result, everyone obtains a final income, which is used
for consumption or for the stock of property.
2.2.2 Recipient unit and classification
With respect to personal income distribution, the income recipient units are person-
s. Defining a person, however, is not as easy as defining income. There are three
alternative descriptions of a person: a household, a family and an individual. Since
Debreu (1959), the household unit has become a popular economic unit for analysis.
A household may be an individual, a family, or a group of people who live together
and share some common uses. The advantage of this concept is that it can reveal
market potential. However, it may prove unsuitable for research on personal income
distribution, because different households may be composed differently. For instance,
while one household may be an individual, another household may be a group of
people. Due to different sizes, income between the two households is incomparable.
Smeeding and Gottschalk (1995) point out that although the household unit captures
the economies of scale associated with shared living arrangements, it assumed a degree
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of income sharing within the household that might not be realized.
On the other hand, the family as an economic unit has been used extensively in
the analysis of personal income distribution. A family is often limited to a nuclear
family that consists of a couple and their children rather than also their parents
and other relatives. Atkinson (1974) proposed that the nuclear family should be the
natural unit for personal income analysis, since by convention children obtained a
large income from the working parents, and wives who did not go out to work shared
income with their working husbands, or men who did not work shared income with
their working wives. In other words, his adoption of the nuclear family unit is based on
the premise that income is identical within the nuclear family. Atkinson (1983) further
consolidated the nuclear family concept in his study of Sweden. In that case, income
distribution on the individual level could not be determined because a large part of the
individuals had very little income and also because of the little information available
on intra-family transfers. These arguments cannot be followed directly, however. By
assuming identical distributions among families, the ambiguity problems associated
with intra-family income transfers can be removed, and income on the individual
level then becomes traceable. There is thus no reason to restrict analysis to the
family level. Atkinson's second argument is that individual income does not represent
the distribution in general because children and non-working people have very little
income. Here, he takes account only of individuals' primary or secondary incomes
rather than their final incomes. Since children and non-working people actually share
income with the working people within their family, individuals' final incomes are
comparable.
In the opinion of this research and many other sources,' the individual is the best
among the three potential units, particularly because it is the only one able to re-
veal income distribution among persons rather than among groups or families. This
research adopts the individual as the basic unit of analysis because the population
can be classified precisely at individual level. In general, personal income differences
are observed between the social classes. The study on personal income distribution,
therefore, always needs to classify individuals into various social classes. The clas-
sification may be done by persons' education levels, occupations, employed status,
economic status, social identifications, ages, sex, etc.. Every individual belongs to a
specific class. As this research is interested in showing how income generates from a
4For instance, Sutherland (1995), and Smeeding and Gottschalk (1995).
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source, how that income flows from person to person, and finally how that income
causes differences between persons, it is desirable to classify persons by income source
into primary, transfer and family income receivers.
The primary income earners consist of wage earners and rent collectors. Typically,
the wage earner is the laborer, which can be further categorized by skill. There may be
many skills, but this research summarizes them into four categories: the unskilled, the
skilled, the higher skilled, and the highest skilled. Correspondingly, labor's categories
are the unskilled, the skilled, the manager and the technician, respectively. If laborers
are paid based on skills, wages will cause income differences between the labor classes.
Typically, the rent collector is the capital owner, to classify whom the capital
amount may be considered as a primary criteria. Yet, this classífication alone is in-
sufficient to reveal the difference in capital income among capital owners, because
capital consists of many types and each type may have difFerent return rates. There-
fore, it is also necessary to classify the capital owner by capital type. Only when both
classifications are used can the difference in capital income be revealed. In practice,
capital ownership, particularly regarding the capital types, is rather difficult to as-
certain, because not only the capitalist but also labor or other individuals may hold
some amount of capital, and the compositions of the capital are basically in hands
not observable. However, in a developing economy like China, this problem is rela-
tively less serious. In China, only the capitalist, in fact, holds a significant amount of
private capital; labor and other individuals usually do not. Following other research
on developing countries,s this research simply assumes that the capitalist is the sole
owner of private capital.
Besides labor and the capitalist, there exists an additional class of primary income
earner, called the self-employed. The income of this class, in fact, is a mixture of
wages and rent. Adelman and Robinson (1978) defined it as the net value-added,
which consisted of the self-employed wage and the residual rent after payments to all
other factors. In my research, the self-employed does not earn any special wage than
the wage of labor. Rather, the wage of the self-employed should be determined by the
skill of the self-employed. Because with competition all wages of labor correspond to
certain levels of skill, the self-employed wage should match the skill level that they
reach. For example, if the self-employed person was a skilled worker, his business
income generated from the work that he is currently doing as self-employed should
sFor instance, Taylor and Lysy et al. (1980).
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not be less than a skilled wage - otherwise he would continue his job as a skilled
worker. Under perfect competition, the self-employed business income might exceed
that of the skilled worker - not because he receives a manager's wage, but rather
because the part over the wage comes from the rent generated from the capital owned
by the self-employed.
In general, the recipients of transfer income cover a broad range. Many individu-
als receive transfer income through various forms of subsidy. The transfer program,
however, is very limited in China, where the government has not widely applied public
security programs. It seems that only retirees are fully supported by the government.s
Other groups of individuals have to rely on their families, and are therefore the recip-
ients of family income, or called the dependants. Unemployed persons in urban areas
rely on family rather than on transfer income. Urban unemployment is small. Most
of the unemployed just temporarily depend on family while looking forward to job
opportunity; the rest of them may get an allowance from the government while work-
ing for the government in some public works project. The amount of the government
allowance is usually too small for a living, and such unemployed persons usually have
to depend on family. It has been calculated that in 1994 the average amount of the
allowance distributed to the applicants is 21.5 Yuan per month per person only, which
is 0.48010 of the average wage at that same time.7 For this reason, the unemployed
person is considered (for our purposes) to depend on family income rather than on
transfer income. As is the case of unemployment, very little income is transfered
through government or public sectors to students and those with disabilities. Few
students, for example, receive subsidies for study, and disabled persons are granted a
limited subsidy only.
In contrast with the recipient of transfer income, many people depend on family
income. These people, who are called dependants, include minors under the age of
15, students above the age of 15, urban unemployment, house~vork, and disabilities.
In total, this research categorizes the population into eight classes: the unskilled,
the skilled, the manager, the technician, the capitalist, the self-employed, the retiree,
and the dependant. Among the primary income earners, the classes of the unskilled,
sIn fact, via firms.
~According to Table 8-15 in the 1995 China Labour Statistical Yearbook, with a 2.8~Jo unemploy-
ment rate in urban area in China in the year 1994, there are 4.764 millions of urban unemployed
persons, 41010 (-1964~4764) of them have been granted an unemployment allowance in total amount
of 507,552 thousands Chinese Yuan, which accounts for some 0.074P1o of total staff and worker's
income.
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the skilled, the manager and the technician earn wages, capitalists earn private-capital
income, and the self-employed earn both wage and private-capital income. The retirees
receive transfer income. In addition to the classification of the population into social
classes, the population must be classified by rural and urban area and by province.
The final data should be detailed to such an extent that each individual is allocated
to a certain class which is formed through a triple classification of social classes, areas,
and provinces. For example, a manager in an urban area in Beijing, and a child in a
rural area in Gansu province.
2.3 Survey of existing theory
2.3.1 On income generation
Income generation lies at the foundation of the functional distribution of income.
Johnson (1973) summarized classical and neo-classical economists' debates on this
topic. Because income generation is the origin of also personal income formation, this
research reviews part of theory of functional income distribution, based on Johnson
(1973).
Among the classical economists, Ricardo8 can be recognized as the founder of
income distribution analysis. His analysis features three production factors: land,
labor and capital. Among these, land and labor are direct production factors. Capital,
necessary for the use of labor during the production process, is an indirect production
factor. National dividends are attributed to the sum of rents to land, the wages of
labor, and the profits to capital. Assuming national output is fixed and there is no
rent (in other words, national output is the margin of production on land), rent is the
residual of total output and the cost of labor and capital. By applying the Malthusian
law of wages that a population breeds to the level of subsistence, the subsistence wage
rate becomes fixed. Then, the excess of marginal product of labor over the cost of
labor is the second residual that is contributed to profits.
A notable feature of Ricardian theory is its stress on the role of land rather than
capital. This emphasis on land originated from the economic situation of that period
(19th century), in which agriculture was the dominating sector of the national econ-
omy, and capital was recognized as a stock of food only. Wicksteed9 extended the
BSee Johnson (1973), for reference
9See Johnson (1973), for reference
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theory by noticing that any of the three factors could be regarded either as marginal
product or as surplus, because Ricardo's definition of residuals is purely arbitrary.
A problem arising from Wicksteed's generalization of the marginal productivity of
all factors is whether the incomes determined by marginal productivity would exhaust
the product exactly. This problem is solved subsequently by Hicks and Samuelsonlo
They argue that perfect competition is a sufficient condition for incomes to exhaust
the product. Since factors are paid according to their marginal productivity, and
perfect competition induces zero profits in the case of constant returns to scale, firms
in equilibrium choose production at a level where both requirements are fulfilled.
Denoting commodity price and quantity by p and X, and factor price and quantity
by w and q, respectively, the competitive condition is:
Px - ~ w9,






The classical Ricardian theory on income categories such as rent, wages and profits
has been developed further by Marshall" for two aspects. First, he discards the spe-
cial role of the rent of ]and and proposes that each of the specific factors used in the
production process may get a'quasi-rent', since they may be in fixed supply - at least
temporarily. Second, he makes a distinction between the concept of profits and the
concept of interest, which are identicalin classical theory. Fisher12 provides a com-
prehensive explanation of interest. He explains income as a stream of contributions
to outputs yielded by some source. Capital is the value of that source, determined
by capitalizing the value of the stream of productive contributions by means of the
current rate of interest. Interest is the relation between income flows and the capital
values of the resources. Anything that yields a contribution to some output is capital
and has a capital value.' In other words, interest is considered to be capital income,
loSee Johnson (1973), for reference
11See Johnson (1973),for reference
12See Johnson (1973),for reference
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whereas profit is a surplus of the reward earned on past investment in relation to
the contractual costs associated with that investment. To summarize, the generaliza-
tion of classical income categories is presented in the below diagram, borrowed from
Johnson (1973):
Necessary payment Surplus or deficiency
Current income receipt WAGES RENT
(always non-negative)
Current income receipts
related to past investment INTEREST PROFIT
(may be negative)
Diagram: Classical Categories of Income
2.3.2 On the nature of income differences
The cause of income differences is one of the two main components of the theory
of personal income distribution. Sahota (1978) provides a comprehensive survey on
theories of personal income distribution.
According to the functional income distribution theory, income is generated, from
an economic point of view in a production process, and income differences result from
the differences in marginal productivity of production factors. Early statisticians and
economists working on personal income distribution were not aware of this, or did
not pay attention to this, however. Instead, some of them tried to approach income
differences from preordained forces, whereas others, instead of relying on human or
social forces, explained the causes of income differences or marginal productivity only
partially. To obtain insight into past and contemporary theories of personal income
dístribution, this research reviews them once again from the viewpoint of final income,
which consists of primary, transfer and family income.
Approaches to final income differences
The early economists did not explicitly divide personal income into the three cat-
egories of primary, transfer and family incomes. Rather, they examined only the
distribution of final income. Well-known approaches were the stochastic approach
and the individual choice approach.
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The stochastic approach is one of the oldest. It originated in the late nineteenth
century and thrived in the first half of the twentieth century. Gibrat and Champer-
nowne are the important contributors. The theory supposes that personal income is
determined by `windfall' and that income distribution is a random process. It predicts
that, no matter what the initial distribution is, due to stochastic forces, the process
converges to an equilibrium at which the income distribution is close to a Pareto type
distribution.
Gibrat13 discovered that the distribution of logarithms of some economic variable
was approximately normal, and also conjectured that the distribution of logarithms
of incomes obeyed the Gaussian law that the logarithms of the income was the result
of a large number of small causes of which, the proportional effects upon income were
independent of the magnitude of other causes. In this context, Champernowne (1937)
argued, however, that the proportional effects of small causes acting upon income
were not independent of one another. Instead, he assumed that the proportional
effects of economic influences on groups of incomes depended largely on the size of
the incomes in the group. Champernowne (1953) concluded that income distribution
fluctuated in the short run, and was in equilibrium in the long term. It seems that the
stochastic approach has reached a dead end, since contemporary economic theories
have stated that income distributions are influenced by systematic forces rather than
windfall forces.
Friedman (1953) proposed an individual choice theory, which stated that personal
income differences resulted from not only uncontrollable circumstances such as wind-
fall, endowment and inheritance, but also from collective action such as taxation and
subsidies. In particular, the theory focuses on the effect of individual choice on income
differences. There are two ways in which individual choice may affect income distri-
bution. First, compensation for non-pecuniary advantages or disadvantages causes
money income difference in order to equalize real income. Second, differences in in-
dividual's tastes for risk cause disparities in income distributions. Individual choice
theory is partial, since it explains only part of these income differences - most of
which are attributed actually to the differences in endowments.
laReferring to Kalecki, M. (1945)
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Approaches to primary income differences
Theories explaining primary income include, for instance, ability, human capital, e-
ducational, and life-cycle theory. One of the early approaches to personal income
distribution, ability theory, originated in the middle of the nineteenth century, and
attributed earning differences to ability differences. It presumes the distribution of
abilities to be normal - just as the distribution of various physical traits, such as
weight and height of the human body, and furthermore infers the income distribution
to be same as the ability distribution. However, this inference was repudiated by
Pareto in 1897; he found empirically that income was distributed lognormally rather
than normally. Since then, ability theory has been conducted to explain the incon-
sistency between income and ability distributions. Among contemporary theories of
personal income distribution, ability theory has become less attractive. Because abil-
ity itself is an ambiguous concept and therefore is indefinable and immeasurable, the
relationships between ability and income are not yet revealed explicitly.
Life-cycle theory is a partial theory considering earning distributions. It considers
that the point-in-time income differences are overestimated and seeks the explanation
of income difference corresponding to one's age and the distinction between life-cycle
income and point-in-time income. Modigliani and Ando (1960) observed that life-
cycle earnings roughly conformed to an inverted parabola. However, there are doubts
about the actual role of the age effect on income distribution for at least two reasons.
First, the age effect is relatively negligible, especially when factors such as schooling
and on-the-job training are split from mere age or sheer experience. Second, according
to Atkinson's experiments, a large part of income inequality in Britain is within rather
than between age groups.
Approaches to transfer income differences
A theory explaining transfer income is the public income redistribution theory, which
deals with two issues: the distribution of tax burdens and the distribution of pub-
lic expenditure benefits. The theory of tax incidence, which has been well formed
in public finance theories, explores the relationships between tax schedules and tax
burdens. Taxes are categorized into, for example, personal income, excise, gift, estate
and death, general sale, custom and duty, corporate income, and property, while tax
burdens are distinguished into taxpayers, consumers, purchasers, households, earners,
and owners. The distributive effects of various taxes on burdens, therefore, constitute
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the content of tax incidence. Theories of tax incidence are reviewed by Musgrave
(1974, 1985).
While the theories of tax incidence are well developed, the theories of the distri-
bution of public expenditure benefits have not been developed to a sufficient extent.
Public expenditure includes transfer payments and publicly provided goods and ser-
vices. The distribution of public transfer payments is straightforward, whereas the
distribution of benefits of publicly provided goods and services is difficult to be speci-
fied, because some public services are such that the resulting benefits may be imputed
to particular individuals or groups. Musgrave (1974) did some hypothetical analysis
on this subject, but no general theories exist.
Approaches to family income differences
The examination of family income transfers is based on inheritance theory. Inheritance
has been frequently considered the same as material inheritance. There are arguments,
however, that inheritance should also include genetic and cultural inheritance. Most
research, however, has to do with material inheritance.
2.3.3 Theoretical structure in this research
Although there exist various theories on personal income distribution, all of them are
partial; the theories complement each other. This problem has lured contemporary
economists into a search for a comprehensive theory on personal income distribution.
This research on China, however, is not intended to do so. Instead, the research is
intended to explain personal income distribution from the point of view of economics.
The economic theory on personal income distribution states that economic funda-
mentals of endowments, technologies and preferences determine functional income
distribution, which is closely linked to the distribution of personal primary income.
Information provided on ownership of endowments, on transfer programs, and on fam-
ily composition can reveal the nature of primary, transfer, family and therefore final
income distributions.
While the study applies the neo-classical theory on functional income distribution,
the theoretical structure of this study also embodies most contents of the theories on
personal income distribution. However, for the sake of experiment, these theories
are simplified in the research. As this research does not consider stochastic forces to
explain personal income, the stochastic theory is not applied in the research. Human
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capital theory has remained popular in recent studies. The model in this research
combines this theory with education, ability, and inheritance theories, for in the model
all these factors are represented implicitly by the difference in labor productivity. The
theoretical structure does consider public income distribution theory, but confines it to
only a certain type of subsidy (such as pensions). This research also applies inheritance
theory, of which only material inheritance is considered.
2.4 The applications
2.4.1 The Adelman-Robinson model
The purpose of Adelman and Robinson's (1978) application was to simulate the effect
of various economic policies on personal income distribution. As they expected, an
evaluation of political impacts should be done within an economic system able to trace
out both direct and indirect influences on personal income, to capture the multiple
impacts of various policy programs, to assess the ultimate consequences of current
decisions, to facilitate comparisons between alternative programs, and, in general, to
allow for intelligent and informed policy designs.
The model has dynamic features. It consists of a static, Johansen (1960) fashion,
within-period adjustment model linked to a dynamic, intertemporal-adjustment mod-
el. Within each period, the static model adjusts towards general equilibrium under
various constraints such as capital stock and labor force, technology, and government
interventions. Between periods, some constraints are adjusted in response to changes
in capital accumulation, population growth, migration, and production structure.
Although the overall model is dynamic, its static part is more interesting to my
research. The static model is built mainly on the neo-classical theory of the functional
income distribution. Production is assumed to be a function of resources such as
labor and fixed capital, and of intermediate resources. The production function with
respect to labor and fixed capital is assumed to be neo-classical, allowing for factor
substitution.
Denoting
.~ - resources, .~ - 1, ..., m,
i- sectors, i- 1, ..., n,
R - input,
X - output,
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the production functions with respect to resources are as follows:
X; - .f;(R;~, ..., R;a).
Let V represent the intermediate output, let j identify commodities, and let A;;
be intermediate coeffiicient, then the intermediate goods required are given by
V;; - A;;X;.
Firms maximize profits. In terms of the firm's behavior, the cost of intermediate
goods is simply proportional to output, and net receipts are the sale price minus the
fixed charge. Thus, denoting
p; - the price of goods,
the net price of goods i can be defined as
P; - P; - ~ A;;Pi,
~
In terms of hiring decisions for other factors, the firm views the net price as the
marginal revenue from the sale of one more unit of output.
In factor markets, the first-order conditions for profit maximization require that
firm i hire factors until the prices of resources equal marginal revenues. Denoting
wa - the price of factor,
then
. af~
P; aR - wa.~a
The first-order conditions are solved by writing factor demands as a function of
net prices, resource prices, and employment of other factors:
R;a - 9;a(P;; wi, ..., w~,.; R;k, k- 1, ..., m, and, k~~).
Denoting rya as the total demands for the factors, the total demands for the factors
are aggregated across sectors:
a
rya - ~ R;~.
~
Assuming that the total supplies of factors, ya, is exogenously given, then equi-
librium in the factor market requires factor demands to be equal to factor supply, or,
excess demand for factors to be equal to zero:
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d n
7a - 7~, - 0.
For given prices, the excess-demand function can be seen as a function of factor
prices. The problem is then to find a set of factor prices that clears factor market-
s. These prices determine product supplies, and hence yield the goods supply as a
function of prices.
With the demand side of the model, the functional income distribution is first
calculated. Denoting ya as the aggregate income by factor ~, it is calculated as
ya - ~~aR;a.
~
The model assumes that each factor type consists of a homogeneous group of
people whose consumption behavior can be represented by an aggregate expenditure
function. Denoting
C;a - the demand for goods,
c- total demands for goods,
the demand C;a for goods i in sector ~ is a function of factor income and commodity
prices:
Cia - hia~yaii~li...,~n~i
The total demand cd for good i is:
cd - ~ C;a.
a
The good supply for final demand is determined by subtracting the demand for
intermediate goods:
c; - X; - ~ A;~X~ .
i
The equilibrium is reached in the product markets if excess demand for each good
is zero:
The market-clearing prices of both goods and factors are solved with the model
that includes around 3,000 unknowns and equations. As this economic system consists
2.4. The applications 37
of non-linear equations, Adelman and Robinson use the following algorithm to solve
it.
(1) start with an initial guess of commodity prices.
(2) solve the factor-market equations for factor prices, employment, and produc-
tion.
(3) solve the product-market equations and calculate excess demands.
(4) raise or lower commodity prices in sectors where there are excess demands or
supplies.
(5) normalize prices and start another iteration. Stop iterating when all excess
demands equal zero.
General equilibrium modelling has been done intensively since Johansen (1960);
the new part of the Adelman-Robinson static model is its extension to personal income
distributions. To access the problem of income distribution between persons, the static
model separates labor into the 15 categories below according to their occupations. The
different types of income that are imputed to the different categories are listed on the
right-hand side, where agricultural wages must be determined in the agricultural labor
market only.
1. engineers - wage
technicians wage




7. government workers, including teachers and doctors - exogenous wage
8. self-employer 1 net value-added
9. self-employer 2
10. capitalists -
11. landlord 1 -
12. landlord 2 -





- agriculture business income
- agriculture business income
- agriculture business income
agriculture business income
- agriculture wage
The connections between the functiona] and the personal income distribution are
done, first of all, by generating the income distribut.ion of workers before taxes and
transfers. Solving the equilibrium functional distribution reveals the mean income
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and the number of each category of workers. To avoid further investigation of the
income distribution of each category of workers, the model simply assumes each of
the within-categories distribution of workers to have a lognormal form. Furthermore,
the log variances of the first seven categories are estimated within the model, whereas
the log variances of the rest of the categories are obtained exogenously.
Following the same procedure, the model determines the within-category distri-
bution of workers' income after taxes and before transfers, and the within-category
distribution of workers' income after taxes and after transfers. Here, direct taxes are
calculated by applying the appropriate Korean tax schedules to each type of income.
Using the size distribution function, average income recipients representing the mean
incomes of successive twentieths of the distribution are constructed for each group of
agents. The appropriate tax schedules are applied to the twenty average incomes in
order to obtain the total group tax. The total group tax is then adjusted for evasion,
by applying a group collection ratio. The process is repeated for each group. The
transfer payments are programmed to account for government transfer payments and
for rer.ts, interest, and profit income that accrues to groups other than capitalists.
Finally, the model investigates income distribution by households, which are con-
sidered to be the unit of income recipients. Households are classified into 15 classes,
according to the occupation of the head of the household. It is assumed that the
within-class distribution of income in each of the household classes has the same
lognormal form as the within-category distributions of workers' income.
The overall size distribution is calculated numerically by adding the group distri-
butions. As information at this stage is sufficient, it is not necessary to assume some
distribution, such as the lognormal form, for the overall size distribution. The model
computes directly various statistical inequality measures such as quantiles, quantile
means, and Gini coefficients.
2.4.2 The present model in this research
The purpose of the present model is different from that of Adelman-Robinson. Name-
ly, this model is intended neither to simulate income distribution policies nor to deter-
mine an optimized policy; rather, it aims to expose the functional income distribution
under perfect competition, and to transform the functional to the benchmark personal
income distribution separately. In that sense, the present model is somewhat simpler
than Adelman-Robinson model, as it merely simulates a full market economy while
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ignoring any description of market imperfections. The model assumes that laborers
are freely mobile across sectors, so that each type of labor corresponds to a unique
wage rate that is not affected by either sector type or firm size (as in the Adelman-
Robinson model). In the present model, labor can substitute following a hierarchy
from highly- to low skilled labor; the wage of highly-skilled labor will therefore not
be less than that of low skilled labor. In the model, capital is completely immobile; it
is assumed to be fixed in sector and location. Among sectors, the difference in rental
rates of fixed capital is caused by the different technologies only.
The model is a static Walrasian general equilibrium model generating functional
distributions. It is built multisectorally and multiregionally. The model applies to the
Chinese economy with most of her provincial economies, each of which has 30 sectors.
Slightly different from the Adelman-Robinson model, the present model includes 30
commodities, 29 of which are tradable and one of which is nontradable, because the
provincíal input-output tables show zero on export and import items only in the 30th
commodity or service.la
The objective of the model in this research is to maximize the overall final use,
which is domestic final demand excluding international trade, subject to commodity,




li - capital input coefiicient,
L - labor input coefficient,
X - output,
the production functions are as follows
Xs - mia(IísXg, LsXs).
Denoting
At - intermediate input coefficient of tradable goods,
A- intermediate input coefficient of nontradable good,
ft - the composition of the provincial final demand for tradable goods,
f- the composition of the provincial final demand for the nontradable good,
d- the share of the final uses of the province ín overall domestic final use,
D- overall domestic final use,
taprovincial input-output tables in China, 1992.
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the demand side consists of intermediate and final demands for tradable goods,
~ AiXt } ~.fid'D,
~ ;
and for the nontradable good,
A'X' -~ f'd'D.





The payment of each province for the net exports to the rest of China is required
to match the observed value. Denote
Pt - the competitive prices of tradable commodities,
the overall value of net exports of each province is
P~[(I - At)X' - f~d`D - E'].
Consider net exports to the rest of the world to be fixed as an exogenous resource,
and denote
E- net exports to the rest of the world,
N - labor force,
M - capital stock,
So - the observed overall value of net exports of each province,
the general equilibrium is reached when D reaches its maximum and commodities
and factors are in balance:
Balance of tradable commodities
~ X` } ~ E` - ~ AiX' ~ ~ ftáD,
~ ~ ; ;
Balance of nontradable commodities
X` - A'X` f f'd`D,
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Balance of labors
Balance of fixed capital
Balance of provincial budgets
Só - P~[(I - A~)X' -.fid~D - E'].
The Adelman-Robinson model was solved by a tatonnement-like process. The
model in this research is also non-linear, but it consists of a large-scale linear program
and a non-linear equation system. The primal program has 948 constraints and in-
cludes 811 variables. Among the constraints, tradable goods are 29; the non-tradable
good constitutes 27 (one for each province); unskilled labor is one; other kinds of
labors are 81 (three for each province); fixed capital constitutes 810 (30 for each
province). The variables are 810 sector activities (30 for each province), plus one for
the overall final use. The non-linear equation system consists of 27 equations and 27
variables. Each of the equations is the payment balance of a province. The variables
are the shares of the final use of the province in the overall domestic final use. The
system is solved by the Newton method.
The information requirements of the Adelman-Robinson model and others are
huge; hundreds of parameters have to be estimated. The model in this research
requires minimal information: first, sector technologies (which are given by input-
output tables, and utilize labor and fixed capital information); second, consumer's
preferences (which are represented by the composition of domestic final use in the
input-output table); third, endowments (consisting of labor resources, fixed capital
stocks and fixed trade abroad).
Unlike Adelman and Robinson, who directly transform the functional to the per-
sonal income distribution in their model, I do the transformation outside the model.
The transformation is the basic requirement for the economic modelling on personal
income distributions. As Sahota (1985) pointed out, the link between functional and
personal income distribution is one of the most intractable in modern economics. The
reason is that functional and personal income distributions belong to two different
regimes. To express personal income in terms of functional income requires informa-
tion on the ownership of factor quantities, particularly on the ownership of capital.
N` - L'X',
M` - lí'X'.
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However, most of the required information either does not exist or is costly to collect.
One therefore has to estimate it, or simplify one's objectives. Practically, the connec-
tion between functional and personal income distribution could be a key to evaluate
the quality of a modelling on personal income distribution. The Adelman-Robinson
model builds a bridge by assuming that any within-category size distribution has a
lognormal form. In the Taylor-Lysy model, the key assumption is that capital income
is appropriated by capitalists only, and not by labor. The Sahota model assigns the
capital owned by different income classes into different sectors to identify ownership.
This research follows Taylor-Lysy's assumption that the capitalist is the sole earner
of rent on private capital.
Chapter 3
Measures of Income Inequality
3.1 Introduction
A quantitative measurement of personal income distribution will provide explicit and
precise information to reveal the ranking of personal income distributions. Many
methods have been proposed to measure distribution. Because these methods dif-
fer in design, the results obtained by the methods may yield different approaches.
Thus, selecting the appropriate measures for a special study on personal income dis-
tribution is an important part of researching income distribution. This chapter, by
discussing the existing popular methods for quantitatively measuring the degree of
income inequality, aims to identify those measures that best suit the research.
The measures of income inequality can be categorized into `positive' and `norma-
tive' methods. Positive measures arose earlier than normative measures. The former
is designed statistically, and presents social welfare implicitly. The design of the latter
is based on an explicit formulation of social welfare. The family of positive measures
includes the Relative mean deviation, Variance, Coefficient of variation, Variance of
logarithms, 5tandard deviation of logarithms, the Gini Coefficient, and the Theil in-
dex; the family of normative measures includes the Dalton measure, the Atkinson
measure, and the Sen measure. Although some economists advocate normative mea-
sures, the positive measures are frequently applied because they are perhaps more
relevant to practice.' However, the applications of the positive measures have their
problems, as different measures may lead to different conclusions. To solve this prob-
lem, researchers recently devised a way to discriminate the positive measures. It was
1Foster (1994) analyzed this situation.
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found that if the measures are examined in conjunction with certain properties that
any measure of income inequality should possess, that some positive measures will
become disqualified and therefore may be eliminated.
In general, the more properties that are added to justify the measures, the fewer
measures remain qualified. Fields and Fei (1978) identified three properties as the ba-
sic properties that an inequality measure should satisfy, namely, the Pigou-Dalton in-
come transfer principle, Symmetry, and Income homogeneity, respectively. Dasgupta,
Sen and Starrett (1973) proposed the additional property of Population homogeneity.
In addition, Additive decomposability was often recommended as a necessary proper-
ty, as the measures used for the analysis of income distribution involve total inequality
and subgroup inequalities. Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980), and Foster (1983)
proved that the Theil index was the only one satisfying all five properties. Further-
more, Shorrocks (1988) proved that the Theil index is also the only one satisfying
subgroup monotonicity.
Although the Theil index possesses nice properties, it has not been applied to
suíFicient extent. In particular, the Theil index has to rely on an exogenously assumed
statistical form of income distribution to observe the within-group inequality - which
apparently violates the definition of the Theil index. This chapter solves the problem
by extending the Theil index to include only between-group inequalities, since by
additive decomposability between-group inequality can be studied in itself. As a
result, the extended Theil index can be applied purely based on the definition of the
Theil index, and can provide information on income inequality in more aspects.
The study in this chapter will be conducted as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews
the popular measures in the family of positive measures and the Atkinson measure
in the family of normative measures. In this section, particularly detailed discussion,
however, is given to the Theil index, based on Theil (1963). Section 3.3 discusses the
properties of the measure of income inequality and concludes that the Theil index is
the proper measure of income inequality for this research. Furthermore, to reconcile
the Theil index with the requirement of this research, Section 3.4 develops an extended
form of the Theil Index, with which the overall inequality is further decomposed into
multiple between-group inequalities so that the final within-group inequalities can be
reasonably ignored. Finally, Section 3.5 presents two programs of application of the
extended form. These will jointly measure the inequalities in the current Chinese
economy in Chapter 4, and in a hypothetical competitive market in Chapter 7.
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3.2 Measures of income inequality
3.2.1 Relative mean deviation
In statistics, the extent to which some variable differs across the population of numbers
may be summarized by the average difference between all values of this variable and
its mean. This difference is positive when the variable is larger than the mean, and
negative otherwise. Because the sum of total differences is zero, in order to calculate
the average difference, statisticians avoid the zero sum by taking the absolute values of
all differences and then getting the average. This average is called the mean absolute
deviation. Because the deviations depend on the mean, they are divided by the mean
to make them scale independent. This is the relative mean deviation. Since Brescian
and Turroni,2 the relative mean deviation has been recommended as a measure of
income inequality due to its simplicity.
Definition: Relative mean deviation For a population with N individuals, let
Ij denote the absolute income devel of individual, j- 1, ..., N and let y indicate the
average income of ald individuals. The relative mean deviation, (RMD~, is that
N
RMD - ~j-1 I I, - 1 ~.
NÍ
RMD, however, is seldom used, because it is insensitive to income transfers hap-
pening in the same side of the mean income. For example, assume that both Il and
12 lie on the side below the mean income, and that after an income transfer, 01, from
Il to IZ they both still remain in the same side, then
R~l~l D
~" ~1 Í~-~~I,-oI-Í~-~I12~-o1-i~7-3 9 -
NÍ
~I;-Í~-~~h-Í~f~l~-~Iz-Í~-DIN~j-3
~" IIj - II~
NÍ ~
NI
The RMD remains constant in this case. One way to overcome this problem would
be to exaggerate the income differences by squaring them. Use of the squared methods
can help capture the impact of an income transfer on income difference. These squared
methods are the variance and the coefFicient of variation.
ZSee, Kakwani (1980)
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3.2.2 Variance and coefficient of variation
The variance was a statistical method. Applied to measuring income inequalities, the
method calculates the average squared difference between individuals' incomes and
their average income.
Definition: Variance For a population with N individuals, let I~ denote the
absolute income level of an individual, and let I indicate the average income of all
individuals. The variance (V~ is given by
V- ~Ni~Ii-Í~a
N
Like RMD, the variance is also simple. Moreover, it is sensitive to income transfers
for all income levels. The problems with the variance are that it is dependent on
the mean income level and the measurement unit of income. For example, assume
that distribution A's mean income is to some extent lower than distribution B's mean
income, and that a relatively great variation happens in distribution A and a relatively
small variation happens in distribution B. In that case, the variance may record a
larger value on distribution B than on distribution A. The variance depends on
the measurement unit of income because the variance measures the average squared
difference in income level. These drawbacks are avoided by the coefficient of variation,
which eliminates the scale by dividing the square root of the variance over the mean
income.
Definition: Coefficient of variation The coefficient of variation (CV) is
The problem with the CV is that it attaches equal weights to income transfers at
different income levels.3 For example, assume that there are two income transfers of
the same amount; one transfers 100 from a person whose income is 10,000 to another
whose income is 9000, another transfers 100 from a person whose income is 1000 to
another whose income is 900. In that case, the CV will record the same impact of
income transfer for both the transfers. However, there are other measures that do not
have this drawback. One of these is the family of logarithmic measures.
3Sen (1973), p. 28.
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3.2.3 Variance of logarithms and standard derivation of log-
arithms
The family of logarithm measures includes variance of logarithms and standard de-
viation of logarithms. The logarithm measures possess the properties that R.1~I D, V
and CV do, except that they are not as simple as the RMD, V and CV because of
the logarithm form. In addition, the logarithm measures can attach importance to
income transfers at the lower end.
Definitíon: Variance of logarithms The variance of logarithms (V L) is that
VL - ~N
1(log h - log 1)z
N
Definition: Standard deviation of logarithms The standard deviation of
logarithms (SDL) is that
SDL - VLZ
Common between the above measures is that all of them consider income dif-
ferences between each income and the mean income. However, it is also desirable
that income differences can be measured between all the pairs of income. The Gini
coefficient is this kind of ineasure of income distribution.
3.2.4 The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is often defined with the Lorenz curve, which was introduced by
Lorenz (1905) to measure the concentration of wealth. The Gini coefficient is an index
based upon the Lorenz curve.' The Lorenz curve reflects the comparative position
between the cumulative proportion of income and the cumulative proportion of the
population in a simple way. The below figure illustrates this idea.
4Kakwani ( 1980) gave a comprehensive exposition of both.
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O P(Y)
Figure: Lorenz curves
In the figure, the horizontal axis indicates the cumulative proportion of the pop-
ulation, while the vertical axis indicates the cumulative proportion of income corre-
sponding to the proportions of the population. Each point onthe Lorenz curve points
out how large the proportion of income is possessed by a given proportion of the
population with the lowest incomes. Thus, a diagonal line represents the egalitarian
distribution, and the lines (OPOI ) state the case of absolute inequality. The Lorenz
curve will be located in between these two extremes.
Definition: Lorenz curve Let I indicate the income level, let P(I) indicate the
cumulative proportion of the population whose income is lower than or equal to I,
and let L(P) indicate the cumulative proportion of total income of the population P.
Then, the Lorenz curve is the graph of the function L(P).
Definition: Lorenz superiority Income distribution A is Lorenz superior to
an income distribution B if LA(P(I)) ~ LB(P(I)) for any P.
In general, the Lorenz curve can provide the precise figures of some income distri-
butions, and can even reveal the rankings of the income distributions by the concept
of Lorenz superiority. However, because the Lorenz curve is unable to provide numer-
ical results on income distribution, it will encounter problems in comparing income
distributions when the Lorenz curves of the income distributions intersect each other.
In that case, Lorenz superiority is not applicable to reveal the rankings of income dis-
tributions. A numerical measure that can reveal the ranking of income distributions
is the Gini coefficient.
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Definition: Gini coefficient The Gini coefjicient (Gini) is the ratio of the area
between the egalitarian line and the Lorenz curve to the area between the egalitarian
line and the absolute inequality curve.
Formally, the Gini coefficient is that (for the continuous case),
i
Gini - 1- 2 f L(P)dP,
0
and let y indicate income share ( for the discrete case),
n~




The Gini coefficient is one of the most popular measures of income inequality,
because of its simple way to explain inequality. A weak point is that Gini's decom-
posability is limited. There exist some measures that have additive decomposability;
among them, Theil's index is a popular one.
3.2.5 Theil's index
Theil's index, proposed by Theil ( 1967), is based on entropy in information theory.
Because of its logarithm form, the Theil index is not as simple as the Gini coefFicient,
but it can be divided into between-group and within-group inequalities. In partic-
ular, Theil's index possesses the properties of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle,
Symmetry, Income homogeneity, Population homogeneity, Additive decomposability
and Monotonicity, which are proposed to be fulfilled by qualified measures of income
inequality, which makes it attractive for application.
Definition: Theil's index Theil's indea is the logarithm of the geometric mean of
the ratios of each individual's income to per capita income in the population, weighted
by the individual's income.
Total Theil's inequality can be decomposed into between-group and within-group
inequalities. The between-group inequality is the logarithm of the geometric mean
of the ratios of each per capita income in each group to per capita income in the
total population, weighted by the per capita income in each group. The within-
group inequality is the logarithm of the geometric mean of the geometric mean of the
ratios of each individual's income to per capita income in the group, weighted by the
individual's income and the group's per capita income.
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If N individuals with total 1 income, the income of each of which is 1; and the
income share of each is y; for j - 1, ..., N and ~N 1 yj - 1, can be divided into G
groups and each of them includes Ng individuals with total Ig income, and the sum
of income shares of individuals in each group is Yg -~N', y; for g- 1...G, and let Ig
and I indicate per capita income in group g and in the total population, respectively,
then Theil's index can be expressed as follows:
eTotal inequality ~( ~ )i,
j-1
eBetween-group inequality - ~ ( ~ )i9
g-1
eTotal within-group inequality X G h 9 h~, i,~(~(Í ) )
g-1 j-1 g






















~ Y ~ y' lo N yig ~, g g Y
g-1 j-1 9 9
(3.2)
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3.2.6 Atkinson's measure
The positive family of income measures faced the difficulty that the empirical results
revealed by different measures within the family were often contradictory. This prob-
lem reduces the credibility of this family. Atkinson (1970) showed the inconsistency in
the measurements between the Gini coefficient, the Standard deviation of logarithms
and the Coefficient of variation, by means of which he measured and compared the
degree of income inequality in 12 countries. This problem has drawn economists'
attention to the social welfare behind the measures. It is argued that the existing
positive measures implicitly describe social welfare, so that all of them in fact reveal
a partial rather than a complete ranking. A proper measure should consider social
welfare explicitly; such a measure is therefore called a`normative measure'. Dal-
ton (1920) was the first to notice the specific welfare properties implied by positive
measures. He proposed a direct use of the social welfare function. Atkinson (1970)
developed a new measure to avoid the variance with respect to linear transformations
of the utility function used in Dalton's measure. Subsequently, Sen (1973) generalized
Atkinson's measure by introducing a more general social welfare function. Because
Atkinson's measure is a typical measure among the family of normative measures, I
shall briefly introduce it in this section.
Definition: Atkinson measure The Atkinson measure is one minus the ratio
of the equally distributed equivalent level of income, IE, in the equally distributed
distribution to the mean, I, of the level of income in the actual distribution.
Atkinson's measure - 1 - IE
I.
If the social welfare function is homothetic, and let f(I~) denote the individuals




The only parameter in the measure is e, which reflects the degree of inequality
aversion or the relative sensitivity of inequality to transfers at different income levels.
Because the parameter needs to be designed artificially, Atkinson's measure has not
been widely applied.
Normative measures have nice theoretical properties, but they cannot yet substi-
tute for positive measures. As Foster ( 1994) pointed out, it is difficult in practice to
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specify the utility function for a normative measure and, more generally, the iden-
tification of inequality with welfare loss might require a more explicit definition of
feasible redistribution.
In addition to searching the substitution for positive measure in the field of norma-
tive measures, economists have recently also worked on identifying the qualification
of the positive measures by properties that any qualified measure should possess. The
more properties that are adopted, the fewer measures hat will remain qualified. The
next section will discuss the basic properties of the income inequality measure and
the evaluation on positive measures in detail to prove that Theil's index is the only
one fulfilling basic characterizations.
3.3 Properties of ineasures
Although simplicity is important for any income inequality measures, it cannot as-
sure the qualification of a measure of income inequality. The previous section intro-
duced a number of popular positive and normative measures without specifying their
properties. In general, every income inequality measure is characterized by certain
properties or axioms. The basic proposed axioms are the Pigou-Dalton transfer prin-
ciple, Symmetry, Income homogeneity and Population homogeneity. In some cases,
Additive decomposability and Monotonicity are added. Fields and Fei (1978), Cowell
and Kuga (1981), Shorrocks (1980), Foster (1983) et al. found that the Coefficient of
variation, the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson measure and Theil's index fulfiled all four
of the basic axioms. Foster (1983) proved that Theil's index additionally possessed
Additive decomposability. Shorrocks (1988) further showed that Theil's index also
satisfied Monotonicity.
An essential property of an income inequality measure is that if income is trans-
ferred from the poor to the rich, inequality shall increase. Pigou (1912) and Dalton
(1920) first proposed this property.
Pigou-Dalton income transfer principle
Any income transfer from low to high increases inequality.
Symmetry
Inequality is invariant to the identification of individuals.
The measure has symmetry, if different permutations of individuals do not yield
different inequalities.
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Income homogeneity
Inequality depends on the relative levels of individuals' income, but is independent
of the absolute levels of individuals' income in a distribution.
This axiom means that when two distributions differ only in the absolute levels of
their income, the two have equivalent inequality. This property enables comparison
to be made between income distributions without considering the difference in mean
income levels.
Theorem 3.3.1 The Coef~jïcient of variation, the Variance of logarithms, the Gini
coef,~tcient, Theil's index and the Atkinson measure possess all three properties.
Fields and Fei (1978) and Fields (1980) have proved this theorem. Atkinson (1970)
stated that Variance failed Income homogeneity and that the Relative mean deviation
was insensitive to transfers on the same side of the mean and therefore could not fulfil
the Transfer principle.
Besides the three mentioned axioms, Dasgupta, Sen and 5tarrett (1973) proposed
Population homogeneity. This axiom may not be included in the family of basic
properties, but it is important to compare the inequality between populations of
different sizes. It has therefore been discussed in Shorrocks (1980), Foster (1983) and
others.
Population homogeneity
Inequality of a population is not changed if the population is replicated.
With this property, inequality depends on the proportion of individuals in each
income level, but is independent of the population size. The property means that two
distributions with the same income proportions but with different population sizes
have identical inequalities.
Theorem 3.3.2 Among the income inequality measures satisfying the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle, Symmetry and Income homogeneity and Population ho-
mogeneity, Coe,fficient of variation, Variance of logarithms, the Cini coe,f,~icient and
Theil's index also fulfil the Population homogeneity.
Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973) showed that Atkinson's measure fulfilled this
property. Shorrocks (1980) showed that the Coefficient of variation, Variance of loga-
rithms and Theil's index satisfied the Population homogeneity. It is trivial to see that
the Gini coefficient also has this property.
Income inequality measures are often demanded for addressing various contribu-
tory factors in applications. The property of Additive decomposability enables the
income inequality measures to meet the demands.
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Additive decomposability
The inequality of an income distribution can be divided into the inequality within
its subgroups and the inequality between its subgroups. Total inequality is equivalent
to the sum of the average of the inequality within subgroups and the inequality between
the subgroups.
Theorem 3.3.3 Theil's index is the only measure satisfying all the fave axioms.
The theorem has been proved by Foster (1983).
Monotonicity
If only a within-group ineguality changes while all others stay the same, then the
overall inequality must change by the sarae amount.
Theorem 3.3.4 Theil's index satisftes Monotonicity.
The theorem has been proved by Shorrocks (1988).
3.4 The extended form of Theil's index
Theil's measure, as Theil himself has realized, must depend on the information avail-
able on the specification of each individual's income. When there are many individuals
whose income is less likely to be specified, the method will encounter calculation prob-
lems. To handle this problem, Theil (1967) proposed an approach of ordinary income
distribution, which dealt with the case that only the number of individuals in any
given income interval was specified, rather than the income of each individual. The
key of this approach is to assume the statistical form of the income distribution. For
example, the ]ognormal distribution and the Pareto distribution can be used. Under
lognormal distribution, the total within-group inequality of Theil's index is equal to
half the variance of the natural logarithm of income shares. Let v2 be the variance of
the natural logarithm of income shares,
Theil's Index - 2v2,
Denote o as the Pareto parameter, which Pareto found to be approximately 1.5.
Under the Pareto distribution, Theil (1967) derived that
Theil's Index - I - log a
a-1 ~-1~
The weakness of this approach is obviously that the results depend on the specific
distributions. Nevertheless, there is an alternative way to avoid this specification
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problem. Income differences among individuals are usually shown from various factors
such as individuals' skills, social stage, property, location, etc.. If one can identify
the inequalities resulting from each of these factors separately, the residual should be
zero when unconsidered factors are ignored. 'I'he proposed method in this section is
to multiply classified individuals into groups, until the individuals itt the same group
have roughly the same incomes. This method, in fact, divides total inequality into
various between-group inequalities and ends up with within-group inequalities that
are caused by unconsidered factors. The multiple classifications require an extension
of Theil's measure being capable of decomposing the overall inequality into various
between-group inequalities. This extension is made in this section.
Assuming that there are N individuals, the income share of individual j is y~, and
these are such that ~N 1 y~ - 1. First, divide all individuals into G groups, St, ..., S~.




and the income share of Sg is
IVy
Yg - ~ ygi.~-t





A Theil entropy H(y) may therefore be expressed as follows:
G Ny 1
H(y) - ~ ~ yg~ log -g-i~-i ygi
c 1 c
- ~ Yg log ~,g f ~ YgHg(y).
On the basis of the above entropies, Theil (1967) obtained an inequality measure
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This is the well-known Theil index measure of income inequality. The left-hand
side expresses the overall inequality. The first term on the right-hand side deals
with the between-group inequality, while the second term reflects the average of total
within-group inequalities.
Further, divide the individuals in S9 into F subgroups, Tl, ..., TF, according to









Let y9 fj denote the income share of individual j in the subgroup f in the group
total income of the population, the income share of subgroup f is
NsJ
Y9f - ~ y9fJ~
j-1




and the entropy of group g can be written as
H9(y) - ~
Yst log Y9 ,
f-1 9 9Í
then the overall Theil entropy H(y) can be written as
C F NJ 1
H(y) - ~ ~ ~ yslj log -y-if-ij-i ysli
- ~Y91ogy9~~Y9H9(y)f9~Y9f~ 9fH9J(y)'
9
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On the right-hand side, the first term is the entropy between G groups, the second
term is the average of the entropies between F subgroups in all G groups, and the third
term is the average of the entropies in all F subgroups and in all G groups. Following
Theil, an extensive form of Theil's index with respect to a two-times classification can
be developed as follows:
c ~,
log N- H(y) - ~ Yg log g
g-i Ng~N
~~ Yg ~ Ygf log Ygf ~Yg
g-i f-i Yg Nsf~Ng
G F Y Ngf Y
} [~ ~.g ~ 9Í ~` y9I7 lOg ygfj, 9f
g-L1 f-1 }r9 j(,-J1 Y9f 1,N9Í
When there are rrz times classifications, the total entropy is obtained by further
decomposing subgroups into subsubgroups and so on. That is
H(y) -
~
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The general form of the extended Theil's index is
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~ g~Yg~
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This research intends to apply the extended form of Theil's index to measure income
inequalities regarding the current and hypothetical Chinese economy. Because these
direct applications are a bit complex, I present an example for a twofold purpose: to
demonstrate the function of the extended form of Theil's measure and to introduce
the applications briefly. In the example, an economy is considered consisting of two
types of population, labor and non-labor. There are two areas, rural and urban,
and two provinces, developed and under-developed. Because the area and province
overlap, to specify each individual in the economy, the population must be classified
twice according to the area and the province where they reside. In principle, there
are alternative ways to identify the population. In the first way, the population
members are divided into two groups by area: the population in the rural area and
the population in the urban area; then, the people in each area are further separated
into two subgroups by province: the population in the developed province in the rural
area, in the under-developed province in the rural area, in the developed province in
the urban area, and in the under-developed province in the urban area. In the second
way to identify the population, the population is divided first of all into two groups by
province: the population in the developed province and the population in the under-
developed province; the population in each province is then further separated into
two subgroups by area: the population in the rural area in the developed province,
in the urban area in the developed province, in the rural area in the under-developed
province, and in the urban area in the under-developed province.
The first program provides the following four sets of information: overall inequal-
ity, inequality between rural and urban areas, inequality between provinces in rural
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and in urban areas, and inequality between social classes in provinces and areas. The
second program provides the following four sets of information: overall inequality, in-
equality between developed and under-developed provinces, inequality between areas
in developed and in under-developed provinces, and inequality between social classes
in provinces and areas. The two programs have exactly same results regarding the
overall inequality and the inequality between social classes in areas and in provinces.
However, they are difFerent in the second and the third term. The second term ín the
first program is an overall inequality between areas in the economy, but the program
cannot show separately the inequality between areas in each province. The third term
in the second program provides the inequality between areas in each province and also
the average of the inequalities. However, the average of the inequality between areas
in provinces in the second program in general is not equal to the overall inequality
between areas in the first program, even though the two are intuitively same. This
difference is caused by the use of different methods, which I shall discuss in detail im-
mediately after the example. Similarly, the third term in the first program provides
the inequality between provinces and the average of the inequalities, while the second
term in the second program is an overall inequality between provinces in the economy.
The combination of the two programs will be complements in providing a complete
set information on the inequality regarding the economy, its areas and provinces.
The information in the two programs is presented in the following tables:
Developed province Under-developed province
Rural Non-labor 1 1
area Labor 1 1
Urban Non-labor 1 1
area Labor 1 1
Table 3.a Population allocation in program 1.
Developed province Under-developed province
Rural Non-labor 1 1
area Labor 2 2
Urban Non-labor 5 3
area Labor 6 4
Table 3.b Income distribution in program 1.
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Rural Urban
Developed Non-labor 1 1
province Labor 1 1
Under-developed Non-labor 1 1
province Labor 1 1
Table 3.c Population allocation in program 2.
Rural Urban
Developed Non-labor 1 5
province Labor 2 6
Under-developed Non-labor 1 3
province Labor 2 4
Table 3.d Income distribution in program 2.
Given the information, Theil's index in either program is calculated as follows:
Program 1 Program 2 Combination
Overall inequality 0.0732 0.0732 0.0732
Overall inequality between areas 0.0568 - 0.0568
Overall inequality between provinces - 0.0061 0.0061
The average of the inequality between 0.0081 - 0.0081
provincesin each area
The inequality between provinces 0 - 0
in the rural area
The inequality between provinces 0.011 - 0.011
in the urban area
The average of the inequality between - 0.0588 0.0588
areas in each province
The inequality between areas - 0.0754 0.0754
in the developed province
The inequality between areas - 0.0357 0.0357
in the under-developed province
The average of the inequality between 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083
population types in areas and provinces
Table 3.e Inequalities in program 1 and 2.
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In both cases, the overall inequality and the inequality among the population types
within both areas and provinces remain constant. Note, however, that the overall
inequality between areas in program 1 is not equal to the average of the inequality
between areas in provinces in program 2, and the overall inequality between provinces
in program 2 is not equal to the average of the inequality between provinces in areas in
program 2. There are small differences between them, which result from the different
way used to approach the inequality. In the practice of this research, these different
approaches cause very little differences between the inequalities, so that the differences
can be neglected.
Denote G as area grouping and F as province grouping, and denote TBG as the
inequality between G groups, Ig - N as per capita income in group g, and 1- ~, as
per capita income in the total population; for the sake of simplicity the exponential
form of the Theil inequality between G groups with program 1 is written as
eTac - ~ ( N ~N )Y' (3.3)
g-1 9
- ~( j9)s (3.4)
g-1
Similarly, the exponential form of the average of the inequalities between subgroups
G in all F groups with program 2 is written as
N
eTwithin F groups - j~ ( TT ( yfg~Yt )y9)Yf (3.5)
t1-11 g1-11 I,Nf
- ~(~( Íg)~)~ (3.6)
f-~ g-~ i
By definition, total Theil's inequality is the logarithm of a geometric mean, weight-
ed by the weights of per capita income in total income, of the ratios of each individual's
income to the mean income. In program 1, the overall inequality between areas is
the logarithm of a geometric mean, weighted by the weights of income in each area
in total income, of the ratios of the arithmetic means of each individual's income in
each area to the mean income. In program 2, the average of the inequalities between
areas in provinces is the logarithm of a geometric mean, weighted by the income in
each area in total income, of the inequalities between areas in each province that is a
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geometric mean, weighted by the weights of each individual's income in total income
in each province, of the ratios of each individual's income to per capita income in each
province.
3.5 Applications of the extended form of Theil's
index
This section extends the dimensions of the previous example to suit the Chinese
economy, whose population is classified in rural and urban areas, in 30 provinces, and
in eight social classes that were discussed in Chapter 2. The application decomposes
the overall income inequality in China into the inequality between rural and urban
areas, the inequality between provinces, the inequality between social classes, and the
inequality within social classes. The decomposition is additive as follows:
Overall inequality
- inequality between areas
f inequality between provinces
~ inequality between social classes
f inequality within social classes
As this research is interested in the income inequalities resulting from the dif-
ferences in areas, regions and social classes, it assumes that the income inequalities
within social classes are minor after the three major inequalities have been separated
out of the overall inequality; I therefore ignore the existence of the income inequality
within social classes. The assumption is based on the analysis on each of the social
classes that income inequality within each social class is small. In the classes of techni-
cian, staff, skilled and unskilled worker, income differences between technicians, staff
workers, skilled and unskilled workers result mainly from position and age. According
to the Wage Reform Program of the Government (1993) in Table 3.f, the distance
between top and bottom technicians is 505 Yuan, but there are 32 positions between
the top and bottom. On average, the wage difference between any two adjacent posi-
tions is nearly 16 Yuan, which accounts for less than 10010 of the bottom wage or 2.5Q1o
of the top wage. The distance between the top and bottom staff is 550 Yuan, but
there are 47 positions between the top and bottom. On average, the wage difference
between any two adjacent positions is nearly 12 Yuan, which accounts for less than
9~ of the bottom wage or 2o-l0 of the top wage. The distance between the top and
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bottom skilled workers is 274 Yuan, but there are also 47 positions between the top
and bottom. On average, the wage difference between any two adjacent positions is
nearly 6 Yuan, which accounts for only 4PIo of the bottom wage or 1.5010 of the top
wage. The distance between the top and bottom unskilled workers is 125 Yuan, but
there are ten positions between the top and bottom. On average, the wage differ-
ence between any two adjacent positions is 12.5 Yuan, which accounts for only 9PIo
of the bottom wage or 5070 of the top wage. Since the retiree's income is accounted
as the average of technician's, staff's, skilled and unskilled worker's incomes, and the
dependant's income occupations also depend on the average, there should be a sim-
ilar situation of income inequality within the retired and dependant class. However,
there may exist big income differences within the self-employed and capitalist classes,
but because these classes' income and population are still relatively small in current
Chinese markets, the big inequalities in these classes will not significantly affect the
average within-class inequality.
Occupations Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Technician (1) 390 430 470 520 570 620 670
(2) 275 305 335 365 395 435 475 515 555
(3) 205 225 245 265 285 315 345 375 405 435
(4) 165 179 193 213 233 253
5taff (1) 480 520 560 605 650 695
(2) 335 370 405 440 480 520 560
(3) 235 260 285 310 340 370 400 430
(4) 180 198 216 234 252 276 300 324 348 372
(5) 160 174 188 202 216 233 250 267
(6) 145 157 169 181 193 207 221 235
Skilled ( 1) 245 267 289 315 341 367 393 419
(2) 205 223 241 259 283 307 331 355 379
(3) 180 196 212 228 248 268 288 308 328 348
(4) 160 174 188 202 224 238 256 274 292 310
(5) 145 157 169 181 197 213 229 245 261 277
Unskilled 135 146 157 168 182 196 `? 10 ~~ ~'2-1 ~'? t Z ~~~60
Table 3.f Wage Reform in China in 1993
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This section adopts two programs to decompose the Chinese economy, because a
single program cannot provide sufficient information required by this research. The
data gaps that remain in one program can be filled by the information from another
program. In program 1, the population is divided by province first, and then each
province is divided by area. In program 2, the population is divided by area first,
and then each area is divided by province. Program 1 does not include the informa-
tion on the overall inequality between areas and the inequalities between provinces in
each area; program 2 does not have the information on the overall inequality between
provinces and the inequalities between areas in each province. The final informa-
tion set provided jointly by the two programs will be on inequality with respect to
provinces, rural and urban areas, and social classes. These programs will be applied
to measure the inequalities in the current Chinese economy in Chapter 4 and the
inequalities in the competitive Chinese economy in Chapter 7.
Let G be area grouping, F province grouping, and E social class grouping. Theil's
measures of the two programs have the following extended forms:
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Program 1: First, the economy is divided into 30 provinces. Second, each
province is separated into rural and urban areas. Third, the population in each area
in each province is divided into eight social classes, namely unskilled labor, skilled
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Program 2: First, the economy is divided into rural and urban areas. 5econd,
each area is separated into 30 provinces. Third, the population in each area and
















Income Distribution in the Current
Chinese Economy
4.1 Introduction
China's 1978 economic reform started from income distribution. This reform aimed
at changing the old centrally-controlled wage system to an income-setting system that
advocates that people be paid for effort. This is, in fact, a change from egalitarian
to efficiency. Time has shown that the reform indeed drives the development of the
Chinese economy. Meanwhile, however, the economic reform has also caused some
new problems, one of which is income inequality. In any economy, inequality is an
important issue; if inequality becomes a serious problem, it will result in the instability
of society, and further hurt the economy. At present, there is increasing concern that
income inequality may become a sensitive problem, because people in many classes
complain that income is being distributed unfairly - the rich are becoming richer, and
the poor are becoming poorer.
This real economic problem is motivating economists to evaluate income distribu-
tion in the current Chinese market. Studies on the topic have mostly been involved
with subjects such as inequalities in rural and urban areas, inequality between rural
and urban areas, inequality in and between regions, and inequality between social
classes. Much of the research work, like Zhu and Wen (1990), Grifl'in et al. (1994),
and Wang et al. (1995), has investigated the inequality in rural areas and in urban
area. A popular conclusion from those studies is that the inequality in either rural or
urban areas is in fact within a proper range - it is not yet high enough to constitute
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a serious problem. Moreover, there is more inequality in rural areas than in urban
areas. It is also commonly observed that the inequality between rural and urban ar-
eas is significant and rigid. Wang et al. (1995) observed that the income difference
between rural and urban areas was showing an increasing trend. In Yang (1992), the
inequality was unbalanced across regions. The developed eastern part of China had
more inequality than the less developed middle part and the least developed western
part, and the middle and western parts had similar inequality. Moreover, Zhu and
Wen (1990) and Grifhin et al. (1994) found that there were no relationships between
inequality and economic development in each province. As regards the income dif-
ferences among social classes, studies have assured at similar conclusions that private
owners and the self-employed earn the highest income, and low-skilled labor's income
is close to that of high-skilled labor.
The existing studies reveal some features of the personal income distribution in the
current Chinese market, but they are still far away from satisfactory, because most
of the studies are based on rough data and analyze the data by superficial methods;
the results thereafter are partial and limited. So far, the most popular information
sources on personal income are the official data provided by the state and the local
statistical and labor bureau through their regular surveys on households and labor.
Unfortunately, these data are too general to be used directly for specific research.
Without a careful specification on the data to be used, any research on personal income
distribution that relies only and directly on the official data produces inevitably poor
results. Unsatisfied with the official data, Griffin, et al. (1994) did a special sampling
survey with respect to Chinese income. Owing to the huge population in China,
this survey was able to collect only a very small amount of information. 5o far,
the methods often adopted in studying personal income distribution are comparing
the income means, calculating the mean deviations and the Gini coefficients. Gini
coefficient is one of the most popular methods, but the income mean and the mean
deviation, even though they can approach the income distribution roughly, have been
disqualified for measuring income inequality. The conclusions obtained through the
data and methods are therefore double.
It is possible to investigate personal income distribution more comprehensively.
First, in addition to the Gini coefficient, other qualified methods exist that could
be used to measure income inequality; Theil's index, in particular, which has been
discussed extensively in Chapter 3, is attractive. So far, this method has not been
applied popularly to measure income inequality in China. Second, existing informa-
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tion sources could be utilized and developed more effectively. In fact, there exist
many information sources such as statistical data, labor and wage data, census data,
special surveys, samplings, and relevant literature. The problem is that the sources
are usually presented in isolation. If they can be connected together to some extent,
more information will become available. Inconsistencies and gaps in data abound in
special research. To overcome these problems, researchers must consider derivation
and estimation based on the relevant information.
This chapter attempts to study current personal income distribution by the ex-
tended form of Theil's index. The chapter includes three parts: a brief introduction
to the Chinese economy, a description of data collection on population and personal
income, and an application of Theil's index to measure income inequalities.
Section 2 will provide a general picture on the current economy of China. Since
this research is especially applied to China, it is necessary to overview certain institu-
tional and economic characteristics of the economy of China before going further to
investigate one of its economic aspects - income distribution. The economic reform
started in 1978 is perhaps the most important event in the history of China's commu-
nist government. Nowadays, this event not only affects Chinese life but also involves
the world economy. Section 2 first addresses the economic reform before going on to
introduce the economic foundations, structures and relations.
To calculate Theil's index, I need two sets of data: namely the population, which
must be classified with respect to area, province and social class, and the correspond-
ing incomes of the population categories. Section 3 describes the procedure of data
collection. In that section, with respect to social class, the population is divided in-
to eight classes by income source: the primary income earner (including unskilled,
skilled, technician, manager, self-employed, and capitalist, the transfer income earner
- including only retiree, and the family income earner - referring to dependant); with
respect to the rural and urban areas, the population consists of a rural and an urban
population; and with respect to the province, the population is by province. The final
data are sufficiently detailed to the extent that the person in a certain class has the
same three marks of social class, area and province. For example, a manager in an
urban area in Beijing, and a child in a rural area in Gansu province. The data on
the classified population are not directly available. But, these can be easily derived
from the 1992 Population Census in China. The data on income levels, however, are
difficult to collect. For this reason, a number of information sources are employed to
derive the data, and sometimes estimations are made to fill the gaps and to connect
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the piecemeal data.
Based on the data, Section 4 calculates Theil's index by the extended method
that was developed in Chapter 3, and investigates income inequalities. The overall
inequality in the nation consists of the inequality between social classes, the inequality
between rural and urban areas, and the inequality between provinces. The overall in-
equality in each area consists of the inequality between social classes and the inequality
between provinces in the area. The overall inequality in each province consists of the
inequality between social classes and the inequality between rural and urban areas in
the province.
4.2 China's economy
4.2.1 The economic reform
Having suffered a political and economic disaster for nearly 30 years since 1949, China
moved toward economic reform in 1978. At the outset, this reform was carefully at-
tempted in rural areas, where the centrally-controlled income distribution mechanism
was changed to a new mechanism that allowed farmers to work for themselves and
to be paid for their achievement. The reform was greatly welcomed by farmers, and
rapidly spread to all the rural areas within the next six years. During the period from
1979-1984, the rural economy grew rapidly. Rural gross output has grown 7.6070, and
farmer's per capita income has grown 17.7101o per year. The success in the rural areas
subsequently drove the entire national economy into the market reform. In 1985, the
urban economic reform was started - with changing from a fixed to a flexible wage
system. The central government released the power in setting wages to local gov-
ernments and firms. This reform stimulated the urban economy to grow drastically.
During the period from 1985-1988, per capita income in urban areas has grown 16.5~0
per year. Looking at the reform period from 1978-1994, in total, rural income has
grown over nine times, and urban income nearly seven and half times.
As the economic reform went further, however, a number of new problems also
emerged. In the initial stage of economic reform, Chinese was mainly interested in
the increase of income levels. After a short while, inflation and inequality drew most of
their concern. But, while inflation has been under effective control by the government
in recent years, the escalating trend of income inequality remains a challenge.
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4.2.2 The households
China has the largest population in the world. According to the population census
(1990), nearly 28P1o of the population are juniors aged under 15, 62oIo are workers
aged between 16-59 (16-54 for female), and l0~lo are senior citizens aged above 60 (55
for female). Among the population above the age of 15, 79~o make up the working
population, and the rest (21010) comprise the non-working population. The latter
includes students, home makers, the urban unemployed, retirees, the disabled and
others. The rural unemployed is not observed, and even the urban unemployed is only
0.7~0 of the population above 15. Workers are ranked according to occupation, with
eight basic categories, namely technician, manager, staff, commercial worker, service
worker, farmer, industrial worker, and others. Traditionally, managers and staff are
categorized into managers, commercial workers and industrial workers into skilled
labor, while service workers, farmers and others comprise unskilled labor. Among
the working population, 5.307o are technicians, 2.8~o are managers, 18.9oIo are skilled
laborers, and 73Q1o are unskilled laborers. Note that farmers are nearly 71oIo of the
working population. During recent years, there have been about one hundred million
farmers moving around the country each year to search for higher income jobs.
Since economic reform, two new types of working people have emerged in the mar-
ket: the capitalists and the self-employed. In China, firms are classified according to
ownership into state-owned, collectively owned, other ownership, and private firms.
The "other" ownership firms include joint management, stock ownership, foreign fund-
ed, overseas Chinese funded, and other units. The private firm is owned privately by
domestic Chinese. The capitalist, therefore, refers to the owner of "other" ownership
and private firms. In 1993, self-employed workers comprised nearly 5Plo of the working
population, while capitalists made up roughly 0.12PIo of the working population.t
1The data on the working population in 1993 are from the 1999 Yeatbook of Labour Statistics
of China. The number of self-employed is available from Table 7-1, "Number of employed in private
enterprises and individual employment both in urban and rural areas by sector", in the yearbook.
The number of capitalists is the sum of owners of other ownership and private firms. The numbet of
the owners of private firms is available also from Table 7-1, but the number of the owners of other
ownership firms has to be obtained indirectly. The number of the other ownership firms is available
from Table 6-1, "Number and wages of staff and workers by sector", in the yearbook. Assuming that
the average number of owners in the firms is five, then the total number of the owners is the product
of five and the number of other ownership firms.
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4.2.3 Fixed assets and investment
Throughout the period of economic reform, China's assets have increased considerably.
According to the China Statistical Yearbook ( 1995), the fixed assets of state-owned
firms was about 680 billion Yuan in the year 1978 (according to the price in the
year 1993). It has increased, however, to 1770 billion Yuan in the year 1993, with
60P1o in industry, 3.301o in agriculture, 2.301o in construction, 1801o in freight transport
and postal telecommunications, 7.3P1o in trade and catering, and 9.107o in services. The
increase was about 100 billion Yuan per year. At present, the state-owned fixed assets
account for about 60P1o of total national fixed assets. In 1994, total investment was
1783 billion Yuan, 91.8P1o in fixed assets and 8.201o in stock. Fixed assets were 1637
billion Yuan, with 5701o in state-owned firms, 16c1o in collectively-owned firms, 27PIo in
other ownership and private firms. 21o1c of the total investment was in rural areas.
4.2.4 The sectors
China has a complete production system, which covers all the existing sectors. The
first classification according to sectors has six basic sectors: agriculture, industry,
construction, freight transport and postal telecommunications, trade and catering,
and services. According to the Input-output Table of China (1992), gross output was
nearly seven thousand billion Yuan, with 13.3c7o from agriculture, 54.407o from industry,
7.601o from construction, 3.9~o from freight transport and postal telecommunications,
9.3~o from trade and catering, and 11.5P1o from services. The second classification
according to sectors includes traditionally 55 sectors. The 1990 input-output table
was different from the traditional classifications, which included three tables that
were made with respect to the first, second and third classifications, respectively. The
input-output table with the second classification has 33 sectors, and the input-output
table with the third classification has 118 sectors.
4.2.5 The rural and urban economies
China is probably the only country in the world carrying out an administrative system
called "Hukou". The so-called "Hukou" is a hierarchy administration to residence.
This administration is specific to rural and urban "Hukou" and to different local
"Hukou". The "Hukou" acts as an internal passport in China; it strictly discriminates
the holders. Specifically, persons holding rural "Hukou" are identified as farmers who
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are restricted to stay and work in rural areas, persons holding urban "Hukou" are
identified as urban residents. Moreover, persons holding "Hokou" in a particular
location cannot freely exchange these for a"Hukou" in other locations. Over the
past decades, the "Hukou" has been one of the most important factors in identifying
residence and restricting people's activity. During the period before the economic
reform, it was almost impossible for the person without a local "Hukou" to make a
living for himself in a particular location. However, the role of "Hukou" has been
diminishing since the economic reform.
In China, rural and urban areas are classified according to the proportion of res-
idents who hold rural or urban "Hukou". The urban areas involve cities and towns
in which the proportion of people with urban "Hukou" meet government regulations.
The rest of the country is the rural area. According to the population census (1990),
80010 of China's population hold the rural "Hukou", and 20Q1o the urban "Hukou".
Yet, the statistical data also revealed that agriculture contributed only 27o-1o to Chi-
na's GDP, and that per capita income of urban households was twice times that of
the households of farmers. 2
4.2.6 The regional economies
Because of its size, China consists of a number of regional economies. Administra-
tively, China has 30 provinces, each of which is a complete economy. These provincial
economies are under the control of central and local governments. Since the economic
reform, the central government has been releasing more and more of its power to
local governments. Economic development is unbalanced across the provinces. Along
the east coast, there are ten provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoníng, Shanghai,
Jiangshu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Sandong, and Guangdong. In 1994, this part was home
to 36.5~0 of China's population and contributed 55.601o to national GDP.3 Per capita
GDP for the east coast was 5720 Yuan. In the middle part of the country, there are
nine provinces: Sanxi, Neimeng, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan
and Hubei. This part was home to 35.6PIo of China's population and contributed 27.6~
to national GDP. Per capita GDP in the middle part was 2913 Yuan. The western
part has the remaining eleven provinces: Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yun-
nan, Tibet, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. This part was home to
2The data sources are Table 2-10, "Gross national products and its indices", and Table 9-1,
"Improvement in people's material and cultural life", in the 1995 Chína Statistical Yearbook.
3A11 the data in this section are from the 1995 China Statistical Yeatbook.
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27.9o-10 of China's population and contributed 16.8~o to national GDP. Per capita GDP
in the western part was 2260 Yuan. In general, the eastern, middle and western parts
are referred to, respectively, as developed, less-developed and under-developed zones.
4.2.7 Trade
Two kinds of trade exist for each province. One is trade with the rest of China,
another is trade with the rest of the world. In China, trade between provinces is
relatively more important than international trade. There are eleven provinces with
significant trading relations outside of China. Input-output tables (1992) include the
separate information on the trade of these eleven provinces to the rest of China and to
the rest of the world. According to these tables, the trade of each of theses provinces
with the rest of China is much greater than with the rest of the world. Total volume
of exports of the eleven provinces to the rest of China is nearly five times that of
the total volume of exports of the eleven provinces to the rest of the world; the total
volume of imports of the eleven provinces from the rest of China is nearly eleven times
that of the total volume of imports of the eleven provinces from the rest of the world.
4.3 The data
4.3.1 The population data
The calculation of Theil's index requires two sets of data, which are the population
and the income. This research requires the population data with respect to the eight
social classes defined in Chapter 2, with respect to rural and urban areas, and with
respect to provinces. These data are directly available from the China Population
Census (1990), except for the number of capitalists and self-employed.
The data on the classes of unskilled, skilled, manager and technician are obtained
from the China Population Census Vol. 2(1990)4, which presents the data originally
with eight occupations: technician, manager, staff, business, servant, farmer, worker
and others. I aggregate staff, business and worker into the skilled class, and aggregate
4Table 6-15 "City Working Persons by Two Digits Classification of Occupation and Province",
Table 6-16 "Town Working Persons by Two Digits Classification of Occupation and Province", and
Table 6-17 "County Working Persons by Two Digits Classification of Occupation and Province" in
the China Population Census Vol. 2(1990). Among the three, the first two are for urban data, the
third is for rural data.
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servant, farmer and others into the unskilled class. The data on retirees are available
from the other three tables in the China Population Census Vol. 2(1990),5 among
which, the first two are for urban data, the third is for rural data. The data on
family-income dependants can be obtained by collecting relevant items in the China
Population Census (1990), or by simply extracting the number of laborers and retirees
from the total population. This research uses the second way. In addition, because
tlte population census data are in the year 1990, they are adjusted into the year 1992
according to the population in 1992 in China from the source in Statistical Yearbook
of China, 1993.6
The data on the number of capitalists and self-employed are collected separately
from another source, the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (1993).~ Instead of pre-
senting the data on capitalist and self-employed directly, the China Population Census
(1990) already has the data included in the labor categories. Therefore, to make the
data consistent, a number of laborers corresponding to the number of capitalists and
self-employed are extracted out of the labor categories. Neither the China Population
Census (1990) nor the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (1993) provides information
on the occupation of capitalists and the self-employed. It remains unclear how many
of the capitalists and self-employed are either technicians, managers, skilled or un-
skilled. This research simply assumes that all the capitalists and self-employed come
from the skilled class. The final data are presented in Table 4.1.
4.3.2 The income data
The income data are required to correspond to the population categories. As sources
that include sufficient information on personal income are rare, collecting income data
is more difficult than collecting population data. This chapter has had to use as many
information sources as possible to derive the data. Sometimes, assumptions have been
made to fill the data gaps. However, the assumptions have been made reasonably and
the data are estimated consistently. The data on income levels must also be classified:
STable 6-28 "City Non-working Persons by Province", Table 6-29 "Town Non-working Persons
by Province", and Table 6-30 "County Non-working Persons by Ptovince" in the China Population
Census Vol. 2 (1990).
sTable 3-3 "Total Population and Birth Rate, Death Rate and Natural Growth Rate of Population
by Province, 1992" in the Statistical Yearbook of China (1993).
~Table 6-3 "Urban Employment in Private Enterprises and Individual Households by Province"
and Table 6-4 "Rural Employment in Private Enterprises and Individual Households by Province"
in the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (1993).
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according to rural and urban areas, to provinces, and to social classes. The detailed
steps in collecting the income data are as follows:
The first step is to collect data on urban wages. Normally, the wage includes two
parts: the money wage and the social insurance and welfare funds. The China Labour
Statistical Yearbook (1993) provides data on money wage by province,8 and the data
on the social insurance and welfare funds of staff and workers.9
Urban wages represent overall data, which need to be further separated by occu-
pation, as information authorities in China usually collect the wage data regarding
sector rather than occupation. A special survey in the Yearbook of Labour Statistics
of China (1993) provided a section regarding occupational wages. According to the
information, the skilled wage matches the average wage, the unskilled wage equals
0.584 times the average wage, the manager's wage equals 1.035 times the average
wage, and the technician's wage equals 1.052 times the average wage. to Assuming
these ratios are applicable to all provinces, I can then separate the provincial data on
urban wage by occupation.
So far, the incomes of capitalists and the self-employed have not been screened well
by the Chinese government. Formal information from the government on capitalist
and the self-employed income is rare. However, small studies have frequently involved
this issue. Most of the studies estimate that capitalist income could be around ten
times, and self-employed income could be around four times, that of a skilled worker.ll
In this research, I borrow the two ratios to determine capitalist and self-employed
incomes in the urban areas.
sTable 1-65 "Number and Total Wage Bill of Staff and Workers by Province" in the China Labour
Statistical Yearbook (1993).
9These are presented in four other separate tables, Table 9-20 "Composition of Total Social Insur-
ance and Welfate Funds of Staff and Workers in State-owned Units by Province", Table 9-31 "Compo-
sition of Total Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workers in Urban Collectively-owned
Units by Province", Table 9-34 "Composition of Total Social Insurance and Welfate Funds of Staff
and Workers in Units of Other Ownership by Province", and Table 9-36 "Composition of Total So-
cial Insurance and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workets in Foreign Funded Enterprises by Province".
The average of these tables is the total social insurance and welfare funds of staff and workers by
province.
loIn the Yearbook of Labour Statistics of China (1993), Table 7-13 "Increase Rate of Wages of 14
Cities' and Counties' Staff and Workers" gives the average wages by occupation in October, 1992
as follows: unskilled 150.62 Yuan, skilled 257.87 Yuan, technician 271.22 Yuan, and manager 266.87
Yuan. In other words, the technician's wage is 1.016 over the manager's wage, 1.052 over the skilled,
and 1.8 over the unskilled. Since the average of the wages is 257.89 Yuan, it can be seen that the
unskilled worker's wage equals 0.584 of the average, the skilled worker's wage equals the average, the
manager's wage equals 1.035 of the average, and the technician's wage equals 1.052 of the average.
11See, Zhong (1989), Yang and Shao (1989), Chu (1990), Li (1990), Luo (1989), and Zhao (1992).
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The data on retired income in urban areas are directly available from the Yearbook
of Labour Statistics of China (1993).12
The income of dependants is obtained by assuming that all families have the
same composition in urban areas; in other words, dependants are equally allocated
to the people on whom they depend. Since income is shared within the family, a
dependant will get a higher income if his income comes from ~vorking persons who
earn more. If the numbers were known of how many dependants are dependent on
which classes of people, it would be easy to derive their income. Unfortunately, this
kind of information does not exist. Therefore, by assuming that dependants are spread
equally among their families, and further by calculating a unique dependency ratio,
which is the ratio of dependants to primary income earners,13 this research obtains the
dependant's income by dividing the average of the primary income earners' incomes
over the dependency ratio. The primary income earners have the net income left after
sharing their primary income with the family. At the stage after the family income
distribution, the average of the net incomes of the primary earners is the same amount
as the income received by the dependants.
The income of rural labor is not directly available, because economic data in rural
areas are usually surveyed with respect to household rather than with respect to labor.
I have to estimate the data from relevant information sources. The Yearbook of Survey
on Rural Households (1992) includes the data on national rural households' income by
education in the year 1991. According to experience, educational level is significantly
related to occupation in rural areas. Therefore, following the general way to connect
one's education level with his occupation in China, I define the occupations of rural
labor by education as follows: those with educational years fewer than six belong to
the unskilled, those have between 7-12 years belong to the skilled, and those having
above 12 years belong to the manager and the technician. In this way, rural labor's
income can be split by occupation, even though the data are still national macro data
12In the Yearbook of Labour Statistics of China (1993), there are four tables used: Table 9-25
"Composition of Total Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of Stafí and Workers under Termination,
Retirement and Resignation in State-owned Units by Province", Table 9-32 "Composition of Total
Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workers under Termination, Retirement and Res-
ignation in Urban Collectively owned Units by Province", Table 9-35 "Composition of Total Social
Insurance and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workers under Termination, Retirement and Resignation
in Units of Other Ownership by Province", and Table 9-37 "Composition of Total Social Insurance
and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workers under Termination, Retirement and Resignation in For-
eign Funded Enterptises by Province". The weighted averages of the incomes in these tables are
calculated to get the retired income in urban areas.
13In this research, retitees are not supposed to afford any dependants.
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rather than provincial data. The survey gives labor composition by education, but it
does not include data on the corresponding income.14 However, the survey presents
the data on household income by labor education.15 Using this information roughly
as labor income by education,16 it can be derived that in rural areas the technician's
and manager's income are the same, which is 1.37 times more than the average, 1.34
times more than the skilled, and 1.59 more than the unskilled. This estimation is
consistent with the common recognition that in rural area the income differences
between technician and manager and between skilled and unskilled are small, but
income difference between the technician and manager and the skilled and unskilled
is large. The reasons behind these are that rural technician and manager are paid still
according to urban wage system, while unskilled and skilled take similar operation
for production. By applying these macro ratios at national level to provinces, I break
down the rural income by occupation or skill and by province.
The income of rural capitalist and self-employed are estimated by assuming that
rural capitalist earns ten times over rural skilled and rural self-employed earns four
times over rural skilled, following the way in estimating the incomes of urban capitalist
and self-employed. The rural retiree receives as same income as urban retiree. The
rural dependant income equals to the rural households' mean income, which is directly
available from the China Statistical Yearbook (1993)." The final data are presented
in Table 4.2.
4.4 Personal income distribution
4.4.1 The overall inequality
As China is a socialist country, China's inequality has been an attractive topic: does
China have less inequality compared to other developed or less developed countries?
Many economists and analysts conjecture that China still has less inequality. Two
14Table 3-2 "Rural Labours' Quality by province" in the survey.
15Table 2-5 "The Main Indicators of Rural Households by Labor's Education" in the survey.
'sAs a result, unskilled income is 611.67 Yuan, skilled 725.83 Yuan, and Manager's and Technician's
971.56 Yuan. The average income of rural households, moreover, is 708.55 Yuan in 1991. Assume
that technician's and manager's income are the same, their íncome is thus 1.37 times more than the
average, 1.34 times more than the skilled, and 1.59 more than the unskilled. The skilled income is
1.19 times more than the unskilled.
'~Table 8-23 "Net Income of Peasant Household Pet Capita by Province" in China Statistical
Yearbook (1993).
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studies used the Gini coefficient to investigate the overall inequality for China. The
special research project conducted by Griffiin et al. (1994) found that the Gini coef-
ficient for China was 0.38 in 1988. Griffin et al. compared their results with other
Asian developing countries and concluded that overall inequality in China was low.
Based on the data collected in the last section, this research now measures income
inequality by Theil's index. The results are presented in Table 4.3. The figure in
row 33 and column 5 indicates a very low value of Theil's index regarding the overall
inequality for China: 0.0873 in 1992. This result is consistent with the conclusion in
other research that income inequality in China is not high until now. Moreover, the
overall inequality is composed of the following: 4301o by the inequality between social
classes in row 34 and column 6, 24oI'o by the inequality between provinces in row 35
and column 5, and 33~1o by the inequality between rural and urban areas in row 33
and column 7. The sum of the first two is, 67~0, the contribution by the inequality in
rural and urban areas in row 33 and column 6.
From Table 4.2, the small difference in income between persons can be seen directly.
In rural areas, the highest income, the rural capitalist's income, is 15 times that of the
lowest income, that earned by the rural unskilled. In urban areas, the figure is nearly
20 times. With respect to each social class, the income in urban areas is higher than
in rural areas. The urban mean income, moreover, is over two times higher than the
rural mean income. Among the provinces, Shanghai has the highest income, while
Guizhou has the lowest income. The former has income over five times higher than
that of the latter.
4.4.2 Inequalities in rural and urban areas
As discussed in Section 2, the distinction between rural and urban economies in China
is so stark that income distribution in rural and urban areas has a marked difference.
Most research, therefore, studies personal income distribution separately with respect
to rural and urban areas.
Some research found that income inequality in rural areas was higher than in
urban areas. The conclusion is the opposite of the situation in other developing coun-
tries in Asia.18 The State Statistical Bureau (1987) found a Gini coefficient in rural
areas in 1987 of 0.236. Zhu and Wen (1990) calculated a Gini coefficient in rural ar-
eas of 0.3014 in 1988. Griffin et al. (1994) found that the Gini coefficients were 0.3338
lssee GrifFin et al. (1992)
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Table 4.3 Income Inequality in the Observed Economy
Rural Urban Across Between Provincial Across Between Per capita
inequality inequality areas areas inequality areas areas final uses
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Shanghai 1 0.0323 0.0209 0.0239 0.0062 0.0301 790~0 21oIo 8529
Tianjin 2 0.0521 0.0256 0.0321 0.0039 0.0359 890~0 11 oIo 4535
Beijing 3 0.0553 0.0328 0.0372 0.0058 0.043 860~0 140~0 6378
Sandong 4 0.0484 0.0445 0.0472 0.0016 0.0488 970~0 3ol0 2467
Jiangshu 5 0.0294 0.0297 0.0295 0.0221 0.0515 57oIo 43oIo 2903
Zhejiang 6 0.0555 0.0515 0.0543 0.0005 0.0548 99oIo 10~0 2875
Liaoning 7 0.0333 0.0401 0.0378 0.0187 0.0565 670~0 330~0 3204
Guangdong 8 0.0392 0.0662 0.0512 0.0054 0.0566 90oIo 10oIo 3441
Fujian 9 0.0245 0.0905 0.0471 0.0189 0.066 710~0 29oIo 2556
Hebei 10 0.0459 0.0327 0.0411 0.0342 0.0753 550~0 45oIo 1853
Heilongjiang 11 0.0157 0.0436 0.0323 0.0114 0.0437 740~0 260~0 2655
Hubei 12 0.0252 0.0355 0.0297 0.0218 0.0516 58oIo 420~0 1376
Jianxi 13 0.028 0.0585 0.0377 0.016 0.0537 70oIo 300~0 1560
Jilin 14 0.0184 0.0455 0.0343 0.0235 0.0578 590~0 41oIo 2369
Hunan 15 0.0257 0.0523 0.0346 0.0297 0.0643 540~0 46oIo 1522
Neimeng 16 0.0233 0.0461 0.0357 0.0296 0.0653 55oIo 450~0 0
Henan 17 0.023 0.0455 0.0303 0.0398 0.0701 43oIo 570~0 1405
Anhui 18 0.0267 0.058 0.0379 0.0391 0.077 49oIo 510~0 1192
Sanxi 19 0.0431 0.0326 0.0379 0.0422 0.0801 470~0 53oIo 2735
Guizhou 20 0.0167 0.0628 0.0323 0.0259 0.0582 560~0 440~0 1062
Shichuan 21 0.0276 0.0467 0.0343 0.0257 0.06 57oIo 43oIo 1477
Guangxi 22 0.0231 0.0682 0.0371 0.0363 0.0733 510~0 49oIo 1535
Yunnan 23 0.0249 0.0448 0.0316 0.0488 0.0804 39oIo 610~0 646
Shanxi 24 0.0275 0.0393 0.0328 0.0587 0.0916 360~0 64oIo 1721
Xinjiang 25 0.0325 0.0496 0.0424 0.0601 0.1025 410~0 590~0 3708
Ningxia 26 0.024 0.0372 0.0312 0.0771 0.1082 290~0 710~0 2182
Gansu 27 0.0262 0.0407 0.0334 0.0804 0.1138 290~0 710~0 1517
Tibet 28 0.0181 0.1045 0.0484 0.0821 0.1305 37oIo 63oIo 0
Hainan 29 0.0267 0.1082 0.0668 0.0648 0.1316 510~0 490~0 0
Qinghai 30 0.0232 0.0461 0.0365 0.0977 0.1342 270~0 73oIo 2257
Acroos provinces 0.0324 0.0455 0.038 0.0284 0.0665 57oIo 430~0
Between provinces 0.0243 0.0163 0.0208 0.0208 100oro Oolo
Theil's inequality 0.0567 0.0618 0.0589 0.0284 0.0873 67oIo 330~0
Across provinces 570~0 740~0 650~0 1000~0 76oIo 430~0
Between provinces 430~0 260~0 35oIo Oolo 240~0
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in rural areas and 0.233 in urban areas in 1988. Wang (1995) calculated the Gini
coefficients for China, which were 0.331 in rural areas, and 0.242 in urban areas in
1993.
Most of these studies argued that the differences in inequality between rural and
urban areas resulted from the fact that the income sources that were more unequally
distributed had more shares in rural areas than in urban areas. According to Griffin et
al. (1994), the inequality in rural areas resulted mainly from farmer's non-production
rather than production income, whereas the small difference between staff and work-
er's money income resulted in the low inequality in urban areas.
The results in this research differ from the others. I found that China had a
similar situation of inequality as found in other developing countries in Asia, that the
inequality in rural areas was nearly the same or slightly lower than in urban areas.
In Table 4.3, the inequality in rural areas is 0.0567 in row (33) and column (1), and
the inequality in urban areas is 0.0618 in row (33) and column (2). In particular, the
inequality in rural areas is more than in urban areas in only six of the ten provinces
in the developed eastern part, and in one of the nine provinces in the less-developed
middle part. The inequality in rural or in urban areas consists of the inequality
between social classes and the inequality between provinces. The results show that
the inequality between social classes is lower in rural areas than in urban areas, while
the inequality between provinces is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. The
inequality between social classes in rural areas is 0.0324 in row (31) and column (1),
which is 14~0 lower than the one in urban areas, which is 0.0455 in row (31) and
column (2); the inequality between provinces in rural areas is 0.0243 in row (32) and
column (1), which is 1.49 times over the one in urban areas, which is 0.0163 in row
(32) and column (2).
4.4.3 Inequality between rural and urban areas
It has been a popular argument that inequality between rural and urban areas is
significant and rigid in China because of the greatly unbalanced development of rural
and urban economies. Wang et al. (1995) compared the income means between rural
and urban areas from 1978 to 1994. They found that income inequality between rural
and urban areas in China had gone through two stages. In the first stage, between
1978-1985, the inequality between rural and urban areas had decreased. The reason
was that rural economic reform caused farmers' income to increase faster than that of
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the urban-dweller during the period. The period from 1985 to 1994 was the time for
urban economic reform. In this stage, urban-dwellers' income grew faster than that
of the farmers, which expanded the income difference between rural and urban areas.
So far, the difference is increasing.
This research observed the income difference between rural and urban areas. In
Table 4.2, urban income was over two times higher than rural income in China. Except
for Zhejiang (where rural income is higher than urban income), all other provinces
reported higher urban income than rural income. Theil's index in Table 4.3 shows
that the inequality between rural and urban areas is 0.0284 for the nation in row (33)
and column (4), which is the average of the Theil's inequalities between rural and
urban areas in all provinces. Moreover, column 7 shows that the inequality between
rural and urban areas contributes 33070 of the overall inequality in the nation, and also
large proportions in provinces, especially in the less- and least developed provinces.
4.4.4 Inequalities in the provinces
Section 2 mentioned that China had 30 administrative provinces, each of which
was a complete regional economy; according to their level of economic development,
these provinces were usually referred to as the developed east-coast part, the less-
developed middle part and the under-developed western part. Income inequalities in
the provinces and economic zones are different.
The inequality in each province is investigated frequently, because each province is
a relatively independent economy. Comparable with the study on income inequality
for the national economy, almost all the studies for each province have investigated
income inequality with respect to rural and urban areas. Zhu and Wen (1990) and
Griffiin, et al. (1994) calculated the rural Gini coef~icients in 1988 for each province.
The results of their research and this research are listed jointly in decreasing order of
the levels of per farmer income in Table 4.4. The data show no systematic relationship
between income inequality and economic development in rural areas. The income
inequality in urban areas has not been studied as much as the income inequality in
rural areas by province. Griffin et al. (1994) calculated the urban Gini coefficients
in ten provinces. They also did not find any relationships between the inequality in
urban areas and economic development. They finally argued that the inequality might
be related to income structures or other unknown factors.
In this research, the overall income inequality in China could be decomposed into
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Table 4.4 Inequalities in Rural Area in China
Per capita income Gini coefficient Gini coefficient Theil's index
of farmers in 1988 in 1988 ' in 1988 " in 1992 ""
Shanghai 1301 0.222 0.215 0.0323
Beijing 1063 0.305 0.233 0.0553
Zhejiang 902 0.286 0.298 0.0555
Tianjin 891 0.394 0.256 0.0521
Guangdong 809 0.306 0.305 0.0392
Jiangsu 797 0.383 0.299 0.0294
Liaoning 700 0.33 0.3 0.0333
Jilin 628 0.354 0.264 0.0184
Fujian 613 0.29 0.218 0.0245
Sandong 584 0.285 0.267 0.0484
Hainan 567 0.276 0.283 0.0267
Heilongjiang 553 0.368 0.294 0.0157
Hebei 547 0.293 0.289 0.0459
Hunan 515 0.255 0.212 0.0257
Neimenggu 500 0.339 0.293 0.0233
Hubei 498 0.231 0.229 0.0252
Xinjiang 497 0.323 0.0325
Qinghai 493 0.313 0.325 0.0232
Jiangxi 488 0.23 0.201 0.028
Anhui 486 0.249 0.207 0.0267
Ningxia 473 0.273 0.315 0.024
Sichuan 449 0.265 0.241 0.0276
Sanxi 439 0.32 0.275 0.0431
Yunnan 428 0.287 0.259 0.0249
Guangxi 424 0.291 0.279 0.0231
Shanxi 404 0.289 0.263 0.0275
Henan 401 0.299 0.25 0.023
Guizhou 398 0.295 0.234 0.0167
Tibet 374 0.279 0.0181
Ganshu 340 0.263 0.248 0.0262
Sources:
' Griffin, et al. (1994)
" Zhu and Wen (1990)
"" this research.
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three parts by Theil's index: namely the income inequality between social classes, the
income inequality between rural and urban areas, and the income inequality between
provinces. In each province, the overall income inequality consists of the income
inequality between social classes and between rural and urban areas only. Studies
like Griffin et al. (1994), which apply the Gini coefficient, are unable to do this.
The results of my research are presented in columns (3), (4) and 5 in Table 4.3,
respectively. Comparing the figures in column (3) and (4), it can be found out that the
income inequality between social classes is higher than the income inequality between
rural and urban areas in all developed provinces, in six of the nine less developed
provinces, and in four of the eleven least developed provinces. Roughly speaking,
there is a negative relationship between the income inequality between areas and their
economic development, a positive relationship between overall income inequality and
the income inequality between areas, and the income inequality between social classes
is irrelevant with the development of the province. The result, therefore, showed
that the difference in the overall income inequality among provinces was approached
mainly by the difference in the income inequality between areas among provinces.
4.4.5 Inequality between provinces
The existing studies provide few numerically explicit results on the inequality between
provinces. Wang et al. (1995) compared the income levels in rural area between the
eastern, the middle and the western parts, and found out that the ratio was 2.58
: 1.16 : 1 in 1992. Further, they compared income levels in rural areas between
provinces in each of the three parts. They concluded that there was a big difference
in income between the eastern part and the middle and western part, a smal] difference
in income between the middle and the western parts. There was a big difference in
income between the provinces within the eastern part and a small difference in income
between the provinces within the middle and the western part. With respect to the
difference in urban income between regions, they found out that the ratio of income
in the three parts was 2.13 : 0.89 : 1, and made a similar conclusion as they did for
rural income. Their analysis was roughly done, as they used the income of a certain
province in each part to represent the income of the part. Yang (1992) calculated the
relative mean deviation of per capita GNP in 1989 with respect to the eastern, the
middle and the western part, and the provinces in the parts. He arrived at a similar
conclusion as Wang et al. (1995). Wei (1992) calculated the weighted relative mean
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deviation of per capita national income, and also obtained a similar conclusion. All
these studies were unable to justify the income inequality between provinces in China.
The results in this research directly reveal similar conclusions. Table 4.2 shows
that the eastern part is richer than the middle and the western part, and that the
middle and the western parts are close in income. Eight of the ten provinces in the
eastern part, two of the nine provinces in the middle part and four of the eleven
provinces in the western part have incomes above the mean income in the nation. In
the eastern part, income distance is large. The highest income in Shanghai is over
three and a half times higher than the lowest income in Sandong. In the middle part,
the income distance is small. The highest income in Heilongjiang is over one and a
half times higher than the lowest income in Henan. In the western part, the income
difference is average. The highest income in Hainan is over two times higher than
the lowest income in Guizhou. Although it reaches similar conclusions, however, this
research produces deeper results regarding the income inequality between provinces
because it uses the extended Theil's index.
Griffin et al. (1994) compared the income in rural areas among all provinces, and
the income in urban areas among ten provinces in 1988. But, they were unable to jus-
tify numerically the inequalities between the provinces in either rural or urban areas.
Through their analysis on sampling, however, they concluded that income inequal-
ity between provinces was large, and that the income inequality between provinces
in rural areas was larger than that in urban areas. 1'he results in this research are
basically consistent with theirs. The income inequalities between provinces in rural
and in urban areas are 0.0243 in row (32) and column ( 1) and 0.0163 in row (32) and
column (2) of Table 4.3, respectively. The former is one and a half times higher than
the latter. The overall income inequality between provinces is 0.0208 in row ( 32) and
column (3) of Table 4.3, which contributes to 24~Io of the overall income inequality in
China.
4.5 Conclusion
Section 4, which decomposed the overall income inequality into four components:
the income inequality between areas, between provinces, between social classes and
within social classes and ignored the income inequality within social classes, showed
the overall income inequality in China to be at a low level. Among the three de-
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composed between-group income inequalities, the income inequality between social
classes contributes the most, 43PI'o, to the overall income inequality; the income in-
equality between rural and urban areas contributes the second greatest, 33PIo; the
income inequality between provinces contributes the least, 24QIo. The results proved
the argument that income inequality between rural and urban areas was large.
Other studies argued that there was a big income difference between the eastern
part and the middle and western part, a small income difference between the mid-
dle and the western parts; and that there was a big income difference between the
provinces within the eastern part and a small income difference between the provinces
within the middle and the western part. The results in section 3 showed a similar
situation. The other research did not shed any light on the income inequality be-
tween provinces. GrifFin et al.'s (1994) work did not reveal any explicit result, but
they argued that the inequality between provinces was large, and that the inequality
between provinces in rural areas was larger than in urban areas. The results in this
chapter proved their conjecture by showing that the inequality between provinces in
rural areas was 0.024, and in urban areas is 0.016. Their average is 0.021, which
contributes to 24PIo of the overall income inequality in China.
The biggest difference between this research and the others was that this research
concluded that in China, like other developing countries in Asia, the income inequal-
ities in rural and in urban areas in fact were very close. In particular, the income
inequality between social classes in rural areas was lower than in urban areas, while
the income inequality between provinces in rural areas was higher than in urban areas.
Griffin et al. (1994) and Zhu (1990) argued that the income inequality in rural areas
was in general greater than in urban areas. I found that this was true only in six of
the ten developed provinces in the eastern part, and in one of the nine less-developed
provinces in the middle part, whereas the income inequalities in the rural areas were
lower than in the urban areas in the other 23 provinces.
The other research was unable to decompose the overall inequality in provinces
into the inequality between social classes and the inequality between rural and urban
areas. The study in this chapter achieved the decomposition of overall inequality. In
particular, this study found that the inequality between social classes was higher than
the inequality between rural and urban areas in all developed provinces, in six of the
nine less developed provinces, and in four of the eleven least developed provinces.
Griffin et al. (1994) concluded that there was no relationship between the economic
development and the income inequality in either rural or urban areas in provinces.
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This chapter showed a similar situation. In particular, this research revealed that the
overall inequality and the inequality between rural and urban areas was negatively
related to the level of economic development in the provinces. Proved correct was the
conjecture of Griffin et al. (1994), that the difference in the overall income inequality
among provinces was approached mainly by the difference in the income inequality
between rural and urban areas among provinces.
4.6 A final remark
Apart from the conclusion, it is also necessary to discuss the validity of the previous
assumption in Chapter 3 that the within-class income inequalities were minor and
could be ignored, as all the results in this chapter rely on the assumption. Comparing
the results in this chapter with Zhang (1997)'s results, it can be concluded that the
assumption in Chapter 3 was reasonable. Zhang found that the income inequality
between rural and urban areas contributed nearly 33010 of the overall income inequality
in China in the year 1995 by the mean logarithmic deviation. The results in this
chapter also reveal a 33~o contribution to the overall inequality. Moreover, Zhang
discussed that the income inequality within rural and urban areas contributed the rest
(67070) of the overall income inequality, while the results in this chapter further reveal
that the rest (67PIo) within-area inequality consists of the 43o-1o inequality between
social classes and the 24~0 of the inequality between provinces. Zhang also calculated
that the income inequality between occupations of households contributed 37PIo of the
overall inequality, which was less than my result that the income inequality between
social classes contributes 43~Io of the overall inequality. The reason may be that he
used the household as the unit while I use the individual as the unit; his results
therefore ignored income inequality within the household.
Chapter 5
Resource Allocation and Values
5.1 Introduction
An economy is defined by three elementary factors: Preferences, initial endowments
and technologies. Given these factors, a central issue is how to optimize the economy.
However, because of the existence of various activities, commodities, and resources,
this question is too complex to solve without the assistance of some special techniques.
Linear programming is one method to search for the optimum solutions to a variety
of economic problems.
Linear programming was first used by George B. Dantzig. Early works on the
application of this technique on economic analysis are by von Neumann and Koopmans
et al. (1951). Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow (1958) perhaps best illustrated its
economic implications. A broad application of linear programming on macroeconomic
issues has been done recently by ten Raa (1995).
This research applies the linear programming method to solve a general equilib-
rium model. Chapter 5 has two parts. First, it gives a brief review of the linear
programming method. Since linear programming is used extensively in economic-
s, formal and complete explanations abound in the literatures: D. Gale (1960), G.
Dantzig (1963), S. Gass (1975), and A. Schrijver (1986). This chapter also focuses on
an application of linear programming by analysing the allocation and value of scarce
resources in an example.
Section 5.2 introduces the basic knowledge of linear programming. This section
first introduces the standard formats of primal and dual programs. Consequently,
the relevant constraints and solutions are discussed. Finally, this section presents the
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important theorems of linear programming: the duality theorem. 5ection 5.3 uses
an example to illustrate the program of resource allocation. The section discusses
the problem of resource allocation with respect to the activities of an economy. The
problem can be considered through its dual program as well. If resources are priced
by their marginal product, and the economy uses these prices, then resources will be
exhausted by the economy. Finding the exact prices of resources is therefore identical
to selecting the economic activities that uses resources. The dual program offers a
solution for the determination of prices. Section 5.4 uses the example to discuss the
pricing of resources.
5.2 A brief review of linear programming
5.2.1 Primal and dual programs
Linear programming is a very special form of mathematical programming. It deals
with the case in which the relationships between variables are linear. More specif-
ically, a linear programming problem consists of an objective function and certain
constraints. The objective function is linear, and the constraints form a system of
linear inequalities. Through linear programming, one either maximizes or minimizes
the objective function under the constraints. In the analysis of economic activity, a
maximizing problem can be designed in which, given the resource endowments, the
available technologies and individual preferences, a solution can be found as to how
this economy allocates the resources in order to maximize its final output. A mini-
mizing problem is stated as that given the non-positive profit restrictions on how an
economy prices its resources in order to minimize the values of its total input. In
general, the former is referred to as the primal program, while the later is the dual
program. They are actually two ways of solving a linear program. The standard forms
of the primal and dual programs are as follows:
Primal program
The standard matrix representation of a primal program is written as follows
maxa~ subject to Cx C b (5.1)
where a is a row vector of objective function coefficients, .r is a column vector of
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Slackness A slack, o-k, is a nonnegative difference between constraint, Ck~, and
its óovnd, bk, such that Ckx ~- ok - 6k.
Binding and Non-binding The constraint, Ck, with ok - 0, is binding; with
Qk ) 0, it is non-binding.
Both binding and non-binding constraints can be dependent or independent. The
binding and dependent constraints are redundant, but the binding and independent
constraints are non-redundant. The non-binding constraints, of course, are redundant.
Non-degeneration A linearprogram, ax, s.t. Cox C b, is called a non-degenerate
program if Co is the set of the binding and independent constraints.
We summarize the constraints according to their definitions in the diagram below:
Binding - Zero Slack
Dependent ~ Non-binding- Positive Slack
Redundant ~ Independent` Non-binding- Positive Slack
Constraints~
` Non-redundartL- Independent- Binding - Non-degenerate
Relationships among the constraints are clear here. The nonredundant constraint
is independent, binding, and therefore nondegenerate. Yet, the independent con-
straint may be nonbinding, and therefore redundant, and is rewarded a positive slack.
Furthermore, the constraint does not have to be binding in order to be independent.
It may be dependent, and therefore redundant (in which case it has a zero slack).
Although it may be independent or dependent, the nonbinding constraint is certainly
redundant, and is associated with a positive slack.
5.2.3 Solutions
Examining the properties of a solution to the linear program, will help us to predict
and understand the possible results of later models. This section reviews some basic
definitions of solutions.
Feasible solution Any solution vector z satisfying the constraints, Cx - b C 0,
is a feasible solution vector.
Optimal solution A feasible solution vector, x', which ma.zimizes the objective
function, is an optimal solution vector.
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variables, C is a matrix of constraint coefficients, one row for each constraint, and 6
is a column vector of constraint bounds.
The primal program can be transformed into its dual program according to the
following rules:
1. The maximization becomes the minimization.
2. Each variable in the primal program requires a corresponding constraint in
the dual program, while the coefficients of the variable become the coefficients of the
relevant constraint in the dual program.
3. Each constraint in the primal program corresponds to a variable of the dual
program, while the coefficients of the constraint are as the coefficients of the relevant
variable in the dual program.
4. The coefficients of the objective function in the primal program are the con-
straint bounds of the dual program, while the constraint bounds of the primal program
become the coefficients of the objective function in the dual program.
5. The inequalities in the primal program become equalities in the dual program,
in addition to the non-negativity constraints.
Hence, the dual program is as follows:
Dual program
where ~ is a row vector of variables in the dual program.
5.2.2 Constraints
Since the system of constraints is often complex in a linear program, one needs to
clarify the properties of and the relationships between the constraints.
Redundancy The row Ck of matrix C is called a redundant constraint if the
elímination of it will not affect the optimal value of the objective function, a~.
Independence The rows of matrii C are linearly independent if and only if 1tC -
0 implies that row vector ~- 0. (ten Raa, 1995, pp 56).
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5.2.4 Opportunity costs
The discussion on employment of resources can be extended further. What special
meanings are there behind the employment of resources? To answer that question,
we shall first consider the case of full employment. If some resource has been fully
employed, any added unit of that resource is able to increase the output by a cor-
responding part. In a perfectly competitive economy, the increase in the value of
output is equal to the marginal cost of production of the commodity with the same
resources. The marginal cost represents the opportunity cost (or shadow price), which
is the price of the resource. If part of a resource is still unemployed, any added unit
of the resource is also not employed, and therefore cannot increase output. In that
case, the opportunity cost faced by firms is zero. In other words, the resource has a
zero shadow price. In a competitive economy, the opportunity cost of the production
of a commodity is equal to its market price.
Differences between unemployment and full employment are consequently reflected
in the differences between the shadow prices of resources. The unemployed or partly
employed resources have zero shadow prices, while the fully employed resources have
positive shadow prices. Therefore, searching for the activities of an economy may
be replaced by searching for the shadow prices of resources in the economy. It is
naturally another aspect of the optimal allocation of resources, either maximizing
total final output by fully employing the scarce resources or using the resources at
their minimum prices. The two aspects are, in fact, equivalent. If a program has
maximal output, then it must also have minimal costs, and vice versa.
However, there is an exception for the case in which the binding constraints are
dependent, since the binding constraints are not necessarily independent. When they
are dependent, some binding constraints are redundant. After the elimination of the
redundant constraints, the remaining constraints are independent and binding, or
non-degenerate.
5.2.5 Duality theorems
The optimality of resource allocation in values is similar to the primal program. The
main theorems of duality presented in this section ensure the same principles between
uses and values of resources.
The link between the allocations and the least costs of resources is identical. It
is straightforward to see that if the activities with respect to the employment of
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resources are optimal, the resources are paid for according to their marginal produc-
tivity. Meanwhile, if resources are priced by their opportunity costs or marginal costs,
the activities with respect to the employment of the resources exhaust the value of the
resources. More specifically, without consideration of the exception, if some resources
are fully employed in the optimal allocation, these resources must get positive shadow
prices. Otherwise, the resources partly employed or entirely unemployed will have
zero shadow prices.
Duality theorem A(The duality theorem)
In optimality, the objective values of both primal and dual programs are the same;
that is, if ~` and ~' are the optimal solutions for the programs, respectively, then
ax' - a'b.
Duality theorem B(Complementary slackness theorem)
The optimal solutions of both primal and dual programs must satisfy, for any
constraint, one of the following three conditions: (1) C;~' G b~ and ~; - 0 or (2)
C;~'-b;anda;l0or(3).~;-OandC;.~'-b;.
The proofs of both theorems can be found in, e.g. Dantzig ( 1963, pp 136), or ten
Raa (1995, pp 59-62).
5.3 Resource allocation: an illustration
This illustration features an economy in which there are three sectors and two types
of commodities. The economy must produce one unit of commodity A per one unit
of commodity B. Sectors 1 and 3 produce commodity A, and sector 2 produces
commodity B, by different technologies that require the input of only two production
factors: labor and capital. The labor endowment is six units. The capital endowments
are 40 units for capital I and ten units for capital 11. In sector 1, each unit of activity
contributes two units of final output of commodity A at the cost of one unit of labor
and ten units of capital I. In sector 2, each unit of activity contributes one unit
of final output of commodity B at the cost of two units of labor and four units of
capital II. In sector 3, each unit of activity contributes two units of final output of
commodity A at the cost of 0.8 unit of labor and ten units of capital I.
Intuitively, the sectors are assumed to be nonnegative, they may be active or
inactive, but cannot take negative activity. Let s;, D~ and D denote the active level
in sector i, the final output of commodity j and aggregate final output, respectively.
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With the conditions stated above, if the economy wants to maximize its total final
output, the example can be written as the following primal program:
Maximize D
Commodity A's Constraint 2s1 ~ 2s3 ~ DA
Commodity B's Constraint s2 ~ DB
Consumer's preference DA - DB
Labor Constraint sl ~ 2s2 -~ 0.8s3 C 6
Capital I's Constraint lOsl -F lOs3 G 40
Capital II's Constraint 4sz G 10
Nonnegative Constraint sl, sz, s3 ~ 0
5.4 Values of resources: the dual of the example
In the standard format, the relevant items are as follows:
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C-
-2 0 -2 0.5
0 -1 0 0.5
1 2 0.8 0
10 0 10 0
0 4 0 0
-1 0 0 0
0 -1 0 0
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Here, Pl, Pzi w, and ry; are the prices of commodity A, B, labor, and capital,
respectively. a; is the slack variable. According to the Duality theorems, the primal
program can be transformed into its dual program:
Minimize 6w f 40y1 f lO7z
Subject to
wf10y,)2P,
2w f 47z ? Pz
0.8w ~- 1071 ) 2Pl
0.5P1 f0.5Pz-1





Chapter 4 investigated the current situation of income distribution in China. Ap-
parently, functional income distribution in China is determined by both market and
non-market forces. Wages do not show a significant relationship with labor produc-
tivity, and capital market is under construction. Income distributions are therefore
the mixed result of market and non-market forces.
Under competitive markets, income distribution is formed internally by the econ-
omy rather than by any public institution. From an economic point of view, personal
income should be determined by working abilities and property advantages. Because
of the failure of competition in some markets', monopoly advantages often distort the
economy. This research is confined to a situation of perfect competition and therefore
eliminates the impact of monopoly. Windfall profits always affect personal income,
but the effect usually is unforeseeable and can never be treated as predominant. It is
also ignored in this research. In brief, this chapter aims to describe the endogenous
determination of primary income in perfectly competitive markets. Precisely speak-
ing, it seeks to determine income from labor skills and properties. The essence of
the economic determination of personal income is to consider income generation and
distribution in an economic system in which production, distribution and consump-
tion flow interactively. Production generates income, income distribution determines
1See Stiglitz (1988).
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consumption, which in turn creates demands for production. As a static model, this
model is confined to describing the first part of the circle: income generation in the
production process.
Theoretically, it is possible to construct models that are able to describe the func-
tional income distribution in competitive markets. Given scarce resources, constant
or decreasing returns to scale technologies, and the preferences of the society, the
productivity of labor and capital can be determined. In competitive markets, they
are identical to the efficient wage rates and rental rates, respectively. Technically, it
is also possible to solve such models if they are not too complex and in reasonable
scale.
This chapter constructs a general equilibrium model of a competitive Chinese
economy to capture the internal forces determining income. In the model, production
takes place according to Leontief's technologies, the preferences are determined by the
observed composition of domestic final demands, and the endowments consist of labor
and capital. Primary income consists of labor and capital income which, according to
neo-classical theory, are paid their marginal productivity.
This model is non-linear. It consists of a linear program core and a non-linear
equations system.2 The primal linear program shows production relationships, while
its dual reveals the aspect of cost relationships. The non-linear equations are for
the balance of payments. Precisely speaking, the non-linear equations' function is to
control the equilibrium in order that the gross value of net exports of each province
in the economy must match their observed value. By means of linear programming
and Newton methods for non-linear equations, we can simultaneously solve endoge-
nous variables in the model when the economy reaches its optimum.3 As a result,
the model is able to describe both macroeconomic and microeconomic issues in the
competitive economy such as economic structure, employment, ef1'iciency, consump-
tion levels, trade patterns and comparative advantage, productivity, and functional
income distribution.
The empirics in this research consider the provincial economy to be independent
2This kind of model is identified as an intermediate step between classical linear programming and
the modern non-linear computable general equilibrium models by Dervis et aL (1982). Its non-linear
part captures the feedback effects to the linear program.
3There are two problems that we need to be aware of when we use a large-scale model like the one
featured in this research: first, the lineat programming may have difficulty being executed; second,
the non-linear equations may not converge either quickly or directly. In the empirical part of this
research, I use a so-called sparse matrix method to execute the large scale linear programming, and
start with two well-estimated initials to solve the non-linear equations by the Newton method.
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in China, and the national economy to be an integration of the provincial economies.
Under the integrated markets, provinces compete with each other, trade between
provinces is perfectly free (unhindered and free of charge), and international trade
with countries outside China is fixed as an external resource. In general equilibrium,
Chinese domestic final output reaches the maximum by optimally allocating resources.
As a result, prices of commodities and factors are endogenously determined.
Section 6.2 discusses economic specifications to the model, section 6.3 presents the
model, and section 6.4 paves the way for the empirics.
6.2 Economic specifications
6.2.1 Neo-classical approach
It is not really a new idea to consider personal income from an economic point of view.
Although most of the classical and neo-classical economists were concerned primarily
with personal income as the result of windfall and other sources, neo-classical theory
has indeed drawn some attention to the economic determination that personal income
depends on factor endowments and their prices, which are set in turn, by the marginal
productivity of factors in the competitive markets.
Classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx have been concerned with the role
of land and labor in the determination of personal income. Ricardo considers only two
factors of production: land and labor. They enter the production process directly and
yield rewards as rents and wages. Capital is treated only as the indirect production
factor and the subsistence for the support of labor during the production process.
Rents are received on land, and labor receives wages, but the returns on capital, or
the amount and the rate of profit depend on the difference between the marginal
productivity of labor in agriculture and the wage rate.
On the basis of classical Ricardian theory, neo-classical economists have made
considerable progress by the introduction of the marginal productivity theory. Neo-
classical economics would discard the special position of the rent of land and would
mention the role of all specific factors in pricing the factor endowments. As land and
labor, capital earned interest by its marginal productivity. In competitive markets,
given a constant or decreasing returns-to-scale technology, competition may yield an
equilibrium in which all the production factors are paid by their marginal products,
and the price ratios between factors correspond to the slopes of the isoquant at the
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point located by the factor endowments.
Neo-classical theory has become one of the most attractive theories in modern eco-
nomics, not only because it provides great insight into the competitive economy and
the determination of income, but also because it permits modelling the competitive
economy and numerically solving the model. There have been some efforts towards
modelling a competitive economy and, especially, accounting for factor prices. Ex-
plorations in this direction, however, have not yet been broadly recognized possibly
because almost all the existing models modelling attempts have not reached a suffi-
cient degree in their description of a competitive economy. In general, the more detail
given to modelling, the more complex the work becomes, and the more techniques
and information are required. Such models become, then, dif~icult to apply. This
problem motivated economists to search for more efficient and advanced methods to
modelling. Recently, ten Raa (1995) proposed a series of theoretical models and some
empirical works on this direction. His work combines the applications of the sys-
tem of national accounts, input-output techniques, and linear programming. In his
theoretical structure, factor prices are determined endogenously.
6.2.2 Labor value
The value of labor is measured by the wage (that is, the product of the wage rate
and the hours worked). In general, the hours worked are supposed to be constant -
therefore only the wage rate matters. According to neo-classical theory, (under perfect
competition) if technology exhibits constant or decreasing returns to scale, a firm will
hire more labor until the wage rates equal the marginal products of labor.
When there are various types of labor, the wages are differentiated by the different
wage rates. Since the abilities of labor may differ, the ability of each type of labor
is reflected by the marginal productivity of each type of labor. It turns out that
the differences between wage rates are determined by the differences between labor
ability. The ability of labor may depend on innate factors and postnatal acquirements.
They are reflected in the differences among such things, as social status and position.
Intuitively, a person with higher ability is more productive and therefore needs to be
paid more. According to Mincer (1985), the earning differences among occupations
are systematic; the higher the occupational rank, the higher the level of earnings.
This model distinguishes labor into four types according to occupations or skills.
They are unskilled, skilled, manager, and technician increasing in rank. The model
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allows for the substitution from higher to lower rank labor. There is a hierarchy for
such substitutions that has been proposed by Mohnen, ten Raa and Bourque (1995).
For example, assume that an economy consists of one sector and two types of labor,
namely unskilled and skilled.
Let L, N and X represent production input demands for labor per unit of pro-




Assume that skilled labor is employed partly, and denote the unemployment of
skilled labor as Nskilledi then
u
skiUed - Nskilled - Lski(ledX
As skilled labor is able to substitute for unskilled labor, the unemployed among
the skilled labor will go to the pool of unskilled labors. The situation now becomes:
Lunski(IedX C Nunskilled ~ Nuskilled
LskilledX C Nskilled
substituting ( 6.3) into (6.4), then
(Lunskilled ~ Lskilled)X C Nunskilled ~ Nskilled
Lski(IedX ~ Nskilled
Theoretically, in competitive markets where agents are utility-driven, labor is a
mobile factor. This research assumes that labor is mobile among sectors, motivated
to seek more income. However, the model maintains that if labor has to migrate,
there is a loss of hometown utility. Labor's decision to migrate therefore depends on
the net income after the more-income utility gain minus the hometown utility loss.
As the model excludes hometown utility, it simply assumes that the income utility
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gain will not exceed the hometown utility loss by migration as long as labor has any
income. Because of the substitutive effect in the model, skilled labor, if losing work,
will prefer occupying lower positions to migrating. Unskilled labor have no room for
substitution, and therefore have to migrate if they become redundant in local markets.
On the basis of this reasoning, the model assumes that all types of labor are mobile
between sectors, unskilled labor is perfect mobile within the nation, and skilled labor,
managers and technicians are mobile only within each province. Because the wage
rate is identical to the ability of each type of labor, the wage rate of unskilled labor is
unique across all sectors and provinces, and the wage rates of skilled labor, managers
and technicians are different in each province.
6.2.3 Capital value
Capital's situation is similar to that of labor. The value of capital return is equal to
the product of capital endowments and the rental rate. When capital endowments are
given, only the rental rates matter. In general equilibrium, the marginal productivity
of capital determines the rent. Moreover, capital can be further distinguished into two
formations, namely fixed capital and circulating capital, according to its performance.
Fixed capital depreciates gradually and is fixed in each production process. On the
other hand, circulating capital depreciates entirely and is mobile among sectors - it
constitutes the contents of intermediate inputs of production. Because fixed capital
is an imperfect substitute (in other words, there are various kinds of fixed capital in
each sector), each kind of the fixed capital specifies a rental rate corresponding to the
different marginal productivity of the fixed capital. The fixed capital forms the sector
capital stock. The value of capital stock is the sum of the products of various sector
capital endowments and their rental rates.
The differences between the rental rates of fixed capital are related to the tech-
nology characteristics of the fixed capital. For simplicity, this research assumes that
technologies are set up with respect to sectors. The special technology in each sector
brings the corresponding productivity of the fixed capital employed in this sector.
Thus, the fixed capital is sector specific and each sector yields a unique rental rate.
Intuitively, the rental rate depends on the scarcity of capital and the technology asso-
ciated with the capital. However, the ownership of capital does not affect the marginal
productivity of capital, because ownership has no impact on the production by firms
and sectors.
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This model specifies the fixed capital in each sector. There are as many types of
fixed capital as there are sectors. Each sector has its own constraint of fixed capital
and, therefore, features a corresponding number of rental rates and sectors. If a capital
holder owns various types of sector capital stocks, his capital income is the sum of the
incomes of each type of sector capital stocks, which are the product of the endowments
of sector capital stocks and their rental rates. Therefore, the capital endowments, the
rental rate, and the composition of capital stock, determine the capital income of
capital holders.
6.2.4 Commodity and service input
Besides the factor input discussed above, production also needs commodities and
services as inputs. Sectors may use their own products and the products from other
sectors as intermediate inputs. The composition of input in a particular sector depends
on the technology that the sector uses. Sectors therefore interact in the economy.
Just as in standard input-output analysis and linear programming, the commodity
and service inputs exhibit constant returns to scale, and their proportions to output
are fixed in the model.
6.2.5 The final product
The final product, or net output, is the surplus of gross product minus intermediate
uses. In an open economy, the final products include the domestic final uses and
net exports. The goal of an economy may be to maximize overall domestic final
products or uses. Without considering leisure in this static model, the domestic final-
use level is a better indicator of the welfare of an economy. Its use consists of domestic
consumption and investment.
The composition of the domestic final product is important because that it may
reveal household preferences. This research uses the observed composition of all the
final products (including public consumption) as given preferences of households in
economy.
6.2.6 The competitive provinces
Chapter 4 mentioned that China constitutionally consists of 30 provinces, each of
which could be regarded as a small economy. This research is intended to simulate
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an integrated Chinese national economy in which the provinces compete with each
other. However, owing to the data problem (which I will explain in detailed later
in this chapter), the modelling in this research has to consider only 27 of the 30
provinces, while assuming that the remaining three provinces, Neimeng, Hainan and
Tibet, will not participate the competition. The exclusion of the three provinces will
not affect the results of the competition, because Neimeng is a middle-sized province,
and Hainan and Tibet are the smallest provinces in China; their shares in national
GNP in 1991 account for only 0.58PIo.4
6.2.7 Open economy
In an open economy, the net output of any specific commodity and service could be
either positive or negative, depending on the net exports. The theory of comparative
advantage reveals that a country gains from international trade if it produces its
advantageous products and imports disadvantageous products from other countries.
Trade between Chinese provinces is basically free. The provincial input-output
tables reveal that the trade data on all sector products (except for the sector of
administration) are non-zero. For each type of the tradable products, there is a unique
price across the same sector in all provinces, while for the non-tradablc product, both
export and import are zero. The prices of tradable and non-tradable products are
endogenously determined by the prices of production factors in the model.
6.2.8 The competitive equilibrium
Under perfect competition, an economy is able to reach a state of equilibrium in which
households' utilities and the sectors' profits are maximized subject to the budget
constraints, and the total excess demand is zero. Such an equilibrium is supported by
a price system and a corresponding active allocation, which is called the Walrasian
equilibrium.
This model simulates the competitive Chinese economy in the following way. Giv-
en initial endowments of production factors, constant or decreasing returns-to-scale
technology and fixed preferences, maximizing the overall domestic final uses deter-
mines the efficient outcome in which there are only active sectors remaining. By the
second welfare theorem, the efficient prices and allocation are the Walrasian equilibri-
4According to the 1994 China Statistical Yearbook.
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um. As a result, the solution exposes the market economy as follows: wage and rental
rates, commodity prices, sector activities, domestic and provincial final uses, and net
exports in provinces.
6.3 The general equilibrium model
6.3.1 Primal program
The model aims to maximize China's domestic final uses. The objective function in
the model is only a scalar, D, which represents the overall value of national final uses
and in fact is the sum of the values of final uses in all sectors in all provinces:
Max D (6.8)
The primal program includes commodity, labor, capital and nonnegativity con-
straints. The commodity constraints include 29 tradable commodity constraints for 27
of all 30 provinces, and 27 non-tradable commodity constraints, one for each province.
The commodity balance requires that final supplies will not be less than final demands.
Denote the variables which are exogenous to the linear program as follows:
At is a square matrix of intermediate input coefficients regarding tradable com-
modities, 30 by 30, of province i(as this model is involved with 30 sectors). In the last,
or 30th, row in the matrix, all elements are zero, which means that the non-tradable
commodity is not included.
fi is a column vector of the proportions of province i's final uses regarding tradable
commodities, by 30. Its last element is zero.
E` is a column vector of province i's net exports to outside China, by 30. The last
element of the column is also zero.
d' is a scalar of province i's overall final uses in overall domestic final uses.
and the endogenous variables are as follows:
X` is a column vector of province i's outputs, by 30.
D is a scalar of overall domestic final uses.
Balance of tradable commodities:s
s~ z~ s~
~ (I - A~)X` ~ ~ fid`D f ~ E'
;-~ ;-i ~-i
sIn all the following equations, the superscripts indicate the number of the province.
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Equation 6.9 shows the balance of tradable commodities. On the left-hand side,
the supplies of each province, i, are obtained by extracting intermediate input, AiX`,
from total output, X'; by each type of tradable commodities; its provincial supplies
are added to national supply in a column vector by tradable commodities. The first
term on the right-hand side is domestic final uses that are obtained by accumulating
the provinces' final uses. There, overall province i's final use, D`, is regarded as a
proportion, d'D, of overall domestic final use, where d' represents the proportion of
overall province i's final use to overall domestic final use. province i's overall final use
is further specified to each type of tradable commodity according to the proportions,
ft, of the final use for each type of tradable commodities to overall final use in province
i. ft is an exogenous column vector consisting of 29 proportions, one for each type
of tradable commodity. The second term on the right-hand side is the exogenous net
exports to outside China, which is accumulated from each provincial net exports to
outside China, E~. This term is also specified for each type of tradable commodity,
and is therefore a column vector. Because there is a unique market for each type of
tradable commodity over the country, there are 29 balances in total, one for each type
of tradable commodity.
The non-tradable commodities exist in each province separately. There are 27
provincial markets of non-tradable commodities, and one balance for each market.
Denote that
AL is a square matrix of intermediate input coefficients regarding the non-tradable
commodity, 30 by 30, of province i. In the matrix, except for the elements in the
last row, all other elements are zero, which means that tradable commodities are not
included.
f' is a column vector of the proportions of province i's final uses regarding the
non-tradable commodity, by 30. The first 29 elements of the column must be zero.
Balances of non-tradable commodities in provinces:
(1 - A`)X' ~ f'd`D, i- 1, ..., 27. (6.10)
The model has 82 labor constraints. Among them, each province has three labor
constraints: namely technicians, managers, and skilled labor. The unskilled labor
constraint is national, since unskilled labor is assumed to be mobile over the country.
The hierarchy of substitution of high for low rank is embodied in the labor constraints.
Denote that
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L' is the matrix of the input coefficients of three types of skilled and highly-skilled
labor in province i, 3 by 30,
Ni is a column vector of initial endowments of three types of skilled and highly-
skilled labor, by 3.
Balances of the three types of labor resources in provincial markets:






(Li 1 ~ L2,1) ...... (Li,3o f L`z,3o)
(L1,1 ~ L2,1 ~ L3,1) """ 1L1,30 ~ L2,30 ~ L3,30)
and
Ni
N' - Ni ~ Nz
Ni-I-Nz~Ns
Denote that
Lu is a row vector of the input coefficients of both unskilled labor and the skilled
and highly-skilled labor in province i, by 30,
Nu is a scalar of endowments of both unskilled labor and the skilled and highly-
skilled labor in province i.
The balance of unskilled labor resources in the national market:
z7 z~
~ LuXt ~ ~ Nu
i-1 i-1
where
L1 1~ L2,1 ~ L31 ~ L9,1~ """ ( L1,30 } L2,30 ~ L3,30 ~ L4,30~ ]
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and
N;,- ~ N;fN2fN3fN4 ~
The model has 810 constraints of capital in total, 30 constraints for each province,
as capital is completely immobile. Denote that
Ii ` is diagonal matrix of input coefficients of fixed capital in province i, 30 by 30,
M' is a column vector of endowments of fixed capital in province i, by 30.
Balances of the capital resources in the provincial markets:




The model has a dual program with the objective to minimize the overall cost of
domestic resources. Denote the following endogenous variables:
P~ is a row vector of the shadow prices of tradable commodities, by 30. Its last
element is zero.
w„ is a scalar of the efficient wage of unskilled labor.
w` is a row vector of the wage premiums of three type of immobile labor (skilled,
managers and technicians) over lower rank labor's wage in province i, by 3. In the
vector, the first element is the technician's wage premium over the manager's wage,
the second is the manager's wage premium over the skilled wage, and the third is the
skilled wage premium over the unskilled wage.
y' is a row vector of the rental rates of fixed capital in province i, by 30.
P' is a scalar of the price of the nontradable commodity in province i.
The objective function is the following:
z~ z~ z~ z~
min ~ y'M' f~ w`N' -h w„ ~ Nu -~ PiE` (6.13)
i-1 ;-1 i-1 i-1
The dual program has 810 budget constraints, 30 constraints for each province:
Pt(I - Ai) f P'(1- A') C w„Lu f w'L' f y'K', i- 1,...,27. (6.14)
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In addition, there are 27 constraints for normalizing relative prices:
P~ fi ~ P' f` - 1, i- 1, ..., 27. (6.15)
Practically, the primal program is constructed first, and then is transformed into
the dual program through the standard format of the linear program, by which the








a- [ ~ ... ~ 1 1
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(3)











(A~ - 1) ... ...... (Ar' - I) ~~'i d`Íi ~
(A' -I) 0 ...... 0 d'f' ,
By the dual theorem, the primal and the dual programs have equal solution values,
ax' -.~'b, or max{ax~C~ C 6} - min{ab~a ~ 0; ~C - a}. Then, the standard
format of the dual program is
Min~b
Subject to




.~ -[ P~ Pr ... P~~ wu wr ... w27 ry~ ... y2~
v is slack.
6.3.3 The nonlinear equation system
In the previous linear program model, interprovincial trade is implicit. The value of
the net exports to the rest of China in a province represents the difference between
final supply and demands. Denoting Sd as the overall value of net exports to the rest
of China in province i, and Só as the observed value of net exports to the rest of China
in province i, the overall value of the net exports in each province can be expressed
in the following equations:
S~(d) - Pt[(I - Ai)X' - f~d`D - E`],i - 1,...,27. (6.16)
In equilibrium, the overall value of net exports to the rest of China in a province
should match a certain level, depending on the modelling purpose. For example, it
may match actual surplus on the trade account, or may be set to zero when the value
of exports equals the value of imports. In the model, the overall value of net exports
for each province to the rest of China is required to equal actual surplus on the trade
account:
S'(d) - Só, i- 1, ..., 27. (6.17)
These equations have three types of variables, namely the prices Pi, the outputs
X and the shares of provincial final use in overall domestic final use d. As prices and
outputs are the solutions to linear programming and the shares of final use prior to
the linear programming, the solutions to linear programming depend on the values
of d. Therefore, the overall value of net exports to the rest of China is in fact the
function of d. The solution, d', of this non-linear equation is obtained by interactively
solving the linear program and applying the Newton method shown below.
Define S`(d) - Só - 0, by the ;Vewton algorithm,
118 Chapter 6. The Computable General Equilibrium Model
~S~(d~) - Só~dn-i - ~S'(dn-i) - Só~dn
Clnn~l - Si(dn) - si(d~-1)
if d` low, S`(d) 1 0
if d` high, S~(d) G 0
This method here uses a two-value strategy to calculate the Newton step. The
procedure to solve the full model takes following steps:
First, set up two sets of well-guessed initial values, do and dl, respectively, prior
to linear programming.
Second, with the two initial values, run the linear programming twice respectively
towards reaching the optimality - where the optimal prices and outputs are solved.
Third, compute non-linear equations. If the non-linear equations, corresponding to
any of the two optimal stages, are fulfilled, the model reaches the general equilibrium.
Otherwise,
Fourth, use the two given sets of the values of d and the two corresponding overall
values, S(dn-1) and S(dn), of net exports, Newton's algorithm solves a new set of the
shares of provincial final use in overall domestic final use, d, which should result in
the closer approximation to the solution of the non-linear equations.
Fifth, with the new set of d that was solved with Newton's algorithm, run the linear
programming once again; if current overall values of net exports to the rest of China
match the observations, the non-linear equation system is solved - and subsequently
the linear program is also solved with the final d. Otherwise, substitute the second
d for the first d and the current d for the second d, and starti again from step four
until the calculated overall values of net exports to the rest of China converge to the
observed levels.
The solving procedure is presented graph 6.1, in which circles represent the shares
of provincial final use in overall domestic final use, squares are computations. Arrows
indicate the computing procedure. If non-linear equations are fulfilled, the "Yes"
leads to the solutions of the model; otherwise, the "No" leads to the next round
computation.
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6.3.4 The Walrasian equilibrium
The present model is carried out toward an optimization, with its solution accompa-
nied by the so-called shadow multipliers or shadow prices. It can be seen that the
shadow prices associated with the optimal solution of this model are in fact the com-
petitive equilibrium prices that support a Walrasian equilibrium, which is defined
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as a price system and the corresponding allocation that ensure that the households
and sectors behave optimally and the total excess demand is zero. Equations 6.20
- 6.23 trace profit maximizations in all sectors. Take any one of those equations in
sector j in province i, it is
P~~fP'GPta~~fP'a'w„luifw'lifyiki
The left-hand side in the above equation represents the unit price, while the right-
hand side represents the intermediate cost, labor and capital costs. The duality
theorem B, or complementary slackness theorem in Chapter 5, ensures that production
costs wil] exactly equal prices for all commodities that are actually produced, and that




This research considers 27 Chinese provinces in competition, whereas 30 administra-
tive provinces exist formally in China. The remaining three provinces that are not
included in the competition, due to data problems, are Hainan, 'Tibet and Neimeng.
Among them, Hainan and Tibet did not produce their input-output tables, and
Neimeng's input-output table was too particular in its sector classification, and hence
was incompatible with the input-output tables of other provinces. For this reason,
the three provinces have been discarded from the model. The other 27 provinces have
produced their 1992 input-output tables in square-matrix form. Most of them have
three versions, namely 6 x 6, 33 x 33 and 118 x 118 sectors or commodities. The model
chooses to use the 33 x 33 version, for the sake of simplicity. The 33 sectors' table
has been adjusted, to accommodate this research, into a 30 sectors' table,s where
maintenance, repair and other industries, commerce and restaurants, freight and pas-
senger transports are combined. The tables can provide a number of data sets such as
intermediate input, value added, domestic final use, interprovincial and international
trade, and gross output.
The provincial input-output tables are not perfectly consistent. Among the 27
provincial tables, 15 of them do not separate the information on interprovincial and
sSee, appendix 6.A for the specification of the 33 sectors.
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international trade. This problem has indeed caused a lot of inconvenience for the
research. Because there is almost no reliable information that can be used to separate
the net export to the rest of China and the net export to the rest of the world (in
those 15 provinces), I have had to separate the data by the following estimations:
First, because twelve provinces have separate information on interprovincial and
international trade, the export to and import from the rest of China in each of the 12
provinces are available. The sum of exports to the rest of China in those provinces
is 829,781.57 million Yuan, the imports are 898,959.09 million Yuan, and the sum of
the net export is therefore -69,177.52 million Yuan. Because the overall provincial
net export is zero, it can be expected that the sum of the net exports to the rest of
China in the 15 provinces that do not have separate information on interprovincial
and international trade must be 69,177.52 million Yuan. It is, however, impossible to
directly derive the export and import to the rest of China in these 15 provinces. They
have to be estimated by assuming that the ratio of the overall exports (829,781.57
million Yuan) to gross output (3,766,102.38 million Yuan) in the 12 provinces, which is
0.22, is equivalent to the ratio of the overall import (58,595.71 million Yuan) to gross
output (2,663,441.38 million Yuan) in the 15 provinces. 5uch an assumption makes
it possible to estimate the overall import from the rest of China in the 15 provinces
as 585,957.10 million Yuan (the overall export is 655,134.62 (585,957.10-~69,177.52)
million Yuan). The overall export is further distributed to each of the 30 sectors
according to the shares of the net exports in each sector in the overall net export.
Once exports to the rest of China in the 15 provinces are estimated on the sectoral
level, imports from the rest of China are the sum of the exports and the net exports
of the other 12 provinces, according to material balance.
While data on the export to and import from the rest of China in the 15 provinces
are separated into 30 sectors, the data need to be further separated with respect to
the 15 provinces. The mixed data on interprovincial and international trade in these
15 provinces are known. Therefore, we can calculate the shares of the mixed export to
the rest of China and to the rest of the world in each province to the overall export in
the 15 provinces. Assume that these shares are equivalent to the shares of the export
to the rest of China in each of the 15 provinces. Then, in the overall export to rest of
China in the 15 provinces, the overall export to the rest of China in the 15 provinces
to each of the 15 provinces can be separated. The same procedure is applied to the
imports from the rest of China.
The overall export to and the overall import from the rest of China in the 15
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provinces need to be separated with respect to sectors and provinces. This is a
complicated procedure. Here, the RAS method' is employed. There is a table (in
which columns 1-27 and rows 1-30 show the data of exports) that is a mixture of the
exports to the rest of China and the rest of the world, in the 15 provinces. Column
28, which is the sum of columns 1-27, shows the overall exports at the sectoral level;
row 31, which is the sum of rows 1-30, indicates the overall exports at the provincial
level. Columns 1-28 and rows 1-31 are the original data, while column 29 and row
32 are the data estimated above. The former are the overall exports to the rest of
China at the sectoral level; the latter are the overall exports to the rest of China at
the provincial level. The data in columns 1-27 and rows 1-30 need to be adjusted
such that the sum of columns 1-27 equals column 29, and the sum of rows 1-30 equals
row 32 by the RAS method. The same procedure is also applied to the import from
the rest of China. Once the exports to and the imports from the rest of China are
separated, the exports to and the imports from the rest of the world can be obtained
by extracting the exports to and the imports from the rest of China from the total
mixture of exports and imports.
After total exports and imports are divided into the exports to and the imports
from the rest of China and from the rest of the world in the 15 provinces, I finally
obtain a consistent database regarding all 27 provincial input-output tables. In the
data base, there are 30 types of commodities, 29 of which are tradable (public ad-
ministration is nontradable because the exports and imports of administrative service
are zero in each of the provincial input-output tables). In the database, the overall
net export to the rest of China for each commodity across provinces is zero. This
database could, in fact, be considered as a sort of national input-output table for Chi-
na. It has a difference, however, from the national input-output table in China that
is produced separately by the state authority. The gaps between the national table
and this aggregated 27 provincial input-output table may result from the excluded
data on three provinces of Neimeng, Hainan and Tibet, and on state activities, which
cannot be presented by the provincial data.
Capital usage and stocks
Besides the provincial input-output tables, the model requires data on capital usage
and stocks at both sectoral and provincial levels. Because the input-output table
7For a detailed introduction to the RAS method, see Bacharach (1970).
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includes information on capital returns rather than on capita] usage and stocks, the
data need to be collected from other sources.
The China Statistical Yearbook provides some information on capital stocks. The
information, however, is insufficient for this research in three respects. First, the
information is on state-owned firms rather than on total firms; second, the data are
presented with respect to the national economy rather than the provincial economies;
and third, the data are presented with respect to only six sectors rather than the
thirty sectors that are required by the model. Detailed information on capital stocks
in industrial sectors, however, has recently become available, which was collected
by the department of industry in the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) through an
industrial census. The SSB has made available to me the unpublished data on capital
stocks in the year 1992 for 40 industrial sectors by province. I adjust these data
to suit this research by aggregating them into 23 industrial sectors according to the
sector classifications in the input-output table. The data have two parts: the capital
stocks and the capital for production, but they do not include capital usage directly.
According to statistics in China, the capital for production is not consistent with the
capital usage in classification. However, it can be loosely considered that capital for
production may be the closest substitute for capital usage. Therefore, this research
uses the data available on capital for production as a substitute for the capital usage
in industrial sectors.
The data for non-industrial sectors are not available; they are estimated from the
information on investment in the China Statistical Yearbook (1993).8 Total invest-
ment on capital construction and technical updating and transformation, with respect






(6)commerce, food services and storage,
(7)real estate and public services,
(S)health care, sports and social welfare,
8In the Yearbook, in Table 5-23 "Investment in Capital Construction by Sector of National Econ-
omy and Province in 1992" and Table 5-43 "Investment in Technical Updating and Transformation
by Sector of National Economy and Province in 1992".






According to the aggregation method of sectors in Table 6.1, sectors (3)-(13) can
be simply aggregated into seven non-industrial sectors. Then we can calculate the
proportions of the investment in industry to the investment in these non-industrial
sectors. Furthermore, assuming that the proportions of capital stocks are the same as
the proportions of investment (because the fixed capital stocks in industry are obtained
previously), it then becomes possible to estimate capital stocks in non-industrial sec-
tors. The data on the capital stocks in the agricultural sector are obtained in a
different way. The Rural Statistical Yearbook of China in 19939 provides data on the
number of rural households by province and on the capital stocks per rural house-
hold; the two sources are used to derive the capital stocks in the agricultural sector by
province. Data on capital usage in agricultural and non-industrial sectors do not exist,
and deriving them is impossible, because no data exists on the capital for production
in these sectors. Therefore, the usage rates in agricultural and non-industrial sectors
use industrial data as a reference. As the estimated utilization rates in industries
are around 0.8, I assume that the utilization rate is applicable to agricultural and
non-industrial sectors in all provinces.
Employment and labor resources
Information on employment and labor resources can be obtained from the provincial
"Population Census in 1990". The original data in each province for employment
and labor are broken down into 55 sectors and eight types of occupation, which are
aggregated into 30 sectors according to the method in Table 6.1, and into four types
of occupations according to the method shown in Table 6.2. As this research assumes
that labor is fully employed, the sum of employment in various sectors is equal to the
labor resource in each province.
9In the Rural Statistical Yearbook ofChina 1993, the Table 3-3 "Rural Households and Population
by Province in 1992" has the data on the number of rutal households by province, and the Table
3-24 "Original Value of Fixed Assets for Ptoduction Per Rural Household by Province" provides the
information on capitalstocks per rural household.
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Table 6.1. A~~re~ations from 55 sectors to 30 sectors
No. Original Sectors No. Aggregated Sectors
(1) Agriculture ( 1) Agriculture
(2) Coal Mining and Processing ( 2) Coal Mining and Processing
(3) Petroleum and Natural Gas (3) Petroleum and Natural Gas
Extraction Extraction
(4) Ferrous Metals, Mining and (4) Metal Mining and Processing
Processing
(5) Nonferrous Metals, Mining
and Processing
(6) Construction Materials (5) Nonmetals Mining and
Processing
(7) Salt Mining and Processing
(8) Other Minerals, Mining and
Processing
(9) Logging, Transport of Timber
and Bamboo
(10) Water Production and Supply





(15) Textile Industry (7) Textile Industry
(16) Garments and Other Fiber (8) Sewing and Leather
Products Products
(17) Leather, and Other Products
(18) Timber, Bamboo and Other ( 9) Timber and Furniture
Products Manufacturing
(191 ~ F~~iri~iïurr~ ~Ixii~-ifaeturing
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Table 6.1 (continued) Aggregations from 55 sectors to 30 sectors
No. Original Sectors No. Aggregated Sectors
(20) Papermaking and Paper (10) Paper Making and
Products Stationery Goods
(21) Printing and Record Medium
(22) Stationery, Educational
and Other Goods
(23) Arts and Crafts
(24) Electric Power and Steam (11) Electric Power, Steam, etc.
(25) Petroleum Processing (12) Petroleum Processing
(26) Coking Products and Gas (13) Coking, Gas and Coal
Products
(27) Raw Chemicals Materials (14) Chemical Industry
and Products
(28) Medical and Pharmaceutical
Products
(29) Chemical Fibers Manufacturing
(30) Rubber Products
(31) Plastic Products
(32) Nonmetal Mineral Products (15) Nonmetals Products
(33) Smelting and Pressing (16) Smelting and Pressing
of Ferrous Metals of Metals
(34) Smelting and Pressing
of Nonferrous Metals
(35) Metal Products (17) Metal Products
(36) Machinery and Equipment (18) Machinery and Equipment
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(37) Transportation Equipment (19) Transportation Equipment
Manufacturing Manufacturing
(38) Electric Equipment and (20) Electric Equipment and
Machinery Machinery
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Table 6.1 (continued) Aggregations from 55 sectors to 30 sectors
No. Original Sectors No. Aggregated Sectors
(39) Electronics and (21) Electronics and
Telecommunications Telecommunications
(40) Instruments and Meters (22) Instrument and Meters
(41) Other Manufacturing (23) Other Manufacturing
(42) Geological Prospecting (24) Construction
(43) Construction
(44) Transportation and (25) Transportation and
Telecommunications Telecommunications




(49) Real Estate and (27) Social Services
Special Services
(50) Health Care, Sports and (28) Culture, Education and
Social Welfare (28) Research
(51) Education, Culture, and etc.
(52) Scientific Research
(53) Banking and Insurance (29) Banking and Insurance
(54) Government (30) Government
(55) Others (27)
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Table 6.2 A re ations from ei ht to four types
No. Original Types No. Aggregated Types
(1) Technician (1) Technician
(2) Officer (2) Manager
(3) Staff
(4) Commercial worker (3) Skilled
(7) Worker




Depending on the exogenous variables, all endogenous variables in the model are
solved. In the general equilibrium, overall domestic final use in China is maximized
subject to an optimal composition of the overall final uses in provinces. Using the
information, the overall final use in i province is obtained by
D`-dD
Chapter 7 will present the results in detail, for they serve as a departure point for
further computations of personal income distribution.
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Appendix 6.A: The List of 33 Sectors in the input-output table of China
No. Sectors No. Sectors
1 Agriculture 18 Machinery
2 Coal mining 19 Transport equipment
3 Crude petroleum, natural gas 20 Electric machinery, instruntent
4 Metal ore mining 21 Electrical, commu. c~quipnu~nt
5 Other mining 22 Instruments, meters
6 Food manufacturing 23 Maintenance, repair
7 Textiles 24 Other industries
8 Wearing apparel, leather 25 Construction
9 Sawmills, furniture 26 Freight trans. and commu.
10 Paper, cultural, edu. articles 27 Commerce
11 Electrical, steam, hot water 28 Restaurants
12 Petroleum refineries 29 Passenger transport
13 Ore mining, gas, coal 30 Public utilities, se~rvici~ti
14 Chemical industries 31 Cultural, education, health
science research institute
15 Building material, non-metallic 32 Finance and insurance






Chapter 4 investigated the personal income distribution in the current Chinese econ-
omy. Some results implied that it was unclear whether the problems with the current
distribution of personal income were caused by the economic reform. IVloreover, this
question remained: if the problems are market-oriented, how would they change if
the Chinese economy moved towards more competition? To answer these questions,
we can best set up a hypothetical market economy. Chapter 6 presented a specific
model with fixed international trade and competition between Chinese provinces and
argued that this approach would reflect market economy features. This chapter will
use the empirics of the model to outline the hypothetical market economy regarding
China. We hope this will shed some light on the personal income distribution under
perfect competition.
This chapter characterizes the market economy with economic activity, efficiency,
migration and functiona] income distribution. It presents the results of the empirics
from Chapter 6, which expose a situation on a competitive Chinese economy, in
which competition has driven labor to be allocated optimally. As a result, some
inefficient sectors are restricted or eliminated, and the efficient sectors are encouraged.
Therefore, competition removes the inefiiciency associated with the misallocation of
resources in the observed economy. Consequently, because resources are valued by
their marginal productivity, functional income distribution under perfect competition
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is revealed.
A crucial part of this chapter is to transform functional into personal income dis-
tribution. In the switch from the current to the market economy, personal income
distribution will be changed because labor and capital are paid by the efficient rental
and wage rates and because migration occurs. The transformation from functional
to personal income distribution proceeds with identifying capital ownership as gov-
ernment or private, and distinguishing the private capital holders by social classes.
Capital is owned by either government or private parties. Because capital associates
with production in various sectors, the shares of government and private capital may
differ, and the incomes of government and private capital are very likely to be different.
This chapter investigates capital ownership with respect to the agricultural sector, the
sectors of industry, construction, transports and communications, and commerce, and
the services sector, respectively. Although the real situation regarding capital owner-
ship between government and private is complex, this research reasonably simplifies
capital ownership as follows: all capital in the agricultural sector is owned privately,
and all capital in the service sectors is owned by the government only. Meanwhile,
data on capital ownership in the sectors of industry, construction, transport and t-
elecommunications, and commerce are available from existing sources. Once capital
has been separated into government and private capital (and therefore the income of
private capital has been calculated), it is time to distribute capital income to private
owners. This research simply ignores other potential private o~a-ners and assumes that
the capitalist is the sole holder of private capital. The capitalist's income can thus
be obtained. Following Chapter 4, the transformation from functional to personal
income distribution further specifies the incomes of other social classes.
Chapter 4 investigated the inequality of personal income distribution in the cur-
rent Chinese economy with respect to the overall inequality, the areas, the provinces
and the social classes inequalities. This chapter discusses income inequality in the
competitive economy in the same way. The results are therefore comparable with
those in Chapter 4.
The chapter is divided into three parts. Section 7.2 describes the structure of
a hypothetical market economy in China. Section 7.3 connects a bridge between
the functional and the personal income distributions. The section focuses on the
connecting processes. Section 7.4 discusses income distributions. The question to be
answered in this section is the following: How will the income inequality be changed
under perfect competition?
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7.2 The competitive market
7.2.1 Economic activity
As a result of competition, some sector activities in provinces shrink or stop, while
some expand. Table 7.1 shows the situation: a zero indicates inactive sectors, the
figures that are less than one indicate that activities decrease in those sectors, and
the figures that are greater than one show the expanded sectors. According to the
table, China's gross output will increase by four percent, and gross sector outputs will
increase by from two to eight percent in 27 of the 30 sectors, while they will decrease
by three to five percent in the wearing apparel, the ore mining, coal and gas, and the
transport equipment sectors. Moreover, gross provincial outputs will increase by up
to 14 percent in 17 provinces, while they will decrease by a maximum of 19 percent
in the remaining 10 provinces.
7.2.2 Efliciency
The efFiciency of an economy can be decomposed into X-efficiency, allocative efficiency
and trade-oriented efficiency.l As the trade to the rest of world is fixed in the model
and labor is fully employed in the observed markets, the inefficiency for China only
includes the allocative inefFiciency. The results in Table 7.2 sho~v that the overall
domestic final uses are given a boost of 707o in the competitive market. Therefore, the
efficiency is 93.5P1o in the observed economy.
Because the objective of the model is to maximize the domestic final uses, there
is no certainty that the provincial final use in each province will be increased at same
time. The results show that the gross final use increases in 24 of the 27 provinces,
and decreases in three other provinces. But, the per capita final uses go down in 16
of the 24 provinces, and rise in the three other provinces.
7.2.3 Labor substitution and migration
Labor substitution and migration happen in all provinces when competition forces
resources to be allocated optimally. Table 7.3 shows the situation. In the technician's
column, a zero means the full employment of the technician in the corresponding
province; a negative figure indicates the redundancy and substitution of the technician
~The way to decompose the efficiency was demonstrated by ten Raa (199~).
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Table 7.3 Labor Substitution and Migration
Technician Manager Skill Unskill Total
1 Beijing 0 -18880 -532592 -1255984 -1807456
2 Tianjin 0 0 -365537 206990 -158547
3 Hebei -26928 26928 0 6610557 6610557
4 Sanxi 0 0 0 -3515805 -3515805
6 Liaoning 0 -43212 10963 2643557 2611308
7 Jilin -17447 17447 0 1756577 1756577
8 Heilongjiang -9330 9331 -409936 2097754 1687819
9 Shanghai 0 0-1223838 202818 -1021020
10 Jiangshu 0 0 -646014 -17553709 -18199723
11 Zhejiang 0 -189 189 3301172 3301172
12 Anhui 0 -29213 29210 -26523541 -26523544
13 Fujian -4884 4884 0 2495875 2495875
14 Jianxi -10923 10923 0 3802483 3802483
15 Sandong -45590 45590 0 9803246 9803246
16 Henan 0 -7886 7886 10329699 10329699
17 Hubei 0 0 0 5570242 5570242
18 Hunan -26048 26048 0 6886476 6886476
19 Guangdong 0 -26833 26833 4757735 4757735
20 Guangxi -14820 14820 0 4790687 4790687
22 Shichuan -18005 18005 -412573 14125543 13712970
23 Guizhou -7450 7450 0 3856868 3856868
24 Yunnan 0 -40025 40025 -17528785 -17528785
26 Shanxi -7465 7465 -37648 3442003 3404355
27 Gansu 0 -17063 17063 -10512968 -10512968
28 Qinghai -753 753 -2584 399822 397238
29 Ningxia 0 -4621 4621 -1704259 -1704259
30 Xinjiang 0 -23685 23685 -4803195 -4803195
China -189631 -21959 -3470240 3681858 5
7.2. The competitive market 139
for the manager. In the manager's column, a zero means the full employment of the
manager in the corresponding province; a negative figure indicates the redundancy
and substitution of the manager for skilled labor. In addition, the positive figure
shows how many manager positions have been substituted by technician. The same
meaning is also applied to the column of skilled worker. A positive figure in the column
of unskilled worker represents a combined result of both the substitution of skilled
labor for unskilled labor and the migration cf unskilled labor from other provinces. A
negative figure shows the redundancy and immigration of unskilled labor by province.
The last column shows the immigration and migration of unskilled worker by negative
and positive signs.
In the twelve provinces of Hebei, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Sandong,
Hunan, Guangxi, Shichuan, Guizhou, Shanxi, and Qinghai, redundant technician-
s substitute for managers. In the provinces of Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui,
Henan, Guangdong, Yunnan, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang, redundant managers sub-
stitute for skilled labor. In the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai,
Jiangshu, Shichuan, and Qinghai, some skilled labor is redundant, and substitute for
unskilled labor. In total, the provinces of Beijing, Tianjin, Sanxi, Shanghai, Jiang-
shu, Anhui, Yunnan, Gansu, Ningxia, and Xinjiang have immigration, while other
provinces face migration.
The immigration and migration between provinces causes the population to change.
Some dependants will of course migrate outward or inward together with the unskilled
immigrants or migrants according to the dependency ratios. After this adjustment,
the population in the competitive economy is obtained, which is presented in Table
7.4.
7.2.4 F~tnctional income distribution
The important information from the results is about the rental and wage rates. The
rental rates, together with the prices of tradable and non-tradable commodities, are
listed in Table 7.5. Given the prices and employment of sector capital, capital income
is obtained by multiplying the rental rates in Table 7.5 with the employed capital in
Table 7.6. The capital income may be separated into three categories by sectors: in
the agricultural sector, in the sectors of industry, construction, transports and commu-
nications, and commerce, and in the sectors of public service, culture and education,
finance and insurance, and administration.
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Let 1K; denote capital income, where j - 1, ..., 27 represents provinces and s-
1, ..., 30 represents sectors. Let Ií and y denote employed capital and rental rates, as
in the previous chapter. Let a represent the agricultural sector, 6 the sectors of indus-
try, construction, transports and communications, and commerce, and c the sectors
of public service, culture and education, finance and insurance, and administration.
Then, the results on capital income presented in Table 7.7 are obtained through the
calculations below.
Capital income in the agricultural sector is
t
IKá - ~ Ií;ry;.
s-~
Capital income in the sectors of industry, construction, transports and communi-
cations, and commerce is
zs
Ilí 6 - ~ Ií,'7; .
s-z
Capital income in the sectors of public service, culture and education, finance and
insurance, and administration is
30
IIí~-~ Ií; 7; .
S-z~
After the model is solved, the results directly include the unskilled wage and the
wage premiums of the technician, the manager and the skilled. The wage of skilled
labor is the sum of their premiums and the unskilled wage:
~ ~ ~
~ekilled - Wunskifled ~ wski(led
The manager's wage is the sum of their premiums and the skilled wage:
~ ~ ~
~manager - ~akilled ~ Wmanager
The technician's wage is the sum of their premiums and manager's wage:
~ i ~
~technician - ~mannger } w technicinn
The results are presented in Table 7.8.
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7.3 Personal income distribution under perfect com-
petition
7.3.1 The government and private capital
When the model was built in Chapter 6, it was not necessary to specify capital own-
ership, because only capital inputs and endowments mattered there. But, when the
functional income distribution needs to be transformed into the personal income dis-
tribution, capital ownership becomes important, because the ownership of capital
contributes capital income to the relevant capital owners. Capital is owned either by
the government or by private parties. In China, the government owns the majority
of capital. Capital income is her direct income (as opposed to indirect income such
as taxation, charges and borrows). The capital income of the government may be
used for investment, government consumption, and redistributive transfers. In pri-
mary distribution, the government has no income from wages; capital income is her
sole income source. Comparatively, private parties may have both labor and capital
income. In practice, it is also less likely to specify capital with respect to capital types
at the individual level, because of the great variety of capital types and the lack of
information on capital holders. However, this research does not need to trace capital
ownership to such a detailed extent that capital are specified perfectly. What this re-
search is concerned with is to distinguish capital into government and private capital,
and to specify the capitalist as the sole holder of private capital. Once the functional
income of capital has been separated into government and private income, it becomes
possible to derive the capitalists' average income by dividing private capital income
over the number of capital holders. Because capital is sector specific in this research,
capital ownership is also different across sectors.
In the agricultural sector, all capital is owned privately by farmers, who, however,
are not capitalists. The rural capitalists, in fact, are those who hold their capital in
sectors such as industry, commerce and construction (but not in the agricultural sec-
tor). Capital income in the agricultural sector is distributed to all farmers who hold
own capital, whereas the rural capitalist receives rents from other non-agricultural
sectors. At present, it is observed that both state and private capital exist mainly in
the sectors of industry, commerce and construction. According to the data on capital
ownership in industrial sectors by province from The Third National Industrial Cen-
sus of China in 1995, I calculate the proportions of private capital in total capital,
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and apply them to the data in 1992 to get the amounts of private capital in industrial
sectors in 1992. Since the data on capital ownership in commerce and construction
sectors are unavailable, I assume that the proportions of private capital in total cap-
ital are the same as in the industrial sector. The capital income in these sectors is
distributed between the state and private holders. The sectors of public service, edu-
cation and culture, finance and banking, and administration are dominated by state
capital. Capital income in these sectors is collected by the government only.
7.3.2 The income of social classes
Capital holders earn rents. But, there is a small group of people who have capital, and
only a few of them hold a significant amount of capital and rely on the capital income.
For this reason, this research simply assumes that the people who own significant
amounts of capital are capitalists, and that the capitalist is the sole earner of private
capital income. The capitalist's income is separated from total capital income, whích
includes both government and private capital incomes, according to the proportions
of private capital in total capital in the sector. Denote
a- the share of private capital income in total capital income,
I - capitalists' average income,
N- the number of capitalists,
then
I' - N~
This research considers that, in competitive markets, self-employed capital is nec-
essary for operating the business. Thus, it will not yield extra rent than the business
income that is the same as the wage of the skilled (since self-employed labor was
assumed to belong to skilled labor). Therefore, self-employed income is set by the
skilled wage. Because retirees consist of various types of labor and also capitalists,
the income in this class is considered to be equal to the mean income that is the
average of the income of the technician, the manager, the skilled and self-employed,
the unskilled, and the capitalist. Because dependants share income with those they
depend on within the family, their income is therefore the mean income divided by the
dependency ratios. Although in competitive markets the same type of labor earn the
same income (no matter whether the labor is in the rural area or in an urban area),
the mean incomes are different between rural and urban areas owing to the difference
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in population compositions and in dependency ratios between the areas. Therefore,
after the transfer and family income distribution, income with respect to each social
class will be different in rural and urban areas.
The final results of income levels regarding all social classes are presented in Table
7.9. Based on the population in Table 7.4 and the income in Table 7.9, the inequality
of personal income distribution in the competitive markets is measured by calculating
Theil's index. The results are presented in Table 7.10.
7.4 Income inequality under perfect competition
7.4.1 The overall inequality
Under perfect competition, income inequality will be great in China. Table 7.9 shows
that in rural areas, the highest income (or the rural capitalist's income, which increases
to over ten times as much as in the current markets), will be 451 times higher than
the lowest income, the rural unskilled income, which decreases nearly 6501o from the
current markets. In urban areas, the figure will be 488 times. With respect to each
social class, just as in the current markets, the income in urban areas will be higher
than in rural areas in the competitive markets. In the current markets, the urban
mean income is two times that of the rural mean income. But, in the competitive
markets, the urban mean income will be almost five times higher than the rural mean
income. Among the provinces, Beijing will have the highest income, while Guizhou
will have the lowest. The former will be about 20 times higher than the latter.
Table 7.10 gives precise and comprehensive information on income differences in
the form of Theil's index. According to Theil's index, the overall inequality in China
is 0.6467 in row 33 and column 5; this consists of the inequality between social classes,
which is 0.4664, in row 31 and column 3; the inequality between provinces, which is
0.0718, in row 32 and column 3; and the inequality between rural and urban areas,
which is 0.1085, in row 31 and column 4. The inequality between social classes
contributes about 7207o to the overall inequality, the inequality between rural and
urban areas 17PIo, and the inequality between provinces 11PIc.
Compared with the current markets, in the competitive markets the overall in-
equality will increase six and a half times, the inequality between social classes over
17 times, the inequality between provinces three and a half times, and the inequality
between rural and urban areas nearly four times.
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~ ~ O~i N N~~ ~ aMD Qi
N a0 ~ ~ CO O M f~ Cp
N N ~ N C~O '-
LL 00 (D 7 R(D 1~ ~ U~ O
~ h O) ~ I~ QO O O O
N fD (O N I~ N
~ ~ M
~ N C7 M 1~ M CO f~ N CO
N ~ u~ ~n v ~n ~ m ~ V
N O O N O~ M~~
N N M N ~ N
T
Q M ~ M~ O O
0 i, ~~~
Qi Qi ~ N ~A ~




OD 00 N N 00 f~ .- (D O
~ N~ iA N O V 00
~ O O c- N N tD (O
N N N N~ ~
~ N~ iA N m N f~ CO ~
N N(O CD N~ tn (O [O
N V Q7 Oi ~t O ~D ~ N
N M M N ~ ~ M.-
N N OD ~
f~ O f~ I~ O N 00 N~~
N OD V V 00 N f~ ~ t0 R
N O~~ O C70 Q1 ~~ M
M M M M O N ~
N N 00
~ 0~0 ~ R 0~0 ~ tT ~ 1~ 1~
r- m M M Q~ ~ O ~ N V
N 00 00 N O N ~ M
V
~ N N V N N~ M M 00
N~~ Q~ m I~ I~ OD ~




d Z I~ I~ f~ I~ N I~ ~ N
~ J O O O M O N) 00 (O O~
~ N N N`M N~ N~~
C M ~
L




E m ~O W
N N~ N M N~ a
O O M ln M M
N ~ N
r~~eocor~rn ov
~ 01 M 1~ ~ r N 00 N
(O M ~ M ~ ~
~ M (O
O O M GO O O N CO m
tn ~(O N~ iA I~ N M
N N ~ (O N ~ ~ ~ ~
v ~
m cD t0 c0 m f0 ~ M O fD
~ ~ ~~ ~ O ~ N N~ M f~ M M
N ~
C ~~ t[) N M f~ O~ NO










C ~ C 0
N d'~j a tn ~ c
Y N f0 C N m N N c- C L .~ N- f0 U N
~~ E ~ u~i m~ á E
m m iv m m io m m ia
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Q! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ N M~~(p r t0
O~~~ V CO ~ N M 00
N t~ I~ O 1~ 1~ f~ O tA
~ ~ V N ~ N
I~ 1~ f~ V 1~ M 00 m ~~
N N N Ó N I~ ~~ f- (D
~ ~ R N V N
N N 00 O N V O~ ~ Q1 N
OO aD ~ ~fi 0~ l!i 00 I~ O N
N N I~ M N I~ I~ QO O
N ~ ~ ~ M aO ~
N
~n ~n ao m ~n ~ v o ~n
N N V N(O V V(D f~
N N N!~ N N V~ 00 N~ ~ ~ rn ~ ~ ~M 1~
O'~ O~ fD O~ O~ u~ CD N O(D
V V O M ~ M N C O
N N N M N V(O a0 I~OD M~ OO O OD
v ~
ln ln ln I~ l!') tn aO N tA
V V V V V O N O ~(O
N N N O) N I~ N M
CO tn ~ M N O
crl CO ~ ~ ~ ~
M V O~ N CO O~ lC) aD
M O ~ N V O ~A 00 ~ ~
N T (O ~ V' ~ ~ 00 ~ (O
~ N
N ~m. E E
C ~ C U C~ `y .c0 0. y f0 c .-
Y N f0 C N~ N N c f0N- C L w'n .- d~~f0 U d
~ ti E~ v~i c~i ~ v E E
c c c c c c c c c ia
m m m m m m m ce m
.~ ~.D D ~ S] ~ ~ ~ j
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ N M~~(O f~ OO
155




X ~ M 1~ 1~ M M Q N
~ rnMnr~Maor~~naó
~ M~~~ 1~ ~(O ln













mj ~~ 00 Q~~ Q~ CD
Z N(O i0 ~(O ~ Oi ~ V
~ N
N ~(7 iA
N~ M i~ (O I~
N N N e- N LL~ ~ iA Q
N N ~ N M~ N
00 N ~! N 1~ m 00 (O
N~ M M~~ Q(D 1f7
O O N ~
N N (D
~ CD 00 ~ ('~ M N O
I~ 00 N N~ OD O f~ 1~
Z ~(O O~ O~ I~ aO V(O (O
N CO N
I~ aD 1A ~ 00 00 M Ln V
~ M CO CO M O~ ~A 00
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t0 ~
~ ~ m
X tA M Q N M~ N~ N
~ ~ 00 00 O 0~0 M Ó~~
~ N ~ N
J O~D 0~0 M('~7 ~~(D N CO
Z ~ ~ tC7 1n ~ ~ I~ ~ 00n ~ v ~~ ~ ~
I
Q
~n ~ r~ o ~ ~n v co~ N N O N O f~ ~A CD
~ ~ M ~ ~ DO M V
ln (D M M
~ T
~ N N CO N N Q c0 (O
~ O O c'~ O.- 00 (D ~ Oi
N N N O N CO 1~ Q~(O
N N ~A N N~ N
~ M i~ I~ M M N N O M
~ M~~ M f~ O(O O~ OQO
~ M M ~ OO .- ~
~ ~ N
~ c0 ~ (O a~ ~ ~ 01 ~ a0
~ M~ O I~ ~[7 N C'
N(O ~~(O ~ N 1~ 00 00
~ N ~
N(n0 Q~~ f~ ~~ 00 M
N I~ 1~ h h N N 1~ ~A Q~
O O M ~ N
N N (O
R Q M CO s! O M 1n (p 1~
~ V(O (O O M O M
00 .M-- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~f Q O~
U~ ~ N ~
a~o~aóaó~~vrnrnv
'- iA O O~ Q~ N
~ ~ M N N ~
~
O) Q ~A OD Q N V O I~ NQ O V(D OO I~ N(O
N O m O OD 1~ ~(O~~ ~ ~ O N ~ M ~
N
W W CO t0 aQ0 O~ ~ I~ ~A N
~~ r r~ N M~ N ~~ ~ ~
~(O (D M(O O M N M Q
N V Q 00 Q I~ ~ N M N
M N N(D N~~ tY M Q
N N N N~ Q Q ~A Q
M
V ~
~ ~ T E E
~` E C O c O Uc O ~ O
N ~ ~U a N ~ .c
N ~ :V ~ y U .c ~C
Y N f0 C N~ N N C Y N C L~~ d N~
f9
C L.~ f0 Vl - ~d .- d N
~~ E~ ói ~~.v É ~~ E a? u~i ~~ v E~
C C C C C C C C C f0
N N f` f0 f` f0 f0 N N f0 f0 l9 (0 f0 f0 l0 N N
J 7 7 j 7 7 7 j j ~~~~~~ D n~~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ N M Q~(p I~ OD ~ N M R~(O 1~ OO


















N v ~ u~ u~ r~ o o ~ ~
(~ O O V V O 00 N N
N V(O (O V CO h V' M
~- N N ~ Q
X I~ ~ O O~~ V' Q~ C7
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M ~ V ~
a0 a0 N O~ ~ R
~ N CO (O N OOe- c- (h
O O 1~ ~ ~
M M 1~ h M N~ O
N N~ M N~ 01 (O ~
N N M
oo~~ocDO~
O O N N O V V M CD
N N ~ M~ N ~ ~ (D ~
~ ~ N
V O f~ I~ O~ CO O O
~ M M O m~(`) N
t~ oo .-. ~ V V~ 00 ao
~ ~ M 00 M
N N f~ f~ N dO (O N
O O O O O OO ~(h CO
N N~ W N N lD O~ W
~ M~ LL) M N~ M N
N CO ~ ~ iA c'~ 1~ ~(O
h 00 ~ ~ V fD N(O 00
~ ~ M 00 N
~ OO 00 ~ CO O) V OO ~
~ N N~ N M f~ tn ~r- iA ~ ~ ~A ~ (O ~
V ~ ~
V(O CO (O N N c'7 ~
(D O~ O~ tI7 6~ V~ N~
N N~ N I~ O t7 ~













N 00 a0 OD 0~ fh f~ O O
00 N N c`~ N I~ f~ (O DO
M M~A M ~ I~ O
O M N M
~ CO fD M (O 00 c'7 00 u
~(O c0 u7 ~p cp V Oi '-
O ~ N M V
~ ~
C O C U
N ~ 'V a N U .c
Y N f0 C d~ N N c
N- f0 U n. .- p. ~
~ m E~ vi c~i ~~ E
f0 f` N f` lD N N N N
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ N(`7 V U'7 t0 1~ oO
N V f~ f~ ~ O~ ~ V M
~ N m~ N O(O ~- I~ N
~~ aD a0 ~ O f~ V M~
V
O~ 1~ ~~ I~ V' V ch 6Oi a~0
~ N CO CO N~ ~~ N n
~ ~ M
V V h I~ V V ~t O OO ~





N N O O N(O ~ aD (O Q1
~ ~ ~A ~ N
N
M(~p ti N~ M í~A aÍ m ~
~ Oi O OO f~ O~ ~ ch ~
N M M ~~ M N M ~-
'- N
a~O a~0 ~~ O~D O M O M N
~ ~ V R ~ R I~ ~('~ N
Cp (p O ~ N ~
N 1~ O O I~ f~ ~ N O O
mcoinrncocD~v~nrn
~ c'7 ~ V V CO N O CO ~
N N N~[`~ N N N
N
CO 1~ I~ 00 1~ 00 N CD N~
ooornori~ncor~co
M~~ ~ V dD ~A O~~
N ~ I~ M M M N
~(D CO f~ (O í~ff O íM[~ O~i N
N ~ ~ CD ~ M a0 ~~~
~ ~~ ~ V O t~ I~ [T
N M
~ tC') ~ ~ ~ (~ (O O fD CO
N~ Q~ (O O~ tt~ V 1~ ~
N W CO I~ 00 ~ ~7 ~ O O
00 ~A O CD t~ ~
N f`~
O~ V 1~ V O~ CO ~ N
~~ 00 O~ ~ 1~ ~ O OD




C O C O C~ y .~ a ;~ m c
Y N~ L~~~~ N NN- l9 U 0..- a N
~~ E a? u~, c~i ~ v E E
c c c c c c c c c m
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O
~ N M~ 1A CO f~ CO
157
158 Chapter 7. Income Distribution in Competitive Chinese Economy




N O(O ~ 01 O Q) iA hI~ M CD (O N ~A N O~ ~Af~ V' f0 fD CO ~~ f~ O~ MO N~ N N ~ N M
M N N~ V(D O) N
~0 f~ ~ N V I~ ~
N N~ V' N(O ~~
tn ch N ~ N ~
00 CO ~Cl r- N~ O~
M V N ~ O M N O(O iA
O ~ tn N aD ~- ~ Y~ N N
M N cD V V~ 00 V r~
O~ V(O 00 ~(O ~ a~ O~
V
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó 0 ó ó
O (O ~ O ~ ~ ~ OO O ~N
ó ó ó ó ó 0 ó ó ó ó
O~7 OD O iA M(O N O 1~O~ 00 OD O~ Qi a0 I~ O~ O~ CO
Oi N 1~ ~ aO Oi O~ ch N
1~ h~ OD m N O~ M tn
M V Q N~ í~A ~ t0 ~ nO O
O O O O O O O O
Q1 M ~ 01 c0 (O ~D N I~ V
c`~ c`~ N N 1~ (O CD V Oi
M CO ~~A N O~ V V CO O~0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó
M~ 1~ ~('7 CO Oa1 lI7 OD tn
N M M R~ V V í~( ~(~O
O O O O O O O O O O
Oi V CO I~ N~ N OO Oi c'~N OD f~ O fD N O~ m V
N(O OD tD O V V V
~ c~ M~ V V V tn ~n (O
O O O O O O O O O
Ó N Q~ V í~ Qi V(O O~O Qi
~ M LL~ N M~ (D N V
(n M~ V QO tA ~ tn CO GO
O O O O O O O O O O
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó
u~ V O N(D V~~.V-
~ N ~
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó
~(O O 00 ~(O I~ CO f0
~ m aO a0 aD 00 00 a0 W
c~7 ~ ~ OO M V' m~
lYJ O lf') ~A CO N M ln
t0 V a0 N~ oO aD ('7
O N M~~~~ tn f0
O O O O O O O O O
CO lD 00 U7 N I~ lA ~
Q) Q) ~ ln f~ ~ N(O CO
N O I~ ~ O CO (O I~ O0 0 0 0 ó 0 0 0 ó
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó
f~ 00 ~ OD N a0 V U)
~ O~ O c7 N~ I~ (O
O N c'~ V M sY V' ~ íNA
O O O O O O O O O
~(O M C~ N OD I~
c0 r o0 I~ c0 ch O~ in~~~ N CO O 00 I~O N N V M~ V R i!7
O O O O O O O O O
M 1~ V N~ 1~ 1~ O)
c'7 I~ ~ O O N M ~I7 1A
Ó ~ M t7 ~ ~ ~ ~ tY
O O O O O O O O O













W ~ ~ ~
~ C 7
~ Ó ~C1 0a a c











~ N fh V tA CO I~ OD W
C1 ~C ~ C
O p~ ~p~ (Ó 0) ~
D) C C~ O. fIl C Of N . X C~~ . C
E~-~ ~ c v d rn c c E 5~X rn ca o á~ m
ui m c a c o m L c c c c. a c
N~7 ~ L L f0 N f0 f0 3 N C l6 f0 - N N 7 3
m LL. F. N fA (n 2~ ~ U` Z Q(n -i ~ 2 Z 2 2
7.4. Income inequality under perfect competition





































O M O OO M Q~ O O
~ R DO (O (O 00 00 t!7 00
~ O tn OO ~ ~ O (D ~
N 1~ 00 tf~ N
I~ O~ N(D O M~ 0~ 1~ ~
~ O~ (O a0 icl N N aO N Oi ~
~ ~ N~ t0
V~ 1~ ~~ OD
0 ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó 0 ó
M~ V~ M.- in ~ 00 I~ N O~ O f~
(O R ~ ~ N ~ N ~ ~ ~ ~
ó ó ó ó ó ó ó ó 0 0 0 ó ó ó ó
I~ CO iA I~ ~ iA m N M 00 O M N
M t17 QO Q1 00 I~ c0 1~ m aD 00 DO O OD I~
~(O u~ W(O CO N M a0 Oi M Oi CO h ó 0O N V~ O(D N~(O V (D~~ 00 ~~ O~ I~ M~ M I~ I~ ~~ ~
N N N V ~A lU (O I~ ~ O(O ~~
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
CO N I~ OO N I~ f~ CO ~ ~f1
N~~ N M ~ N M N O(O ~O
Ó Ó Ó O O Ó Ó ~ Ó ~ Ó O
~ ó 0
p 0o O
O O O O O O O O O O O O
~ 00 M ~ W V~(D N 00 N V M M ó 0aD (D f~ N ~A O I~ N O O O CD 00
Ó Ó ~ N N N M~ tn ~A (O ~ O~ M ~ó~ó~ó~~~~~ó ó~~
tn N 00 m ~ I~ (O N W C(D O~ ó óV 00 N~~ CO 1~ m O N N(D N
O O~ W(O h!~ O M 00 N CD (D ~ r ~
N N N V~~~ f~ V O ~ M
O O O O O O O O O O O O Ó
1~ N t~ 00 OD 00 I~ (O M N 40 00 00 ó 000 (p M OD ~ 1~ ~ M N(O h N O N
N O ~~~ M M~ I~ ~ I~ 0~~~
O O r- O M V V V' ~ ~ ~
O O O O O O O O O O O O O
O ~ N M~~(U I~ 00 ~ O ~ N M~~
N N N N N N N N N N M M M M M M
C m (p ~ X ' C
a f0 C N~ X L~ L C 7
y C C C:- CI .IV (9 ~ t9 Lc c c
H2}U'~iCZU` C7C'1(Aln Qm~QO~
f~ N
U C ~ U .C
C 1 l0 C 1
j O 7 j O
O p, ~ O ~.
á C C C. c
y ~ -~ N ~
O ~ '~ O ~
U N L U N
159
160 Chapter 7. Income Distribution in Competitive Chinese Economy
7.4.2 The inequality between social classes
In particular, the greater overall inequality is mainly a result of the inequality between
social classes. Table 7.9 shows that incomes of different social classes will be greatly
different in both rural and urban areas and in every province. The figures in row
31 and columns 1 and 2 in Table 7.10 show that the Theil index of the income
inequalities between social classes are 0.4728 in rural areas and 0.4624 in urban areas
in the competitive market, which are about 15 and ten times higher than the income
inequalities between social classes in the current market.
In rural areas in the competitive market, the capitalist will still earn the highest
income, which is 120 times higher than the rural mean income in the competitive
market, while the figure is 12 times in the current market; high-skilled people will
also earn high incomes in the competitive market; the wage of the rural technician
will increase about 18 times from the current market and rank at the second highest,
which is 1.73 times higher than the one of rural manager, which will grow about nine
times - 23 times higher than the wage of the rural skilled, and 98 times higher than
the wage of the rural unskilled; the rural retiree's income will remain nearly the same
as the wage in the current market, which will be 3.3 times above the rural mean
income in the competitive market; from the current market, the rural self-employed
income will go down 70~0, skilled income will go down 13~0, the dependant's income
will be up 15~0, and the income of all three classes will be slightly over the rural mean
income in the competitive market; the rural unskilled income will go down sharply to
35~0 of the wage in the current market, and account for only about a quarter of the
rural mean income in the competitive market.
In urban areas, the capitalist's income will increase over five times from the current
to the competitive market, and will be 489 times higher than the income of the
unskilled, and 30 times higher than the urban mean income in the competitive market;
the technician's income will grow nearly 14 times, and will be 2.28 times higher than
the manager's income, which will grow over five times - 22 times higher than the
income of the skilled, and 114 times higher than that of unskilled in the competitive
market; the urban retiree's income will go up 75o-Io from the current to the competitive
market, and will be slightly over the urban mean income in the competitive market;
the incomes of the urban unskilled, skilled and self-employed will go down from the
current to the competitive markets by 75~10, 30PIo and 78P1o, respectively; the urban
dependant's income will go up 32010, and the income of all four classes will drop below
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the urban mean income in the competitive market.
From the current to the competitive markets, income differences among social
classes will increase in every province. In Beijing, whose income will be the highest
under competition, the decreasing ranking of income levels is the capitalist, the tech-
nician, the retiree, the dependant, the self-employed, the manager, the skilled and
the unskilled. The capitalist's income will be 1.69 tímes higher than the technician's
income, which is 57 times higher than the retiree's income, which is 7.97 times higher
than the dependant's income. The dependant's income is 159 times higher than that
of the manager, the skilled, the self-employed and the unskilled. In rural areas, the
capitalist's income will be 13 times higher than the rural mean income. In urban
areas, the capitalist's income will be 5.38 times higher than the urban mean income.
In Sanxi, whose income is similar to the overall mean income in China, the decreasing
ranking of income levels will be the capitalist, the technician, the manager, the retiree,
the dependant, the self-employed and the skilled, and the unskilled. The capitalist's
income will be 1.26 times higher than that of the technician. The technician's income
is 1.22 times higher than the manager's income, 5.88 times higher than the retiree's
income, 12.71 times higher than that of the dependant, 13.92 times higher than that
of the skilled and the self-employed, and 72.8 times higher than the unskilled. In
rural areas, the rural capitalist's income will be 16.6 times higher than the rural mean
income. In urban areas, the urban capitalist's income will be six times higher than the
urban mean income. In Guizhou, whose income is the lowest among the provinces,
the decreasing ranking of income levels will be the capitalist, the technician and the
manager, the skilled and the self-employed, the retiree, the dependant, and the un-
skilled. The capitalist's income will be 1.18 times higher than the technician's income
and the manager's income, which is nine times higher than that of the skilled and
the self-employed, 18 times higher than that of the retiree, 31 times higher than the
dependant's income, and 62 times higher than the income of the unskilled. In rural
areas, the rural capitalist's income will be 46 times higher than the rural mean in-
come. In urban areas, the urban capitalist's income will be ten times higher than the
urban mean income. The figures in columns 1, 2 and 3 from rows 1 to 30 in Table
7.10 show the inequality among social classes with respect to the rural areas, urban
areas, and the average of the two areas in each province.
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7.4.3 The inequality between rural and urban areas
In the competitive market, urban income will be higher than rural income. Table 7.9
shows that the urban mean income is 4.57 times higher than the rural mean income.
In every province, the urban income will be higher than the rural income. With
respect to each social class, the income in urban areas will also be higher than in rural
areas. In each province, there are three factors determining the income of either area:
the income of the capitalist and labor, population composition and the dependency
ratio. In the competitive market, labor is freely mobile between rural and urban areas.
Wages will be determined only by the productivity of labor, no matter where the work
is - in rural or urban areas. In other words, there is no difference in income between
the same types of rural and urban labor. In the empirical section, rural and urban
private capital is not distinguished; in other words, rural and urban capitalists are
considered to have the same capital income. Therefore, the remaining factors are only
the population composition and the dependency ratio. Because low-skilled labor holds
relatively more shares in rural areas than in urban areas, and high-skilled labor holds
relatively fewer shares in rural areas than in urban areas, the mean of rural labor's
income and the capitalist's income (which is weighted by labor and the capitalists),
is lower than the mean of urban labor's income and the capitalist's income. As the
empirics assume that the retiree's income equals the mean, the rural retiree has a
lower income than the urban retiree. Also, owing to the fact that there are more
dependants in rural areas than in urban areas in China, the income of rural labor
and that of the capitalist will be discounted more than the income of their urban
counterpart, after the income is shared with dependants. Because the dependant's
income is the mean of labor and capitalist income, divided by the dependency ratio,
the income is affected by both the population composition and the dependency ratio.
Therefore, the income of the rural dependant is much lower than that of an urban
dependant.
The income inequality between areas in the nation, which contributes 14oIo of the
overall inequality, is the figure in row 33 and column 4 in Table 7.10. The other
figures regarding the inequality between areas by province are listed in column 4 in
Table 7.10. In all provinces, except for the three provinces that did not participate the
competition, the inequality between areas holds a proportion of around ten percent
in the provincial inequality.
From the current to the competitive market, the income gaps in most provinces
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between rural and urban areas will be extended. By comparing the results in Tables
4.3 and 7.10, it can be found that the Theil index of the overall income inequality
between rural and urban areas will go up nearly four times. In the developed eastern
part, the income inequalities between rural and urban areas will go up in all the
provinces. In the less-developed middle part, the income inequalities between rural
and urban areas will also go up in all the provinces except for Anhui province (whose
farmers migrate in great numbers). In the under-developed western part, the income
inequalities between rural and urban areas will go up in six of the 11 provinces, and
will go down in the remaining five provinces (whose farmers migrate in great number.
7.4.4 The inequality in rural and urban areas
The inequality in either rural or urban areas can be divided into the inequality between
social classes and the inequality between provinces. In the competitive market, the
inequality between social classes will contribute the most to the area's inequality. The
figure in row 33 and column 1 in Table 7.10 is the rural inequality, according to which
the overall inequality in rural areas will be made up of the inequality between social
classes in rural areas (86010), and of the inequality between provinces in rural areas
(14070). The figure in row 33 and column 2 in Table 7.10 is the urban inequality, which
will be made up of the inequality between social classes in rural areas (87QIo) and of
the inequality between provinces in rural areas (13010).
Chapter 4 shows that in the current market the overall inequality in rural areas
is slightly less than in urban areas in the nation, in all under- or less-developed
provinces (except for Sanxi province), and in four of the ten developed provinces. In
the competitive market, the figures in columns 1 and 2 in Table 7.10 show that the
overall inequality in rural areas will be greater than in urban areas in the nation,
in eight of the ten developed provinces in the eastern part, in four of the nine less-
developed provinces in the middle part, and in one of the 11 under-developed provinces
in the western part. But, in the other 17 provinces there will be opposite situations.
Just as in the current market, the inequality between provinces in rural areas will
be larger than the inequality between provinces in urban areas in the competitive
market. The richest rural areas are concentrated in the provinces in the eastern part.
According to Table 7.9, eight of the ten provinces in the eastern part have incomes
above the rural mean income; in the middle part, three of the nine provinces are above
the mean; and in the western part, seven of the 11 provinces are above the mean. The
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richest urban areas are concentrated in the eastern part, while the poorest urban parts
are found in the middle and the western parts. According to Table 7.9, seven of the
ten provinces in the eastern part have income above the urban mean income; in the
middle part, one of the nine provinces are above the mean; and in the western part,
three of the 11 provinces are above the mean.
7.4.5 The inequality in provinces
The inequality in provinces can be decomposed into two parts: the inequality between
social classes and between rural and urban areas. Just as in the current market, in
the competitive market in all the provinces that participate the competition, the in-
equality between social classes will contribute most to the overall provincial inequality.
Theil's index inequalities in provinces are listed in column 5 from rows 1-30. From
the current to the competitive market, the overall inequalities will increase in all the
competitive provinces. In each province, around 8501'0 of the Theil's index inequality
will be contributed by the inequality between social classes, which is listed in colum-
n 3, and only a small part will be contributed by the inequality between rural and
urban areas in each province. In the eastern part, Guangdong will have the biggest
inequality, and Beijing the smallest inequality; in the middle part, Hunan will have
the biggest inequality, and Anhui the smallest inequality (except for Neimeng, which
does not participate in the competition); in the western part, Sichuan will have the
biggest inequality, and Yunnan the smallest (except for Tibet and Hainan, which do
not participate in the competition).
In the current market, because of the significant existence of the income inequality
between rural and urban areas, the income inequality in each province is negatively
related to economic development. Under perfect competition, the income inequality
in each province will not be related to development in the province - neither will the
inequality between social classes nor the inequality between areas. Table 7.10 lists
the data for each part of the country, listed increasingly according to the inequality
in each province to show that there is no significant relationship between the income
inequalities that exist and the development of the province.
7.4.6 The inequality between provinces
From the current to the competitive market, income inequality between provinces will
grow 2.5 times. In the competitive market, the income inequality between provinces
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is 0.0718 (in row 32 and column 5 in Table 7.10), which contributes ll07'o to the
overall inequality in China. According to Table 7.9, Beijing, in the eastern part, will
have the highest income, which is over eight times higher than the lowest income in
Hebei; in the middle part, Anhui will have the highest income, which is over six times
higher than the lowest income in Henan; in the eastern part, Gansu will have the
highest income, which is over 11 times higher than the lowest income in Guizhou.
By comparing the incomes among the three parts, the income in Beijing will be over
two times higher than the income in Anhui and less than two times higher than the
income in Gansu; the income in Hebei will be nearly two times higher than the income
in Henan and over two times higher than the income in Guizhou. The overal] mean
income in the nation will be 1618. Provinces with incomes above the mean are as
follows: seven of the ten provinces in the eastern part, three of the nine provinces in
the middle part, and four of the 11 provinces in the western part. Apparently, the
eastern part will be the richest, the middle and the western parts will be the poorest,
and the income difference between the two parts will be relatively small.
7.5 Conclusion
The inequalities in China and the provinces will become much higher under perfect
competition. The inequality in China overall is shown to grow six times greater.
Among the three decomposed inequalíties, the inequality between social classes will
contribute the most to the overall inequality, the inequality between provinces the
second most, and the inequality between rural and urban areas the least. In each
province, the inequality between social classes will also increase.
As in the observed market, in the competitive market the overall inequality in rural
areas will be also slightly less than in urban areas, and the overall inequality between
social classes in rural areas will be also lower than in urban areas. In particular, only
in some developed provinces will the inequality between social classes in rural areas
be higher than in urban areas.
The inequality between rural and urban areas will increase, but its share in the
overall inequality will decrease. This is because the competitive markets allow labor
to move freely between rural and urban areas; the rural and urban areas are no longer
the factor causing the difference in labor's income. The remaining inequality between
rural and urban areas results from the difference in composition and the dependency
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ratio of the population between rural and urban areas.
Income inequality will not be related to economic development. In the compet-
itive market, the majority of the inequality will arise from the inequality between
social classes, which is irrelevant to development. It was observed that the inequality
between rural and urban areas was related to economic development. But, in the
competitive market, the share of the inequality between rural and urban areas in the
overall inequality will decrease.
The inequality between provinces will increase, but its share in overall inequality
will decrease. The increase in the inequality between provinces is caused by the
expansion of capital income and wages of highly ranked labor between provinces in
the competitive market. The decrease in the share in overall inequality results from
the great increase of the inequality between social classes.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This research attempted to explore what effect a market economy would have on the
distribution of personal income in China. To serve this purpose, I developed a theory
of the distribution of economic determinants of income by constructing a computable
general equilibrium model to outline the perfectly competitive economy and, in par-
ticular, the income distribution. I then conducted an experiment based on the real
economy in China. Throughout the research, I have reviewed the advanced theories
on income distribution, the Chinese economy, the modelling process, and the personal
income distributions in the actual current market economy as well as in a hypotheti-
cal one. This chapter offers some conclusions to this research. I shall summarize the
results from three angles: What is the current distribution of personal income in the
Chinese marketplace, and what is it in the hypothetical competitive market? How will
the distribution of income change as the current economy evolves toward that of the
hypothetical competitive marketplace? Which regions, areas and social classes will
be the winners and losers of competition? In addition to answering these questions I
shall also evaluate my model and the empirical results. With respect to the modelling,
first the achievements of the research will be mentioned; the discussion subsequently
moves on to the limits. Some of the limits have potential for improvement. With
regard to the empirics, although the utmost has been done to collect sound data,
some rough estimations and assumptions on the non-existing data may still hurt the
results considerably.
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8.1 On personal income distribution
Income inequality is low in the current Chinese market, but it will increase greatly
under perfect competition. In particular, among the income inequalities, the inequal-
ity between social classes will increase the most, and will contribute to the majority
of the overall inequality.
Research has concluded that compared to other developing countries in Asia, Chi-
na's overall income inequality is low. The Gini coef~icients calculated in 1988 by
Griffin, Lee, Karn and Zhao (1994) was 0.382. Wang et al. (1995) found out that
Gini coefficients in 1993 were 0.331 for rural areas and 0.242 for urban areas. The
Theil's index that I calculated in Chapter 4 followed their results. In 1992, the Theil's
inequality was less than 0.09 for China as a whole, and about 0.06 for both rural and
urban areas. The low inequality in the current Chinese market reflects the fact that
the income differences between social classes, between regions and between rural and
urban areas are relatively small in the current market. Among the overall Theil's in-
equality, the inequality between social classes is less than 0.04, the inequality between
rural and urban areas is about 0.03, and the inequality between provinces is a little
over 0.02.
According to the Theil's index that I calculated in Chapter 7 for the competi-
tive market, this situation changed dramatically. Table 8.1 shows that the overall
inequality increased about seven times - from 0.09 in the observed market to 0.65 in
the competitive market, among which the inequality between social classes increased
about 12 times, from 0.04 to 0.47, the inequality between areas increased nearly four
times, from 0.03 to 0.11, and the inequality between provinces increased three and a
half times, from 0.02 to 0.07.
The biggest increase is the inequality between social classes. In competitive mar-
kets, highly skilled labor and capitalists will be the big winners and retirees and
dependants will be modest winners; the unskilled, the self-employed and skilled work-
ers will be the losers. Column 1 in Table 8.2 shows that in rural areas, the technician's
income increases nearly 20 times, the manager's ten times, a capitalist's ten times,
a retiree's one time, a dependant's a little over one times; a skilled worker's income,
however, decreases to 0.87 times, the self-employed to 0.3 times, and an unskilled
worker to 0.34 times. In urban areas, the technician's income increases nearly 15
times, the manager's six times, a capitalist's six times, a retiree's less than two times,
and a dependant's over one times; the income of the skilled, however, will decrease to
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Table 8.1 Inequality Changes in the Competitive Economy ( ratios)
Rural Urban Across Between Provincial Per capita
inequality inequality areas areas inequality final uses
1 2 3 4 5 6
Shanghai 1 25.88 22.31 22.26 4.48 18.6 1.02
Tianjin 2 10.73 14.36 12.08 13.36 12.25 1.16
Beijing 3 6.34 8.84 7.9 5.84 7.63 1.62
Sandong 4 11.35 9.27 9.88 60.38 11.53 0.55
Jiangshu 5 19.27 18.38 18.84 2.09 11.69 1.73
Zhejiang 6 7.65 9.33 8.39 105.8 9.28 0.74
Liaoning 7 18.87 13.71 15.03 3.46 11.2 0.83
Guangdong 8 16.56 9.73 12.61 18.41 13.17 0.75
Fujian 9 13.57 3.96 7.3 3.35 6.17 0.58
Hebei 10 11.21 12.24 10.93 4.14 7.85 0.65
Heilongjiang 11 29.54 9.25 13 5.5 11.04 0.67
Hubei 12 16.5 13.8 15.4 3.51 10.35 0.62
Jianxi 13 13.59 7.3 10.61 3.49 8.49 0.54
Jilin 14 22.84 8.09 11.19 3.19 7.94 0.52
Hunan 15 18.91 11.01 15.22 3 9.57 0.61
Neimeng 16 1 1 1 1 1
Henan 17 17.93 9.05 13.6 1.74 6.87 0.5
Anhui 18 7.03 4.44 6.09 0.25 3.12 3.71
Sanxi 19 7.64 9.16 8.18 1.78 4.81 0.61
Guizhou 20 20.05 7.61 12.31 2.81 8.08 0.49
Shichuan 21 19.83 15.48 18.37 3.35 11.94 0.57
Guangxi 22 18.77 6 11.39 3.13 7.32 0.51
Yunnan 23 4.14 4.3 4.98 0.52 2.27 3.97
Shanxi 24 17.32 14.76 16.18 1.79 6.94 0.58
Xinjiang 25 4.18 5.34 5.33 0.56 2.53 1.36
Ningxia 26 4.08 7.44 7.38 0.79 2.7 2.25
Gansu 27 4.53 7.12 7.25 0.16 2.24 3.88
Tibet 28 1 1 1 1 1
Hainan 29 1 1 1 1 1
Qinghai 30 21.23 11.53 13.98 0.44 4.12 0.54
Across provinces 31 14.59 10.16 12.27 3.82 8.65
Between provinces 32 3.29 4.09 3.45 3.45
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seventy percent, that of the self-employed to twenty percent, and that of the unskilled
to twenty-five percent. In most of the provinces, the technicians will be the biggest
winners, and the unskilled and the self-employed will be the biggest losers. In Shanghai
(in the eastern part), and Anhui, Hubei, and Henan (in the middle part), capitalists
will be the biggest winners. But, in Qinhai (in the western part), the urban capitalist
will lose.
There exists a notable difference in income between rural and urban areas in the
current Chinese market. This problem will become more serious in the competitive
market. However, the share of the income inequality between the areas in the overall
measure of inequality will go down.
Chapter 4 stated that there existed an obvious distinction between rural and urban
economies. In the actual current economy, income differences between rural and urban
areas is observed by most research. Wang et al. (1995) pointed out that urban
income was 2.33 times rural income in 1992, 2.54 times rural income in 1993, and
2.61 times rural income in 1994. In Chapter 4, I calculated that urban income was
over two times higher than rural income in China, and also observed that in all other
provinces (except for Zhejiang where rural income was higher than urban income),
urban incomes were higher than rural incomes. The overall Theil inequality between
rural and urban areas that I calculated is 0.028 for the nation.
Under perfect competition, the inequality between rural and urban areas will in-
crease to 0.11, and rank at the second biggest growth behind the growth of the in-
equality between social classes. This is because the growth rate of urban income is
faster than that of rural income. In the competitive market, urban areas will be the
winners in all provinces, and rural areas will be the relatively small winners in nine
provinces, the big winners in six provinces, and the losers in 12 provinces. Column
1 in Table 8.2 shows that urban mean income will increase over two times, whereas
rural mean income will increase just one time. In nine of the 27 provinces that par-
ticipate in the competition, both rural and urban areas are the winners, but because
the growth rate of urban income is higher than that of rural income, urban areas will
be the big winners. However, in Anhui (in the middle part), and in Gansu, Xinjiang,
Ningxia, Yunnan and Qinghai, opposite situation occurs in which rural areas are the
big winners. Moreover, when urban areas are the winners across all provinces, rural
areas will be the losers in 12 other provinces (in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Sandong and
Hebei in the eastern part, in Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Henan
in the middle part, and in Sichuan, Guangxi and Guizhou in the western part).
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In the competitive market, the share of inequality between rural and urban areas
in the overall inequality decreases relatively, as its level increases by a factor 3.82 only,
whereas the inequality across areas goes up by a factor 9.14 (Table 8.2, bottom line).
By comparing the figures in column 7 in Tables 4.3 and 7.10, one can see the decrease
in share in most of the provinces (except for the four developed provínces, Tianjin,
Sandong, Zhejiang and Guangdong, as the levels in the provinces increases by factors
13.36, 60.38, 105.8 and 18.41, whereas the inequalities across areas go up by factors
12.08, 9.88, 8.39 and 12.61, respectively (Table 7.10, cells on column 7 and rows 2, 4, 6
and 8).), which means that in the other 23 provinces the growth rate of the inequality
between social classes is higher than the growth rate of the inequality between rural
and urban areas - but that in the four developed provinces the opposite is true.
Inequalities in rural and urban areas are about the same in China. Within the
areas, inequality differs by stage of development. In lesser- and under-developed
provinces, inequality is mostly in urban areas, whereas in the developed provinces
inequality is mostly in rural areas. All these findings will remain valid under perfect
competition.
While most of the Asian developing countries report less inequality in rural areas
than in urban areas,' some research has also observed that rural areas have more
inequalíty than urban area in China. Griffin et al. (1994) calculated the Gini coeffi-
cients for China in 1988 as 0.334 in rural areas and 0.233 in urban areas. Wang et al.
(1995) calculated the Gini coefficients for China in 1993 as 0.331 in rural areas, and
0.242 in urban areas. Both concluded that rural inequality was higher than urban
inequality.
Is it really true that China is different from the other developing economies in Asia?
My calculation of Theil's index gave a negative answer to the question. The results in
Chapter 4 revealed that, just as in other developing countries in Asia, the inequality
in rural areas in China was nearly same as the inequality in urban areas. In Table 4.3,
the inequality in rural areas is 0.0567 (in row 33 and column 1), and the inequality in
urban areas is 0.0618 (in row 33 and column 2). My conclusion differed from the others
in that the inequality in rural areas was found to be slightly less than the inequality
in urban areas. Griffin et al. (1994) and Zhu (1990) concluded that the inequality
in rural areas was usually greater than in urban areas in all provinces. This research
distinguishes China's provinces into developed, less-developed and under-developed
'See, Griffin et al. (1994).
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in Chapter 4. Through my calculation, I found that the inequality in rural areas was
larger than the inequality in urban areas in only six of ten developed provinces; the
inequality in rural areas was less than the inequality in urban areas in the remaining
22 less- and under-developed provinces.
The results in Chapter 7 revealed that the competitive market would have a similar
situation, as the bottom line of Table 8.1 shows that rural and urban inequalities are
affected by roughly equal factors, 9.75 and 8.56, respectively. A careful check with
respect to provinces shows that in eight of the ten provinces in the eastern part, in four
of the nine provinces in the middle part, and one of the 11 provinces in the western
part, the rural inequalities will be larger than the urban inequalities; in other 17
provinces, however, most of which are the less- and least-developed provinces, urban
areas will have more inequalities than rural areas. This phenomena may be understood
by reasoning that in developed provinces there are relatively larger proportions of
high-income people in rural areas, whereas in under-developed provinces, there are
relatively larger proportions of low-income people in rural areas.
Income inequality between provinces contributes significantly to the overall in-
equality, to the inequality in rural areas, and to the inequality in urban areas. This
inequality will increase under perfect competition, but its shares in the overall in-
equality, in the inequality in rural areas, and in the inequality in urban areas will
decline.
In a big country like China, income differences certainly exist between regions.
Griffin et al. (1994) compared the income in rural areas among all provinces, and the
income in urban areas among ten provinces in 1988. They were unable to justify the
inequalities between the provinces in either rural or urban areas. Wang et al. (1995)
compared the income levels in rural areas between the eastern, the middle and the
western parts, and found out that the ratio was 2.58 : 1.16 : 1 in 1992. Further, they
compared income levels in rural areas between provinces for each of the three parts.
They concluded that there was big difference in income between the eastern part and
the middle and western parts, a small difference in income between the middle and
the western parts, a big difference in income between the provinces within the eastern
part, and small difference in income between the provinces within the middle and
the western parts. With respect to the difference in urban income between regions,
they found out that the ratio of income in the three parts was 2.13 : 0.89 : 1, and
made a similar conclusion as they did for rural income. Their analysis was rather
rough, because they used the income of a special province in each part to represent
176 Chapter 8. Conclusion
the income of the part. Yang (1992) calculated the relative mean deviation of per
capita GNP in 1989 with respect to the eastern, the middle and the western part, and
the provinces in the parts. He got a similar conclusion as Wang et al. (1995). Wei
(1992) calculated the weighted relative mean deviation of per capita national income,
and also obtained a similar result. All these research attempts were unable to come
up with some answers about the income inequality between provinces in China.
To begin with, the results that I obtained in Chapter 4 can directly draw the
conclusions that are similar to the others above. Table 4.2 shows that the eastern
part is richer than the middle and the western parts, and that the middle and the
western parts are close. Evidently, eight of ten provinces in the eastern part, two
of nine provinces in the middle part, and four of 11 provinces in the western part
that have income above the mean income in the nation. In the eastern part, there is
big difference in income, because the highest income in Shanghai is over three and a
half times higher than the lowest income in Sandong; in the middle part, the income
difference is not that big, because the highest income in Heilongjiang is nearly two
times higher than the lowest income in that part - in Henan; in the western part,
the income difference is also small, because the highest income in Hainan is over two
times higher than the lowest income in Guizhou. In addition to these results, however,
Chapter 4 provided deeper results regarding the inequality between provinces in the
form of Theil's index.
In the current Chinese market, the inequality between provinces contributes sig-
nificantly to the overall income inequality. According to the data in Table 4.3, the
inequality between provinces in rural areas accounts for 43o1c of the overall inequality
in rural areas; the inequality between provinces in urban areas accounts for 26P1o of
the overall inequality in urban areas; and, the inequality between provinces accounts
for 33~0 of the overall inequality in China.
Under perfect competition, the inequality between provinces will increase, but its
share in the overall income inequality will decrease. According to Table 7.10, the
inequality between provinces in rural areas will increase over three times, but it is
only 14~0 of the inequality in rural areas; the inequality between provinces in urban
areas will increase slightly over four times, but it is only 13010 of the inequality in urban
areas; and the inequality between provinces will increase three and a half times, but
it is only 17~ of the overall inequality in China.
The increase of the inequality between provinces occurs under perfect competition
because the provinces gain differently. According to Table 8.2, the overall mean
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income of China will increase less than two times. Among the eastern, the middle
and the western parts, the eastern part will be the big winner, as all ten provinces
there will have their income increased. In particular, the six provinces of Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Guangdong will gain much. The growth
rates of income in these provinces are almost double. In the middle part, income
increases in five of the nine provinces, with only Anhui and Sanxi featuring growth
rates of income well over the average growth rate. However, Jiangxi and Henan, with
decreasing income, will lose. In the western part, four of the 11 provinces will have
their income increased. In particular, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia and Yunnan will be
the big winners, and Guangxi and Guizhou will be the losers.
In the observed markets, there is a negative relationship between income inequality
and economic development. But, under perfect competition, this relationship will
vanish.
Although Griffin et al. (1994) argued that there was no relationship between in-
come inequality and economic development in either rural or urban areas in provinces,
Theil's index in Chapter 4 showed that the inequality within each province was relat-
ed to its economic development. In the developed provinces, the inequalities between
rural and urban areas were less. It was shown, however, that the less developed the
province was, the greater the inequality was between rural and urban areas. The
overall inequality in each province consists of the inequality between social classes
and the inequality between areas. In the current market, the former was not relat-
ed to economic development, while the latter was. Because the latter contributes
significantly to the overall inequality, the overall inequality was therefore related to
development in each province. In the competitive market, the share of the inequality
between areas in the overall income inequality will decrease; the overall inequality
will thus be approached mainly by the inequality between social classes, which is not
related to the development.
Unskilled labor will migrate out of the under-developed western part; the less-
developed middle part will not be affected, but the developed eastern part will "im-
port" the migration of the western part's unskilled labor. The migration of unskilled
labor significantly influences local economies. The provinces from which the unskilled
labor and their families emigrate will see an increase in mean income levels, where-
as the provinces that welcome the immigrant unskilled labor and their families will
experience a decrease in mean income levels.
In Chapter 4, I have introduced the so-called "Hukou", or a special system of
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residence registration conducted by the Chinese government. The economic reform
has weakened the action of the "Hukou", which has given more freedom to the labor
markets. Labor moves under the incentive to survive or to improvethe the standard
of life. Currently, the mobility of labor, particularly farmers, is steadily increasing. In
current years there have been tens of millions of farmers moving around the country
in search of work. Wang et al. (1995) estimated that, at that time, China had in fact
130 million surplus farmers, and that this number would increase to 230 million in
the next ten years.
The results of this research in Table 7.3 showed that in the competitive market
there would be nearly 86 million unskilled laborers ready to mígrate.2 Table 8.3 shows
that total amount of the migrants that is including with the family members,3 will
be about 150 million.4 Table 8.3 also shows that the provinces with the exodus of
unskilled labor will have higher income ranks, and the provinces experiencing immi-
gration will have lower income ranks. In the eastern part, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu
and Tianjin will have 37 million immigrants; the other six provinces will have 52
million immigrants, and the net number of immigrants will be nearly 15 million. In
the middle part, only Anhui and Sanxi will have numbers of immigrants over 53 mil-
lion. Neimeng's population will remain constant, as it does not participate in the
competitive market; the other six provinces will have 53 million migrants, with the
immigrants almost matching the emigrants. In the western part, Xingjiang, Ningxia,
Gansu and Yunnan will have over 61 million immigrants, the populations in Hainan
and Tibet will remain as constant as Neimeng. The other five provinces will have over
46 million migrants. The western part will have over 15 million net immigrants.
8.2 On the modelling
An important part of this research is the modelling. A good model is a bridge between
theory and practice. On the one hand, the model's construction should be theoret-
ically well based; on the other hand, it also should be applicable to real economic
problems. The modelling in this research was an exploration in that direction.
Neo-classical economic theory, which provides the basis for the modelling, states
2This is the sum of either all the positive or all the negative entries of the column of totals of
Table 7.3. The labor substitution figures cancel out.
3The family members are accounted for based on the dependency ratios in each province, which
are presented in Table 4.1.
4This is the sum of eithet all the positive or all the negative entries of last column of Table 8.3.
8.2. On the modelling 179
Table 8.3 Migration in the Competitive Economy
Mean income Migration out Migration inward Net migration out
Beijing 10361 3154313 0 3154313
Shanghai 8706 1763622 0 1763622
Tianjin 5271 284480 0 284480
Jiangsu 5022 32138700 0 32138700
Liaoning 2659 0 4554553 -4554553
Guangdong 2589 0 8464158 -8464158
Zhejiang 2118 0 5781061 -5781061
Fujian 1471 0 4434715 -4434715
Sandong 1345 0 17137073 -17137073
Hebei 1211 0 11636488 -11636488
Eastern part 37341115 52008048 -14666933
Anhui 4424 47192609 0 47192609
Heilongjiang 1782 0 2962822 -2962822
Sanxi 1662 6240171 0 6240171
Jilin 1242 0 3090346 -3090346
Neimeng 937 0 0 0
Hunan 935 0 12190874 -12190874
Hubei 848 0 9867711 -9867711
Jiangxi 843 0 6760587 -6760587
Henan 696 0 18335609 -18335609
Middle part 53432780 53207949 224831
Gansu 5882 18632325 0 18632325
Xinjiang 5056 8584547 0 8584547
Ningxia 4920 3054507 0 3054507
Yunnan 2565 31128881 0 31128881
Hainan 1290 0 0 0
Qinghai 1228 0 704016 -704016
Tibet 1117 0 0 0
Shanxi 997 0 6040128 -6040128
Sichuan 845 0 24150559 -24150559
Guangxi 784 0 8510678 -8510678
Guizhou 523 0 6857153 -6857153
Western part 61400260 46262534 15137726
China 1618 152174155 151478531 695624
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that in a competitive economy, given endowments, preferences and technologies, mar-
ket forces will automatically drive the economy to the level of efficiency at which the
economy maximizes final output and optimally employs resources. The modelling in
the research, therefore, attempted to maximize the final product and simultaneously
allocate resources optimally. The theory states that in a competitive economy, re-
sources are valued by the marginal productivity. The modelling therefore considered
the computation of the marginal productivity.
In brief, the modelling in this research has made some considerable achievements.
The model describes a large-scale integrated market, in which a number of sectors
and small economies compete with each other. More specifically, there are 810 sectors
and 27 economies. As a result of the competition, some sectors and economies would
expand, some shrink, and some even disappear. The modelling reallocated resources
among sectors and economies, so that the final product was maximized in the economy.
In particular, it captured labor substitution and migration. This was a speciality of
the modelling in this research. The modelling determined the prices of resources and
commodities, and therefore revealed the functional income distribution under perfect
competition.
In spite of these achievements, the modelling has some limits, which need be
improved in future research. First, the objective is not the real final product, it is only
a part of the final product. By definition, the final product consists of consumption,
investment and net export. The modelling considers the net export as an external
resource; therefore, the objective, in fact, includes only consumption and investment.
If the model incorporates the net export into the objective, then it must also consider
the economy outside the integrated economy.
Second, the assumption that fixed capital is sector specific is too strong. In fact,
fixed capital can be divided into two types: specific and common fixed capital. Specific
fixed capital is the capital designed specifically or for special uses; medical machines,
for example, become useless out of the sector, and can therefore be assumed to be
sector specific. Common fixed capital is capital for common uses; the buildings, for
example, computers and office facilities - this type of capital can be mobile among
sectors or even among locations.
Third, the assumption that the technician is mobile among sectors is not precise
enough. The technician may also be divided into two types: the specialist and the
general technician. A special technician, a veterinary surgeon in agricultural sector,
for example, is unable to find proper position in other sectors; an engineer in farming
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machinery, however, may do so.
Fourth, because the main part of the model is a linear program, it is affected by the
limits of linear programming that the number of non-zero shadow prices is determined
by the number of independent constraints in the linear program. In other words, the
fewer the number of independent constraints, the more zero shadow prices. To avoid
the problem, one may choose to use a non-linear program.
Fifth, the model makes no direct connection with personal income distribution.
In this research, the model is confined to generating a functional income distribution;
it does not incorporate a personal income distribution. The research investigates per-
sonal income distribution only empirically. For research that is intended to investigate
personal income distribution, it may be convenient and comprehensive to model the
functional and personal income distribution together. Especially if the research is con-
cerned with policy making and the optimal pattern of income distribution, the model
has to capture the feedback effects; it therefore needs to consider various aspects such
as population composition, government intervention and family structure together.
8.3 On the empirics
This research put a lot of eífort inon the empirics. It dealt with hundreds of thou-
sands of data and employed a number of advanced computing methods and computer
programs to compute the model and to calculate the personal income distribution.
Because the existing data were insufFicient for the requirements of the research, the
empirics were meant to derive, to estimate and assume the data that were unavailable
by referring to relevant information sources and the literature. Because the model
included a large-scale linear program, normal computer programs and mathematical
methods were not enough to compute the model. The empirics had to adopt the
sparse matrix method to handle this problem. However, the empirics still retain some
problems.
First, because information on capital utilization does not exist in China, the empir-
ics had to substitute the capital for production for the capital utilization in industrial
sectors. Certainly, the two are vastly different, at least in definition. But, my experi-
ence leads me to conject that the two may have many things in common in Chinese
statistics. In the sectors of agriculture, commerce, construction, finance and banking,
education, and public administration, the rates of capital utilization are estimated
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very roughly by referring to the literature and to other partial information sources.
Second, the empirics assumed that labor was employed fully in the observed mar-
kets, which in fact was not true. There may be a certain amount of unemployment
in the markets. However, because unemployment is not well defined in China, in-
formation on the term is rather rare and untrustworthy. Especially in rural areas,
it is hardly possible to distinguish between employment and unemployment. And,
in urban areas, the low unemployment rate released by official authorities is highly
improbable because it is far away from public's feeling on the markets.
Third, it was not realistic enough to assume that the capitalist is the sole earner
of capital income in the empirics. Apparently, other classes of people may also hold
a certain amount of private capital, and earn the income. If the empirics could have
included this part of income, the results would have been more precise, and might
have drawn some different conclusions.
Fourth, because of the lack of micro-data this research was unable to investigate
income differences within social classes; the absence of the information about income
inequality within social classes has inevitably kept us from drawing explicit and deep
conclusions. A way to counteract this weakness may be to further divide social classes
into subclasses according to income levels or ages with the assistance of relevant micro-
data.
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Samenvatting
Het is een opmerkelijk feit dat, waar wereldwijd vele economieën stagneren, de social-
istische economie van China de afgelopen jaren aanmerkelijk is gegroeid. Dit wordt,
onder anderen door economen, toegeschreven aan de markt-georiënteerde hervormin-
gen die daar in 1978 zíjn begonnen. Momenteel maakt men goede vorderingen met de
hervormingen, niettegenstaande het feit dat China nog een lange weg te gaan heeft
naar een markteconomie. De vraag hoe lang die weg is, en op welke manieren de mark-
thervormíngen de Chinese economie zullen beinvloeden, ligt ten grondslag aan deze
monografie. Op basis van een model van een hypothetische Chinese markteconomie
zal getracht worden om inzicht in deze vraagstukken te krijgen.
De monografie belicht een bepaald aspect van de economie, namelijk de verdeling
van de private inkomens; specifiek, de invloed van een markteconomie daarop. Daarbij
is de discussie opgebouwd rond drie thema's. Ten eerste, de huidige situatie met
betrekking tot de private inkomensverdeling. Ten tweede, de verandering van de
verdeling als gevolg van economische hervormingen. Ten derde, de rechtvaardigheid
van de verdeling.
Het onderzoek in deze monografie gaat uit van de vooronderstelling dat fun-
damentele economische variabelen het inkomen bepalen, en de functionele met de
private inkomensverdeling verbinden. Aangenomen wordt dat het private inkomen
bepaald wordt door private beginvoorraden, meer specifiek door de prijs van begin-
voorraden, gegeven vaste eigendomsrechten hierop. Volgens de neo-klassieke theorie
van de functionele inkomensverdelingen bepaalt in een markt met volledige mededing-
ing de marginale produktiviteit van een goed diens prijs. Omgekeerd is het private
inkomen afleidbaar als de goederenprijzen eenmaal bekend zijn. Om die reden is
de kern van deze monografie het afleiden van een evenwichtige inkomensverdeling in
een mededingingseconomie. In de eerste plaats wordt daartoe een algemeen even-
wichtsmodel geconstrueerd en opgelost, waarin lonen en rentevoeten gekoppeld zijn
aan de marginale produktiviteit van arbeid en kapitaal, respectievelijk. Vervolgens
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wordt de functionele inkomensverdeling omgezet naar een private inkomensverdeling.
In het algemeen evenwichtsmodel wordt China voorgesteld als een geintegreerde
economie met wereldwijde handelsbetrekkingen. Internationale handelsstromen wor-
den daarbij als gegeven beschouwd. Het doel van de planner van deze economie is om
de netto binnenlandse consumptie te maximaliseren. In het model is China opgedeeld
in dertig provincies, die ieder op zich een onafhankelijke economie vormen. Iedere
provincie wordt op zijn beurt gekarakteriseerd door dertig goederen- en diensten-
sectoren. Tussen de provincies is volledige vrijhandel in goederen en diensten, met
uitzondering van de dienst 'openbaar bestuur', die provincie-specifiek is.
Voor de productie van goederen en diensten wordt gebruik gemaakt van arbei-
d, kapitaal en tussenproducten. Kapitaalgoederen worden daarbij als sectorspec-
ifiek beschouwd. Arbeid wordt geklassificeerd op basis van scholing; vier niveaus
worden onderscheiden, namelijk 'ongeschoold', 'geschoold', 'manager', en 'technicus'.
Aangenomen wordt dat arbeid een mobiele produktiefactor is. Het model beschouwt
drie soorten substitutie: tussen hogere en lagere scholingsniveaus, tussen sectoren,
en tussen regio's. Volgens de theorie van het menselijk kapitaal komen verschil-
lende scholingsniveaus overeen met verschillende niveaus van marginale produktiviteit,
waarbij hoger geschoolde arbeid lager geschoolde arbeid kan vervangen. Het model in
deze monografie beschouwt de volgende substitutie-hiërarchie tussen scholingsniveaus:
een technicus kan alle andere niveaus vervangen, een manager kan geschoolde en
ongeschoolde arbeiders vervangen, en een geschoolde arbeider kan een ongeschoolde
arbeider vervangen.
Arbeid is ook mobiel tussen sectoren. Daarbij wordt verondersteld dat arbeiders
uitsluitend over zullen stappen naar een andere sector indien zij in de bestaande
sector een inkomen verdienen gelijk aan nul. Dit betekent dat geschoolde arbeiders
niet naar een andere sector zullen overstappen, maar genoegen zullen nemen met
een een lagere positie, als hun werk in een bepaalde lokale markt overbodig wordt.
Ongeschoolde arbeiders kunnen echter geen hoger geschoold werk aannemen, zodat
zij altijd zullen overstappen als hun werk overbodig wordt. Met andere woorden,
technici, managers en geschoolde arbeiders zijn mobiel tussen de sectoren van een
provincie, en ongeschoolde arbeiders zijn mobiel over geheel China.
Het model wordt geanalyseerd op basis van data die betrekking hebben op de
Chinese economie van 1992. De aanwezigheid van competitie in het model draagt
er zorg voor dat grondstoffen efficiënt gealloceerd worden, en dat sectoren een op-
timale omvang aannemen. De empirische studie in deze monografie vergelijkt de
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geobserveerde allocatie in de Chinese economie met de efficiënte uitkomst. De be-
langrijkste uitkomst van deze vergelijking betreft de functionele inkomensverdeling.
Namelijk, als grondstoffen volledig worden benut, worden ze gewaardeerd tegen hun
marginaal product, gelijk aan de efficiënte rente- en loonvoeten. Dientengevolge is ook
de private inkomensverdeling efficiënt, gegeven de eigendomsrechten op grondstoffen.
De inkomensongelijkheid in de werkelijke en de hypothetische Chinese economie
wordt gemeten met behulp van een uitbreiding van de index van Theil. Daarbij
wordt zowel de ongelijkheid in de economie als geheel, als de ongelijkheid tussen
sociale klassen, in en tussen gebieden, en in en tussen regio's gemeten. Het belang
van de resultaten is gelegen in het vergelijken van de mate van inkomensongelijkheid
in mededingingsmarkten. In het bijzonder worden zowel de geobserveerde als de
hypothetische private inkomensverdeling afgeleid.
Het voornaamste resultaat van deze monografie is dat zij zowel de geobserveerde als
de hypothetische private inkomensverdeling naar voren brengt. In de overgangsperi-
ode van de huidige Chinese economie naar een markteconomie zal de private
inkomensverdeling ingrijpend veranderen. In het bijzonder zal de inkomensongeli-
jkheid tussen de sociale klassen groeien. Dit komt door het overvloedige aanbod van
ongeschoolde arbeid gecombineerd met een tekort aan geschoolde werknemers. Indien
arbeid wordt beloond naar haar marginale productiviteit, zal een geschoolde werkne-
mer veel meer verdienen. Als gevolg van het toenemen van mededinging in de markt
gaan technici, managers en grote ondernemers erop vooruit, terwijl de ongeschoolde
arbeiders en eenmans-ondernemingen erop achteruit gaan. Tevens zal de inkomen-
songelijkheid tussen regio's en provincies toenemen, ook al neemt hun aandeel in de
algehele inkomensongelijkheid af. Deze ongelijkheid wordt grotendeels veroorzaakt
door de migratie van ongeschoolde arbeiders. De stedelijke regio's zullen er in alle
provincies op vooruit gaan. De plattelandsregio's daarentegen gaan er sterk op vooruit
in zes provincies, redelijk in negen provincies, en gaan erop achteruit in twaalf provin-
cies. Oost-China gaat er sterk op vooruit: het inkomen in alle provincies in dat deel
van het land stijgt.
Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Dissertation Series
No. Author Title
1 P.J.J. Herings Static and Dynamic Aspects of General Disequilibrium
Theory; ISBN 90 5668 001 3
2' Erwin van der Krabben Urban Dynamics: A Real Estate Perspective - An
institutional analysis of the production of the built
environment; ISBN 90 5170 390 2
3 Arjan Lejour Integrating or Desintegrating Welfare States? - a qualitative
study to the consequences of economic integration on social







Statistical Methods in Financial Econometrics;
ISBN 90 5668 002 1
Policy Coordination and Convergence in the EU;
ISBN 90 5668 004 8
7 Herbert Hamers




12 W.B. van den Hout
13 Paul W.J. de Bijl
Coordination in Hierarchical Control; ISBN 90 5668 006 4
Sequencing and Delivery Situations: a Game Theoretic
Approach; ISBN 90 5668 005 6
Strategic Decision Making in Politics; ISBN 90 5668 007 2
Simplicial Fixed Point Algorithms and Applications;
ISBN 90 5668 008 0
Neural Networks in Economic Modelling - An Empirical
Study; ISBN 90 5668 O10 2
Acquisition of Technological Capability in Small Firms in
Developing Countries; ISBN 90 5668 009 9
The Power-Series Algorithm - A Numerical Approach to
Markov Processes; ISBN 90 5668 Ol l 0
Essays in Industrial Organization and Management Strategy;
ISBN 90 5668 012 9
' Copies can be ordered from ThelaThesis,Prinseneiland 305, 1013 LP Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
phone f 31 20 6255429; faz: f31 20 6203395; e-mail: officeC~thelathesis.nl
No. Author Title
14 Martijn van de Ven Intergenerational Redistribution in Representative
Democracies; ISBN 90 5668 013 7
15 Eline van der Heijden Altruism, Fairness and Public Pensions: An Investigation of





20 Edwin van Dam
21 Henk Oosterhout
22 Jan Lemmen
23 Chris van Raalte
24 Bas van Aarle
Competition in Spatial Location Models;
ISBN 90 5668 O15 3
Essays in Competition with Product Differentiation and
Bargaining in Markets; ISBN 90 5668 016 1
Three-Gap Analysis of Structural Adjustment in Pakistan;
ISBN 90 5668 017 x
A Treatise on Labour: A Matching-Model Analysis of
Labour-Market Programmes; ISBN 90 5668 018 8
Graphs with Few Eigenvalues - An interplay between
combinatorics and algebra; ISBN 90 5668 019 6
Takeover Baniers: the good, the bad, and the ugly; ISBN 90
5668 020 x
Financial Integration in the European Union: Measurement
and Determination; ISBN 90 5668 021 8
Market Formation and Market Selection;
ISBN 90 5668 022 6
Essays on Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction:
Applications to EMU and Eastern Europe; ISBN 90 5668
023 4
25 Francis Y. Kumah Common Stochastic Trends and Policy Shocks in the Open
Economy:Empirical Essays in International Finance and
Monetary Policy; ISBN 90 5668 024 2
26 Erik Canton Economic Growth and Business Cycles; ISBN 90 5668 025 0






32 Anurag N. Banerjee







40 Henk van Houtum
41 Jorg Jansen
42 F.B.S.L.P.Janssen
43 Henri L.F. de Groot
Title
Numerical Analysis of Eigenvalue Algorithms Based on
Subspace Iterations; ISBN 90 5668 026 9
Essays in Behavioral Economics; ISBN 90 5668 028 5
Limited Dependent Variable Models for Panel Data; ISBN
90 5668 029 3
Empirical Studies on Individual Labour Market Behaviour;
ISBN 90 5668 030 7
The Sensitivity of Estimates, Inferences, and Forecasts of
Linear Models; ISBN 90 5668 031 5
Essays on Testing for Spanning and on Modeling Futures
Risk Premia; ISBN 90 5668 032 3
Froduct Differentiation, Collusion and Standardization;
ISBN 90 5668 033 1
On Income Expectations and Other Subjective Data: A
Micro-Econometric Analysis; ISBN 90 5668 034 X
Cooperative Decision Making in a Stochastic Environment;
ISBN 90 5668 035 8
Environmental Policy Instruments and International Rivalry:
A Dynamic Analysis; ISBN 90 5668 036 6
The Use of Management Accounting Systems in Functionally
Differentiated Organizations; ISBN 90 5668 037 4
Households' Portfolio Choices; ISBN 90 5668 038 2
The Development of Cross-Border Economic Relations;
ISBN 90 5668 039 0
Service and Inventory Models subject to a Delay-Limit;
ISBN 90 5668 040 4
Inventory Management Systems: control and information
issues; ISBN 90 5668 041 2
Economic Growth, Sectoral Structure and Unemployment;
ISBN 90 5668 042 0
No. Author Title
44 Jenke R. ter Horst Longitudinal Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance; ISBN
90 5668 043 9
45 Marco Hceberichts The Design of Monetary Institutions; ISBN 90 5668 044 7
46 Adriaan Kalwij Household Consumption, Female Employment and Fertility
Decisions: A micrceconometric analysis; ISBN 90 5668 045
5
47 Ursula Glunk Realizing High Performance on Multiple Stakeholder
Domains: A Resource-based Analysis of Professional
Service Firms in the Netherlands and Germany; ISBN 90
5668 46 3
48 Freek Vermeulen Shifting Ground: Studies on the Intersection of
Organizational Expansion, Internationalization, and
Learning; ISBN 90 5668 47 1
49 Haoran Pan Competitive Pressures on Income Distribution in China;
ISBN 90 5668 48 X
vrt~uag l ~ ~unt t~Jy
om 14:15 uur




in de aula van de
Katholieke Universiteit Bra
Warandelaan 2 te Tilbur
Graag nodig ik u uit to~








Bibliotheek K. U. Brabantau u i ~ ~~
1 7 000 O 1 6063 ~ O O
Haoran Pan received his Bachelor and Master degrees in
economics at Liaoning University and Renmin University in China,
respectively. He joined the Ph.D. program at the Department of
Econometrics and CentER for Economic Research of Tilburg
University in 1993. His research interest hast~ers in empírical
economics, especially for developing economies.
This thesis applies a computable general equilibrium model to
China to explore what perfect competition would do to income
distribution in China. The research analyzes this question by
determining personal income distribution under hypothetical,
perfectly competitive conditions, where factors are rewarded
according to their marginal productivities. Comparison with the
observed personal income distribution reveals dramatic changes.
In particular, the income inequality between social classes will
grow. The income inequalities between areas and provinces will
also increase, even though their shares in the overall income
inequality will decrease. Competition would dissolve the existing
negative re~ationship between the levels of economic
development and of income inequality across provinces.
ISBN 90 5668 048 X
